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Abstract 
i 
 
Abstract 
Given the lessons learned from the financial crisis and housing crash in Japan and the 
US, as well as the strong connection between the shadow banking sector and property 
market in the second-largest economy, China, it is essential to understand the 
mechanism of a model that contains both shadow banking activities and the housing 
market. Therefore, the first objective of this thesis is to model the Chinese banking 
and housing sector and understand the underlying mechanism. The second objective 
is related to a methodological issue. In recent years, many researchers, especially in 
mainland China, have been exploring the Chinese shadow banking system. Most 
researchers either only calibrate or use Bayesian estimation to estimate their model. 
However, none of the approaches test the model against real data. Different models 
can tell different stories and potentially provide different policy implications. However, 
if the model is rejected by the actual data, all the results and policy suggestions might 
become insignificant. Therefore, in my research, I adopt two different estimation 
approaches, Bayesian estimation and Indirect Inference approach, to first provide 
some understanding about Chinese shadow banking system, and second, to discover 
whether my model can or cannot be rejected by the actual data.   
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
1.1 Background and Motivation  
Since April 2019, China has been the second-largest economy in the world, ranking 
number one exporter of goods to the United States (17.4% of the total U.S imports) 
and followed by Canada and Mexico. China was also the third-largest importer of US 
goods1 (6.2% of the total U.S. exports). The voluminous level of trade between China 
and the United States suggests a strong connection between these two economies. The 
latest financial crisis that originated in the United States in 2008 had spread swiftly 
and strongly to the Chinese economy, substantially decreasing Chinese real GDP 
growth rate from 14.2% in 2007 to 9.7% in 2008 and 9.4% in 20092. The Chinese 
government had to stimulate the economy immediately by injecting a four trillion 
RMB package to offset the potentially detrimental effects.  
One of the main causes of the US financial crisis was the massive use of securitisation, 
mainly by bundling subprime mortgage loans to new financial products. The enormous 
default risk in these financial products was largely neglected by the credit rating 
agencies and the public since the market believed housing was the most solid 
investment in the economy. Borrowers could borrow money continuously from the 
bank if the housing price kept increasing. This contributed to a housing bubble that 
 
1  Top Trade Partners – April 2019, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/foreign-
trade/statistics/highlights/toppartners.html 
2 China NBS / Bulletin on Reforming China 's GDP Accounting and Data Release System: stats.gov.cn (12-Jan-17) 
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rapidly accumulated within a few years and eventually burst when borrowers began to 
default. Securitisation was the main characteristic of the US shadow banking system, 
which clearly states that shadow banking was one of the key culprits of the latest credit 
crunch (Fagan, 2011).  
In recent years, there have been increasing concerns whether the financial crisis might 
repeat in China. Chinese shadow banking sector has been dramatically growing. 
According to the Financial Stability Board3, the year-on-year growth rate has been 
more than 30% since 2014, compared with 10% growth in the rest of the world. 
Moody’s estimation4 shows that the total share of shadow banking assets to GDP 
peaked 87% at the end of 2016 and gradually lowered to around 73% in 2018. Shadow 
banking normally relies on short-term liabilities to support long-term loans, and it has 
been the main source of financing for private-owned enterprises (POEs), especially 
small-and-medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in China. Due to the lack of regulation 
and monitoring, risks can be accumulated in the sector very quickly. However, regular 
traditional banking can be intertwined with shadow banking, which can raise the 
degree of systemic risk that shadow banking poses. Moreover, codependency between 
China and other countries suggests that crisis in China would impose significant 
negative impact internationally, especially in countries like the United States that has 
large trading volume with China.  
 
3 Shadow banking in China: a looming shadow, February 2017, http://www.caixabankresearch.com/en/shadow-banking-china-
looming-shadow 
4
 Moody’s: Shadow banking activity in China continues to contract, but de-risking of financial sector likely to moderate, Aug 
2018, https://www.moodys.com/research/Moodys-Shadow-banking-activity-in-China-continues-to-contract-but--PR_387952 
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Both the U.S. and the Japanese financial crises originated from the crash of the housing 
market. As measured by the Case-Shiller U.S. home price index, the national housing 
price in the U.S. grew by more than 100% between 1995 and 20065 ; residential 
property prices6 increased by approximately 95% between 1980 and 1990 in Japan; 
while in China, the house price index appreciated by more than 230% from 2008 to 
20187. This raised another substantial concern related to the gigantic Chinese housing 
market, which is similar to the property bubbles that developed in Japan before 1991 
and in the U.S. before 2006. Housing prices have experienced tremendous growth in 
the recent decade. Chen and Wen (2017) document the data for thirty-five major cities 
in China and show that the average annual growth rate of real housing prices has 
maintained 17% for the past 10 years, while the average income growth rate and gross 
domestic product (GDP) growth rate are only 11% and 10% respectively.  
Since 2010, funds from the shadow banking sector were frequently tied into the real 
estate sector. The reason was that authorities in China restrict bank lending to the 
public after the stimulation package in order to prevent a potentially overheated 
economy. This mainly affects the property developers (Hsu et al., 2015). The majority 
of the real estate sector is comprised of small-and-medium-sized developers; therefore, 
after the tightened regulation, they found difficulty in obtaining finance and turned to 
the shadow banking sector for loans. Consequently, this triggered a simultaneous 
 
5 See FRED Economic Data https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/CSUSHPINSA 
6 See FRED Economic Data https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/QJPN628BIS 
7 See CEIC https://insights.ceicdata.com/Untitled-insight/views 
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boom in the Chinese shadow banking sector and housing market.  
Given the lessons learned from the financial crisis and housing crash in Japan and the 
US, as well as the strong connection between the shadow banking sector and property 
market in the second-largest economy, China, it is essential to understand the 
mechanism of a model that contains both shadow banking activities and the housing 
market. Therefore, the first objective of this thesis is to model the Chinese banking 
and housing sector and understand the underlying mechanism. The second objective 
is related to a methodological issue. In recent years, many researchers, especially in 
mainland China, have been exploring the Chinese shadow banking system. Most 
researchers either only calibrate or use Bayesian estimation to estimate their model. 
However, none of the approaches test the model against real data. Different models 
can tell different stories and potentially provide different policy implications. However, 
if the model is rejected by the actual data, all the results and policy suggestions might 
become insignificant. Therefore, in my research, I adopt two different estimation 
approaches, Bayesian estimation and Indirect Inference approach, to first provide 
some understanding about Chinese shadow banking system, and second, to discover 
whether my model can or cannot be rejected by the actual data.   
1.2 Research Logic and Findings 
1.2.1 Research Logic 
It is impossible to construct a sophisticated model that can fulfil my research 
objectives in one step; therefore, my research logic is to start with a simple model and 
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gradually add ingredients into the framework. Eventually, I developed three models 
sequentially in this thesis. Each of the models can be viewed as a more general case 
then the previous one and closer to reality. The first model studies an important 
segment of the Chinese shadow banking sector by focusing on one of the two largest 
shadow banking instruments, entrusted loans. Private-owned enterprises (POEs), 
especially small-and-medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) largely rely on entrusted loans 
to obtain external finance, since they can rarely obtain access to bank credit.  
Ehler et al. (2018) claim that the Chinese shadow banking sector is the ‘shadow of the 
banks’. This indicates a strong interconnected relationship between shadow banking 
activities and conventional banking sector. Hence, my second model is built upon the 
first one by adding another important shadow banking instrument, wealth management 
products (WMPs), and shadow banking activities in the conventional banking sector. 
Building both WMPs and entrusted loans in one model captures more than 70% of 
total shadow banking assets in China and constructing commercial banks’ shadow 
banking activities allows my model to perfectly reflect the key feature of the Chinese 
shadow banking system. Lastly, the third model aims to incorporate housing market 
into the model, developed from the previous two models.  
1.2.2 Research Findings 
The first part of research findings focuses on the mechanism and implications of my 
models, and the second part answers the methodological issue. My models indicate 
that, first, tighter banking regulation pushes the economy away from traditional bank 
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loans towards shadow banking channels; second, contractionary monetary policy 
exerts a more negative impact on SMEs’ output than that of SOEs, and the existence 
of shadow banking sector dampens the contractionary monetary policy; thirdly, 
positive fiscal policy, i.e. four trillion RMB government spending, only temporarily 
increases GDP in China. However, it crowds out private investment in the SMEs sector, 
which plays a detrimental effect on SMEs’ retained earnings or net worth accumulation 
and slows down economic growth in the following periods.  
In terms of the methodological issue, I ran indirect inference estimations on both the 
second and third models. To avoid duplication, it is sufficient to start running the test 
from the second model rather than the first model since the second is a more 
sophisticated framework, purely focusing on the shadow banking sector. In addition, 
the second model framework is closer to reality and more general, compared to the 
first one. The third model needs to be tested since it not only has the shadow banking 
sector but also incorporates the housing sector. The estimations show that the results 
are relatively robust in both models, and most of the estimated parameters are similar 
in both models. The Indirect Inference tests show that, although adding a housing 
sector in the model can dramatically improve the model performance against the real 
data, it still cannot pass the test. The reason for obtaining these results may be because 
the model still lacks some important components that are key to explaining the 
information in the data, or it may be on account of the nature of these models itself. 
All my models are Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium models, which are too 
complicated to pass the test. The experience is that the more complicated the model is, 
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the more difficult to pass the test. Both Professors Lucas and Prescott used to claim 
that likelihood ratio tests reject too many good models. The Indirect Inference is an 
even more powerful test than Likelihood Ratio (Le et al., 2015). It is not too surprising 
that none of my models can pass the test. However, if the model fails to explain the 
data, there is no doubt that all policy implications suggested by the model need to be 
cautiously applied. 
1.3 Thesis Structure 
Before addressing my model frameworks, I focus in Chapter 2 on a detailed review 
into the background of shadow banking sectors in both the U.S. and Chinese markets, 
including definition, structure and development of the shadow banking systems. In 
addition, I discuss the 2007-2009 financial crisis and the risks related to the shadow 
banking system in China, in which I review the crisis in the peer-to-peer platform (one 
of the shadow banking instruments). The three model frameworks are introduced in 
the subsequent three chapters. Specifically, the first model, in Chapter 3, investigates 
the entrusted lending market in a ‘financial accelerator’ type DSGE model. The second 
model, in Chapter 4, includes both WMPs and commercial banks’ shadow banking 
activities. The housing market is incorporated into the framework in Chapter 5 with 
the inclusion of the shadow banking system introduced in the previous two chapters. 
Chapter 6 concludes.
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Chapter 2 Shadow Banking System and Related Literature  
In this chapter, I first review the definition and development of both US and Chinese 
shadow banking system (Sections 2.1 to 2.3). The reason for considering these two 
countries is that shadow banking system is the largest in the US compared to other 
countries, while the system is the fastest growing in China in the recent decade. 
Development of the shadow banking sectors shares some common factors in both 
countries, but at the same time, there are considerable differences since both countries 
remain different economic structure. Hence, to understand the similarities and 
differences, it requires me to carefully demonstrate and review the evolution of the 
system in detail (Section 2.1 to Section 2.3). In Section 2.4, I discuss the reason for 
adopting the DSGE framework to conduct the underlying research. Prior research has 
been applying different methodologies to study the shadow banking system, so it is 
essential to explain why I use this type of model framework. Section 2.5 provides 
literature about modelling the shadow banking system. Furthermore, the theoretical 
frameworks in this research are estimated by using different estimation techniques, 
including Bayesian estimation and indirect inference technique. One of the advantages 
of using the Bayesian approach is to use prior knowledge. An increasing amount of 
research has studied the shadow banking sector, both in China and the US, in recent 
years. Therefore, it is relatively convenient to estimate our model by incorporating 
knowledge from previous research. However, Bayesian approach does not test the 
model framework with the actual data; instead, it normally concludes which model is 
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more likely to be better than another, but the better model does not mean that it can 
mimic the real data. Hence, the purpose of using indirect inference estimation is to 
occupy this gap, since Indirect Inference provides a classical statistical inferential 
framework for judging whether the model is rejected or not rejected by the actual data. 
Thus, in Section 2.6, I review the estimation procedure of both Bayesian and indirect 
inference estimation. Section 2.7 concludes.       
2.1 What is ‘Shadow Banking’ 
From the lesson of the global financial crisis in 2007, it is well accepted that the 
‘shadow banking system’ can become a source of systemic risk, both directly and 
indirectly. It can directly affect the economy in supplying credit or liquidity and 
indirectly influence the system because of its interconnectedness with the regular 
banking sector.  
To understand the function of the shadow banking system, it is necessary to know what 
the shadow bank is and the difference from the traditional banking system. In the 
conventional system, banks engage in size, maturity and credit risk transformation 
through the process of funding loans with deposits (Matthews and Thompson, 2005). 
Lenders or depositors of the banks often have smaller quantities of funds compared to 
the requirements of borrowers. Therefore, size transformation implies that banks 
gather small size deposits from a mass of depositors and lend to borrowers who need 
large size loans. Maturity transformation refers to the use of short-term deposits to 
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finance long-term loans. Credit risk can be transferred by banks since lenders prefer 
safe assets, while borrowers may use borrowed funds to invest in the risky project. 
Deposits are insured fully or partially (if the size is bigger than the cap in one bank 
account); hence, it is treated as a low-risk asset for lenders. While loans usually contain 
higher risk, banks can charge a higher interest rate and monitor the behaviour of the 
borrowers to control the risks (although it is difficult in practice). Furthermore, the 
central bank acts as the so-called ‘lender of last resort’, meaning that it offers loans to 
banks when they experience financial difficulty or near bankruptcy.  
The term ‘shadow banking’ was first invented by the executive director Paul McCulley 
of Pacific Investment Management Company (PIMCO) in 2007 at Federal Reserve 
System annual meeting. According to the financial stability board (FSB) in April 2011, 
the ‘shadow banking system’ can be broadly defined as ‘credit intermediation 
involving entities and activities (fully or partially) outside the regular banking system’. 
It is a useful benchmark at the global level. However, one should understand the 
limitations of this definition. Pozsar and Singh (2011) and Cetorelli and Peristiani 
(2012) argue that some entities, such as leasing and finance companies, corporate tax 
vehicles, leasing and finance companies, etc., may be covered by this definition since 
they do intermediate credit, yet are commonly thought of as non-shadow banking 
entities. Second, shadow banking activities are defined primarily outside the regular 
banking system, but in practice, shadow banking does operate within banks; for 
example, securitisation, repo, collateral operations of dealer banks, etc. (the definition 
of different financial products will be discussed in the following sectors).  
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One main difference of the shadow banking is that it is removed from the official 
public-sector enhancements; in other words, it has no access to a solid backstop that 
the traditional banking system always has, which is the central bank. Risks can be 
diversified in the conventional banking system by using the law of large numbers (a 
mass of depositors), monitoring, as we mentioned above, while shadow banking 
distributes undesirable risks across the financial system (Claessens and Ratnovski, 
2014). For example, securitisation can strip credit and liquidity risks from assets 
through tranching and supplying liquidity puts (Pozsar et al., 2010; Pozsar, 2013; 
Gennaioli et al., 2012) or the use of collateral can also decrease counterparty credit 
exposures in the repo market (Gorton, 2012; Acharya and Öncü, 2013). However, even 
if these undesirable risks can be distributed, the systemic ones remain in the system, 
such as the systemic liquidity risk in securitisation, bankruptcy risks of the large 
borrowers themselves, etc.  
Despite the limitations of the definition, shadow banking in different countries also 
has different structures. It can be mainly divided into two different types, indirect 
shadow banking activities and direct/straightforward activities. China’s shadow 
banking system relies more on direct lending, while countries like the USA and some 
European countries frequently use indirect shadow banking instruments, such as 
securitisation. Therefore, in the following sectors, we will carefully review the shadow 
banking systems in two important economies, the US and China.  
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2.2 Shadow Banking in the US and the 2007-2009 financial crisis  
2.2.1 Why Do Shadow Banks Exist in the US? 
The name ‘shadow bank’ was invented in 2007, but its formation can be traced back 
to earlier decades. The existence of shadow banks can be broadly explained by three 
reasons that are empirically intertwined with each other, which are financial 
innovation in terms of aggregate money supply (Gorton and Metrick, 2012), 
regulatory arbitrage and technology changes (Gorton et al., 2010; Acharya et al., 2011; 
Acharya et al., 2014; Buchak et al., 2018), and agency problems in financial markets 
(Mathis et al., 2009; Xia and Strobl, 2012).  
2.2.1.1 Financial Innovation Regarding Aggregate Money Supply 
Before we discuss the shadow banking sector, it is helpful for us to clarify financial 
innovation in the traditional banks, since it should be more familiar to one with limited 
knowledge about shadow banking. The earliest forms of money are commodity money 
that comprised of gold or silver. However, it was replaced by fiat money which is 
intrinsically useless (Wallace, 1980). Fiat money plays a crucial role in our daily life, 
and it is the most well-known financial innovation in terms of the money supply. In 
the early 1800s, money was backed by the promise of convertibility into gold or silver 
coin, and this gold standard was broken when the Bretton Woods system collapsed in 
the 1970s. The value of money is based on confidence; the loss of confidence would 
then cause severe financial panics in the economy. The idea of confidence might sound 
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strange nowadays since fiat money is one of the most common things that everyone 
has. But thinking back to the time that was just invented, people were willing to hold 
this paper note only if the issuer promised that it could be converted into a commodity. 
It works similarly today, if the value of the money is stable, one is confident to use the 
same amount of money to buy the same goods that they used to buy. However, if the 
faith were lost, people would feel panic about whether they could still use the money 
to buy the same commodities. 
During the period from 1837 to 1862, the so-called ‘Free Banking Era’, only state-
chartered banks existed, and there was no federal regulation in the banking system. If 
the initial capital is adequate, any banker can enter the banking sector, but state or 
federal government bonds with a face value equal to the value of notes are required to 
deposit. Reserve requirement, interest rates were regulated heavily by the states. 
Unfortunately, even if the states had tried diverse ways to stabilise the notes, half of 
the free banks resulted in failure. It was difficult to maintain confidence during that 
period because of a reduction in state debt (Jaremski, 2010; Rogoff, 1985). The 
solvency of a bank was seriously doubted, and depositors would insist on banks to 
fulfil their obligation to convert deposits into specie. However, banks had a limited 
specie in reserve, they were unable to solve the problem, and bank run happened. To 
stabilise market confidence, in 1863 and 1864, the National Banking Act was 
announced. Explicitly, it stated that banknote is replaced by a national currency backed 
by the U.S. Treasury bonds and state-banks gradually converted to national banks 
(White, 1982). Nevertheless, the issue of confidence remained because the treasuries 
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fluctuated in value until the central bank acted as a lender of last resort following the 
Great Depression in 1933.  
In the cases above, bank deposits (both state-issued and national currency) are all 
financial innovation in the composition of the money supply. It is secured by the 
general assets of the bank, and it should be converted into specie once their depositors 
request. If banks could not meet the obligation, the central bank acts as the lender of 
last resort. Regarding the shadow banking system, over the past few decades, we have 
seen many financial innovations in the market. Investors can invest in diverse financial 
products rather than only deposit their money in a bank account or treasury bills. For 
example, a) money market mutual funds (MMMFs), b) asset-backed commercial 
papers (ABCP), c) asset-backed securities (ABS), d) repo (repurchase agreement). The 
compositions of the aggregate money supply became much more complicated. These 
innovations had boomed up the economy before the financial crisis, but it also made 
the financial system far more difficult to understand and vulnerable.  
a) Money market mutual funds (MMMFs) 
This was first created in 1971 in response to Regulation Q, which is interest rate ceiling 
on deposits and limit deposit insurance. MMMFs have been treated as safe as bank 
deposits, but with a more attractive interest rate (Cook and Duffield, 1979). It is open-
ended mutual funds that gather money from investors and invest into short-term 
securities, such as treasury bills, commercial papers and repurchase agreements (repo), 
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in which the overnight repo is one of the primary investments of MMMFs. This 
investment is secured by collateral, mainly U.S. Treasury obligation, and equivalent 
to banknotes. The innovation of MMMFs is that it transforms uninsured deposits from 
investors into an instrument that resembles an insured deposit. 
In 2008, the size of MMMFs in the U.S. peaked at around $3.5 trillion. However, 
following the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers, the run on MMMFs was triggered as 
the net asset value dropped below the stable level, which is $1.00 per share (Wermers, 
2011). There are two types of investors who invest in MMMFs, institutional investors 
and retail investors. Wermers (2011) shows that, during the crisis, institutional 
investors were more likely to run than retail investors, and they can be viewed as a 
transmission channel for a contagious run. Regarding the risk taken by MMMFs, 
Kacperczyk and Schnabl (2013) explore the question as to how risk-taking behaviour 
differs between stand-alone MMMFs and mutual funds organised by conglomerates. 
They conclude that, in the run-up to the crisis, MMMFs in conglomerates took more 
risk, while a stand-alone MMMFs took more risk during the crisis.   
b) Asset-backed commercial paper (ABCP) 
ABCP is a form of short-term borrowing with maturity between 1 and 270 days. It is 
an alternative option for customers, offered by financial institutions, by pooling the 
customer's assets to back the paper (Covitz et al., 2013). Variety assets can be included 
in asset pools, for example, trade receivables, consumer receivables, auto loans and 
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leases, student loans, corporate loans, etc. ABCP can be categorised as either single-
seller or multi-seller programs. If the source of all assets come from one entity, such 
as a single banking institution or finance company, it is a single-seller program. If 
assets are supported by different entities, it is a multi-seller program.  
The ABCP program is issued by a bankruptcy-remote special purpose vehicle (SPV), 
such as ABCP conduits or special investment vehicles (SIVs). It is normally sponsored 
by a highly rated bank or other financial institution. The SPV purchases assets (i.e. 
receivables, etc.) into the ABCP program, which is funded by selling commercial 
paper to investors. The assets must normally be diversified to meet the rating standard 
of credit rating agencies. At the maturity date, investors can be repaid by the issuance 
of additional commercial paper or the cash flow received from receivables.  
ABCP issuers (SPVs) commonly receive unconditional enhancements from 
commercial banks. It is exempted from the potential bankruptcy because of the backup 
lines of credit and liquidity. Similarly to traditional banking regarding maturity 
transformation, shadow banking, by using the example of SIVs, also conducts maturity 
transformation. On the liability side of SIVs balance sheet, it is short-term borrowing, 
while on the asset side of SIVs are securitised assets, such as asset-backed securities 
(ABS), including mortgage-backed securities (MBS), collateralised debt obligations 
(CDOs), collateralised loan obligations (CLOs), and collateralised mortgage 
obligations (CMOs), which are usually medium-term notes or long-term notes. SIVs 
were first created in 1988. It was used to move the financing part of Citigroup from 
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on-the-balance to off-the-balance. SIVs can be closely associated with a particular 
financial institution or operate independently. After the financial crisis in 2009, SIVs 
have stopped operating.  
As mentioned above, ABCP is sponsored by high rated banks or finance companies. 
But what if the sponsor went bust? American Home declared bankruptcy, which is the 
sponsor of a single-seller mortgage conduit. Since then, the ABCP market has 
experienced a run. Covitz et al. (2013) document an investor run on over 100 ABCP 
programs based on the data from the Depository Trust Clearing Corporation (DTCC), 
which is one-third of the entire market. Most runs of the ABCP programs were 
associated heavily with a subprime mortgage, weaker liquidity support and lower 
credit ratings. Following the crisis, the sharp decline amount of ABCP outstanding 
resulted from the general deleveraging process. Economy activities decreased to a 
lower level that led to a reduction in receivables, which used to be assets of ABCP 
conduits. The total size of outstanding is less than $250 billion in the ABCP market.  
c) Asset-backed security (ABS) 
An ABS is collateralised by a pool of financial assets, including receivables, loans or 
mortgages (Gorton and Metrick, 2009). For example, if a student loan (originating 
from a commercial bank) is securitised by a trust company, the payment of the loan 
from the student will flow to the investor who purchased this ABS through the trust. 
Securitisation is the heart of shadow banking, and it is the most important financial 
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innovation in the past decades. The credit originator can sell the pool of these assets 
to another entity, as well as transferring the risk.  
The ABS is again issued by a bankruptcy-remote SPV that typically conducts credit 
risk and liquidity transformation. Risks can be transformed through diversification, 
and illiquid assets can become liquid by pooling such illiquid assets. However, during 
economic downturns, the liquidity of the ABS becomes more illiquid. As mentioned 
previously, one particular form of ABS is CDO. CDO is the pool of assets such as 
mortgages, bonds and loans. When the collateral is agency mortgage-backed securities, 
it is called collateralised mortgage obligation (CMO); while the collateral is 
syndicated loans, it is called collateralised loan obligation (CLO). CMO was first 
issued by Salomon Brothers, and First Boston in 1983 and CDO was issued by Drexel 
Burnham Lambert in 1987. The scale increased to the issuance of $893 billion in 2006 
and peaked in 2007 but collapsed during the credit crunch between 2007 and 2009 
(Agarwal et al., 2011).  
d) Repurchase agreement (Repo) 
Another important shadow banking instrument is the repurchase agreement which 
implies the sale of security combined with a deal to buy back the security or portfolio 
by the seller on a specified future date at a prearranged price (Fleming and Garbade, 
2003). Most of the repo contracts are short-term between one-and-ninety-days 
maturity. Repos are over-collateralised loans, in which posting more collateral than is 
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needed to achieve more favourable credit rating. The difference between the sale price 
of the repo and the value of the underlying collateral is named as ‘repo haircut’. A 
typical repo transaction starts from a cash provider (such as MMMFs, asset manager 
etc.) who wants to obtain specific securities as collateral to hedge or speculate the 
fluctuated value of the securities. They purchase the securities and transfer their cash 
to a collateral provider with an agreement that the collateral provider will repurchase 
the securities later. The earliest form of the repo is the bilateral repo market (Copeland 
et al., 2012), specifically, delivery versus payment or DVP repo. Initially, all reports 
are bilateral; the collateral provider receives cash and delivers the securities to cash 
provider simultaneously.  
Another form of the repo is the so-called tri-party repo, which specifically relates to a 
clearing bank, a bank which is a member of the clearinghouse, acts as an intermediary 
between two entities (Copeland et al., 2014). It is the clearing bank’s responsibility to 
administrate the transactions, and the transactions also appear on their balance sheets. 
More specifically, the clearing bank maintains both cash from cash providers and 
securities from security dealers, then the bank sets up the tri-party contract and passes 
the securities to cash provider as well as transferring money to the dealers’ account. 
When the contract matures, the clearing bank conducts the transaction oppositely. In 
the U.S., the tri-party repo is the primary source of funding for security broker-dealer, 
and the lender is normally the MMMFs and other cash-rich investors. Generally, the 
tri-party repo is included in the general collateral (GC) market, which implies the 
investors may care more about the underlying collateral than the securities itself. The 
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volume reached above $2.8 trillion in 2008 and around $1.8 trillion in 2017.  
To briefly summarise this sub-section, all the financial innovations, as discussed above, 
in the shadow banking sector are legally operated with very complex structures, which 
made the U.S. economy challenging to understand and vulnerable to the financial 
crisis.  
2.2.1.2 Regulatory arbitrage and technology changes 
One of the leading hypotheses of explaining the existence of the shadow banking 
sector is regulatory arbitrage. The traditional banking sector has been heavily 
regulated, most importantly, the regulatory capital requirements that restrict their 
leverage (first introduced in the Basel I officially and modified in Basel II and Basel 
III). The rise of any new form of financial contracts is often driven by regulatory 
arbitrage; this has been a long-standing idea agreed by researchers traced back decades 
ago (Silber, 1983; Miller, 1986; Kane, 1988). The description provided by Pozsar et 
al. (2010) shows that shadow banking has a similar order of magnitude on its total 
liabilities compared to conventional banking. By using near-monies, i.e. MMMFs, etc., 
shadow banks can refinance bank assets with higher leverage. Consequently, the 
effective leverage on loans in the U.S. economy has been dramatically increased along 
with the existence and development of the shadow banking system.  
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In the face of the costs of the crisis in 2008, the suggestion of heightened capital 
requirements has emerged. However, regulatory reforms in the shadow banking 
system remain silent (Adrian and Ashcraft, 2012), which encourages even more 
regulatory arbitrage opportunities in shadow banking with lighter regulation. Buchak 
et al. (2018) examine whether the regulatory burden is a driving force on the reduction 
of traditional mortgage banking. They show that 50% of loans in the conforming 
market and 75% of loans insured by the Federal Housing Administration (FHA) 
originated by shadow banks, in which the FHA loans allow lower-income and less 
creditworthy households to borrow money (riskier borrowers). They further argue that, 
in the U.S., since Fintech (financial technology) companies account for approximately 
a quarter of shadow bank loan in 2015, it implies online origination technology also 
plays an important role in circumventing heavily traditional banking regulation. 
The U.S. shadow banks rely heavily on government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs) and 
FHA guarantees. Levitin and Wachter (2011) study the role of implicit guarantees for 
the supply of mortgages by using a quantitative assessment. Buchak et al. (2018) also 
suggest that the increased regulatory burden of traditional banks accompanied by 
GSEs and FHA guarantees, to some extent, may contribute to the rise of the shadow 
banking sector. Moreover, the rapid expansion of ABCP market resulting from the 
changes in regulatory capital rules since 2004 in the U.S. (Acharya et al., 2011). The 
financial accounting standards board (FASB) suggests that the bank should 
consolidate the assets of ABCP conduit on the balance sheet in January 2003. 
Nevertheless, U.S. banking regulators refused to include the assets from conduits in 
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the measurement of risk-based capital. 
2.2.1.3 Agency problems in financial markets 
Another area explains the existence of shadow banking related to agency problem and 
informational friction. Ashcraft and Schuermann (2008) explore several important 
informational frictions, including asymmetric information between the lender and 
originator, between the lender and investors, between the servicer and investors, etc. 
Investors rely more on the credit ratings of security when they are planning to invest. 
However, over-reliance on credit ratings can create issues. Mathis et al. (2009) 
endogenous the reputation in a dynamic model of ratings and find that credit ratings 
are less accurate during a boom time, meaning that credit ratings may send incorrect 
information about security when we experience economic growth. The reason is that 
rating agencies also need to compete for the contract. To secure more contracts in good 
time, they might be less restrictive on analysing the risks of security. Otherwise, the 
issuer may turn to another agency. 
Similarly, Strobl and Xia (2012) compare the ratings issued by an issuer-paid rating 
agency and investor-paid rating agency. They conclude that it is particularly severe 
when the agency is issuer-paid. Specifically, firms with more short-term debt, lower 
past bond issues rated and a newly appointed CEO (chief executive officer) or CFO 
(chief financial officer) are more preferred by issuer-paid rating agencies. Cohen and 
Manuszak (2013) document the fact that variables should not affect a CRA’s 
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(community reinvestment act) view of the credit risk of the conduit; however, 
variables could affect the incentives of issuers and CRAs in the presence of rating 
shopping.  
2.2.2 The Mechanism of Shadow Banking in the US 
Securitisation and wholesale funding are the centres of the shadow banking system in 
the U.S. As we mentioned in the previous section, loans, mortgages and leases can be 
securitised and converted into tradable shadow banking instruments, while wholesale 
funding is an alternative method that banks use to finance operation besides bank 
deposits. The source of wholesale financing includes federal funds, foreign deposits 
and brokered deposits (Adrian and Ashcraft, 2016). When banks face difficulty in 
attracting regular depositors (because of the low-interest payment on deposits), apart 
from the securitisation, they may turn to this alternative way (wholesale funding) to 
raise money. Shadow banking system is complex. To understand the mechanism of 
shadow banking, it is essential to know how securitisation works and the wholesale 
funding market, in addition to the subsegment of shadow banking, including internal, 
external and independent, and government-sponsored shadow banking.   
2.2.2.1 Securitisation   
It is common knowledge that commercial banks collect deposits from depositors and 
lend out money to borrowers. Deposits are the liability of the bank and loans are the 
asset on the bank balance sheet. The spread between the deposit rate and the loan rate 
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is the net interest of the bank (Matthews and Thompson, 2005). In the 1920s, 
commercial banks were permitted to invest in the stock market by using money from 
depositors apart from making bank loans. However, in 1929, the Wall Street crashed 
alongside share prices plummeting, which rendered banks unable to fulfil their 
obligation to their depositors. Banks run resulted, and the U.S. economy entered the 
Great Depression. To remove commercial banks from investment banking businesses, 
the Glass-Steagall Act was introduced in the early 1930s. It implies that commercial 
banks can only take depositors money to make loans but not purchase securities. 
In contrast, investment banks cannot take money from depositors. Instead, they can 
assist their customers in accessing debt and equity capital market. After the 
implementation of the act, the U.S. entered a relatively stable economy (Kroszner and 
Rajan, 1994). Nevertheless, the profit of the banks had dramatically reduced, and the 
separation between activity of commercial banks and investment banks became 
increasingly blurred. Financial communities had never ceased lobbying for the act to 
be repealed. Investment banks had persistently endeavoured to access the strength of 
the commercial bank's deposits, while commercial banks had wanted to enter the 
security market to make a higher profit. In 1999, the Glass-Steagall Act was officially 
repealed. Large commercial banks merged with large investment banks (Crawford, 
2011).  
Initially, securitisation was created to culminate the interests of commercial and 
investment banks. Specifically, investment banks purchase loan books from 
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commercial banks and set up a conduit (such as SPV). Subsequently, loan books are 
passed to SPV, as well as risks being removed from commercial bank balance sheets 
(Acharya and Richardson, 2009). As mentioned in the previous section, SPV is the 
institution that issues bonds. This institution bundles the loan books to issue bonds and 
then sells the bonds to investors (these bonds can be ABS, MBS, etc.). Hence, the 
funding would transfer from the bondholders to the investment bank via the SPV. The 
investment bank then returns the money to the commercial banks, which can be used 
to meet the obligation of repay interests to depositors and further lend out to other 
mortgage borrowers. 
The core operation of commercial banks has been changed due to securitisation. 
Initially, commercial banks can only have money to lend out contingent upon 
successfully attracting depositors. However, since loan books can be securitised, 
commercial banks can attract more money from bondholders if they can issue more 
loan books that can be bundled and construct to bonds. Loan books are separated into 
different elements or tranches, and the loan books from the borrowers with lower repay 
probability is segmented into ‘Inferior’ quality tranches. Similarly, medium-quality 
borrowers can be classified as ‘Medium’ tranches, and the loan book with very high-
quality borrowers is known as ‘Good’.  
Banks can charge a higher interest rate on the ‘Inferior’ loans and securitise all the 
‘Medium’, and ‘Good’ loan books that can be used to back the bond that is issued by 
the SPV. Since the process of the securitisation can be very complicated, bondholders 
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are unable to understand the nature of each bond. Instead, they use information 
disclosed by the credit rating agencies, which effectively rate each security that is 
considered as a correct assessment on the bonds. The safest security is rated as ‘AAA’ 
rating. 
Furthermore, to prevent unexpected events, investment banks purchase insurance 
against potential risks. In particular, the insurance companies (such as A.I.G) sell credit 
default swaps (formal insurance contract) to investment banks in case the 
securitisation goes wrong (although before 2007 nobody believed it could go wrong). 
Insurance companies receive premiums regularly paid by investment banks (Acharya 
and Richardson, 2009). Interestingly, insurance companies can also use the money 
they earn and invest in securities.  
The non-technical discussion above explains the function of securitisation. Now, we 
turn to the demand side of these securitised bonds. In the 1930s, the traditional banking 
system faced a potential bank run since deposits were not protected. However, this 
ended in 1934 in the USA (Calomiris and White, 1994) with the introduction of federal 
deposit insurance (deposit insurance capped at $100,000 per account). It operates 
satisfactorily for retail investors, but not for institutional investors with large cash 
holdings. Therefore, it is less safe for institutional investors to deposit their money into 
a bank account. Instead, institutional investors, such as MMMFs and pension funds, 
prefer to receive collateral from the bank, which is securitised bonds (created by the 
mechanism that we introduced above). These collaterals can be asset-backed securities 
Chapter 2 Shadow Banking System and Related Literature 
28 
 
with a very high rating that work similarly to deposit insurance - briefly describing, 
banks corporate with the conduit to issue securities which are essentially bundled by 
loan books. Banks use these securitised bonds as collateral to borrow money from 
institutional investors and then lend out the funds to borrowers (Gorton and Metrick, 
2010).  
We have discussed the general mechanism of the securitisation intuitively. In the 
following, we will describe shadow credit intermediation in the wholesale funding 
market in more comprehensive detail. 
2.2.2.2 The shadow credit intermediation process  
Shadow banks conduct similar business to traditional banks via a more complicated 
and ‘shadowy’ process. Pozsar et al. (2010) explain the credit intermediation chain 
that consists of seven steps, including loan origination, loan warehousing, ABS 
issuance, ABS warehousing, ABS CDO issuance, ABS intermediation and wholesale 
funding. Other finance companies, besides commercial banks, can perform loan 
contracts. After loan contracts are originated, single or multiple conduits will conduct 
loan warehousing, and broker-dealers’ ABS syndicate desk will take over and issue 
ABS by pooling or structuring all the loan books. Once the ABS issuance is completed, 
the warehousing will be facilitated through trading books and further convert into 
CDOs by broker-dealers’ syndicate desk. The next step is ABS intermediation, 
performed by limited-purpose finance companies, structured investment vehicles 
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(SIVs), securities arbitrage conduits and credit hedge funds. The whole process is 
conducted in the wholesale funding market, and the source of the funding is mainly 
from institutional investors, such as money market mutual funds and other large cash 
pools. The authors emphasise that first step (loan origination) and the last step 
(wholesale funding) are essential in the chain. However, shadow credit intermediation 
does not have to include all the other five steps, or it can contain more than five by 
repeating some of the steps; for example, repackage ABS CDOs into the so-called 
CDO squared, which make the product even more complicated. Intuitively, the whole 
credit intermediation cannot be implemented without the initial loan contracts (loan 
origination), and it also cannot be conducted if there is no one to purchase the products 
(wholesale funding); nevertheless, the procedures that transfer the original loan 
contracts to tradable shadow banking products (e.g. CDOs) can be adjusted based on 
different situations. 
2.2.3 The Financial Crisis in 2007-2009 
The series run of ABCP conduits first signalled the collapse of the shadow banking 
system and the activities of securitisation were terminated entirely in the following. 
Five largest investment banks suffered in substantial lost and struggled for survival, 
during which Lehman Brother declared bankruptcy, Goldman Sachs and Morgan 
Stanley converted to banking holding companies, Bear Stearns and Merrill Lynch were 
acquired by J.P. Morgan and Bank of America respectively. A large number of shadow 
banking institutions exited the market, such as SIVs and CDOs (Adrian and Achcraft, 
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2016).  
To prevent further spillover effect of the shadow banking distress and to stabilise the 
collapsing system, the Federal Reserve decided on solving the liquidity problem, while 
the U.S. Treasury’s initiated programs to mitigate credit problems. Money market 
investors pulled out their funding because of the deterioration of the asset quality of 
the ABCP conduits and SIVs. The sponsoring BHCs had to seek other sources of 
funding, even from the unsecured market, such as the Libor market. As a result of the 
disruption in Libor market, the Federal Reserve initiated the Term Auction Facility 
(TAF) to provide funding to commercial banks, mainly replacing the term funding lost 
in the ABCP market (Armantier, et al., 2008). Foreign banks also gain access to term 
funding from the TAF via the Fed’s discount window by using the foreign exchange 
swaps.  
The deterioration in the repo market occurred following the collapse of the ABCP 
conduits. Bear Stearns could not obtain funding through tri-party repo market after 
March 2018; the Federal Reserve then introduced the Primary Dealer Credit Facility 
(PDCF) to solve these funding difficulties (Armantier et al., 2008). Specifically, 
primary dealers were permitted to obtain funding from the Fed and effectively gain 
access to the lender of last resort. Furthermore, Fleming et al. (2010) also explain the 
detail of the Term Security Lending Facility (TSLF) by which the exchange of agency 
mortgage collateral by Treasury collateral is allowed.  
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In September 2008, followed by the bankruptcy of Lehman Brother, money markets 
suffered a run, which further resulted in the funding shortage of ABCP, CP and repo 
issuers. Two facilities were introduced by the Federal Reserve to mitigate the issue, 
including the Asset-Backed Commercial Paper Money Market Mutual Fund Liquidity 
Facility (AMLF) and the Commercial Paper Funding Facility (CPFF) (Adrian, 2010). 
As can be seen from the name of these facilities, their purpose is to offer to fund 
commercial paper issuers and replace the money market funding.  
Also, the Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility (TALF), described by Ashcraft 
and Pozsar (2012), was created to meet the credit needs of households and small-and-
medium businesses. It was mainly aimed to provide support of the ABS collateralised 
by student loans, credit card loans, residential mortgage servicing advances, 
commercial mortgage loans etc. 
The series of the facilities can be briefly summarised as providing the last-resort 
lending to the shadow banking system during the financial crisis. The purpose of it, as 
previously mentioned, is to mitigate deterioration and prevent the further spillover 
effect of the collapse of the shadow banking system. 
2.3 Shadow Banking in China and the Collapse of P2P Platform 
In this subsection, we will focus on both the banking and shadow banking systems in 
China, and the outline addresses a) the structure of the Chinese traditional banking 
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sector; b) the evolution of China’s SMEs and why they need shadow banking; d) the 
status of the shadow banking sector; e) shadow banking instruments. 
2.3.1 The Structure of the Chinese Traditional Banking Sector 
Before understanding the shadow banking sector, it is essential to know the structure 
and status of the conventional banking sector in China. According to the latest data 
released by the China Banking and Insurance Regulatory Commission, Chinese bank 
assets reached RMB 254.3 trillion ($ 37 trillion) in 2018, which account for more than 
300% of the Chinese GDP.  
The PBoC was the only bank that functioned as both central bank and commercial 
bank in 1978. Since then, China’s banking sector has grown rapidly. In the early 1980s, 
the government established four state-owned banks in addition to the PBoC. The four 
big banks comprise the Bank of China (BOC), the Agricultural Bank of China (ABC), 
the China Construction Bank (CCB) and the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China 
(ICBC). The Bank of Communications is known as the fifth-largest bank in China 
which was restructured and re-commenced operations in 1987. Joint-stock commercial 
banks were founded both by the government and the private sector during the late 
1980s and early 1990s; for example, the China Everbright Bank and CITICS. The state 
partially owns them but with much less share compared to the ‘Big Five’ (Elliott and 
Yan, 2013). To separate policy lending and commercial lending, three policy banks 
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were created after 1994, which are the Agricultural Development Bank of China, the 
Export-Import Bank of China and the China Development Bank. 
The share of total assets of the ‘Big Five’ banks ranks first in the Chinese traditional 
banking system. However, it has fallen from 78% to about 41% from 2003 to 2014 
(Fungáčová et al., 2018) and further shrank to 35% in mid-2018. Joint-stock 
commercial banks rank the second largest category of banks, which accounted for 
approximately 18% of total banking assets by the end of 2014 (Fungáčová et al., 2018). 
Besides foreign banks that do not account for a significant part of the Chinese banking 
system (2%), the remaining banks include 349 commercial township banks, 85 rural 
commercial banks, 223 rural cooperative banks and approximately 2650 rural credit 
cooperatives operating by the end of 2010 (Martin, 2012).  
2.3.2 The Evolution of China’s SMEs and Why They Need Shadow Banks 
In China, 96% of registered firms are small-and-medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) 
(National Bureau of Statistics [NBS], 2014) and they contribute more than 60% of 
China’s GDP and 65% of employment (Asian Development Bank [ADB], 2014). The 
concept and classification of SMEs have been modified along with the development 
and restructuring of both state and private sectors. Before 1978, all registered 
‘enterprises’, regardless of scale (large, medium or small), were state or collectively-
owned by the government at different levels. However, this is no longer the case since 
the reform era began. Individual entrepreneurs took advantage of the loosening policy 
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environment and engaged in petty commerce and trading during the early reform era; 
for example, private restaurants, retail stores and rural household factories (Solinger, 
1984). Nevertheless, private entrepreneurs that officially registered with more than 
eight employees were still not allowed before 1988. Therefore, before this period, if 
private entrepreneurs did not want to subject numerical limits on employees, they 
could only disguise themselves as ‘red hat enterprises’, which implies they had to 
register as ‘collective enterprises.’  
The legal boundaries for China’s private enterprises were relaxed in the 1990s and the 
ideological climate transferred towards profit-oriented activities. Private 
entrepreneurs in partnership with local government officials began to flourish (Tsai, 
2007). Following the official ideological slogan of building ‘market socialism with 
Chinese characteristics’, almost one-third of Chinese Communist Party (CCP) 
members were involved in private businesses, termed the so-called ‘red capitalists.’ 
Following removal of the major political barrier to large scale private enterprises, i.e. 
the official legitimation of red capitalists, restructuring policy of the state sector, 
known as ‘grasping the large, letting go of the small’ resulted in the privatisation of 
smaller SOEs (Garnaut et al., 2005). More than 85% of small-and-medium-sized 
industrial SOEs conducted restructure by the end of 2003 (Zeng, 2013). Since then, 
the government has started to categorise enterprises into seven different types of 
industries, according to revenues, total assets and unemployment based on ‘Temporary 
Regulations on the Classification of Large, Medium, and Small Enterprises’. In 2011, 
China’s authorities, including the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, 
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National Development and Reform Commission, National Bureau of Statistics and the 
Ministry of Finance, jointly presented the ‘Standards of Classifying SMEs’ that further 
differentiated among fourteen sectors and first introduced the concept of 
‘microenterprises.’ Table 1 shows detail of the standard of how business size is 
distinguished by firms’ operating income and a number of employees in fourteen 
different sectors in China. 
However, official statistics do not differentiate SMEs by ownership type, which 
implies some SMEs are state-owned rather than private entities. The NBS’s Third 
National Economic Census8 (2014) reports that there were 8.2 million ‘corporate 
enterprises’ by the end of 2013, and 7.5 million were controlled by either state or 
private entities in the mainland of China (excluding Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan). 
By using 7.5 million as the base number of SMEs in total, regardless whether state or 
privately owned, Tsai (2017) estimates there are approximately 95% SMEs privately 
controlled, which implies 7.06 million are privately owned, 220,000 firms are state-
owned, and the remaining SMEs are collectively controlled. Tsai (2017) further shows 
that private firms (both large and SMEs enterprises) have outperformed SOEs in return 
on assets (ROA) consistently since 1999.  
SMEs are the backbone of the economy, but especially small and micro enterprises 
face severe financing constraints in acquiring bank credit due to heavy regulation from 
the central bank. In contrast, state-owned enterprises (SOEs) are inefficient and 
 
8 http://www.stats.gov.cn/english/pressrelease/201412/t20141216_653756.html 
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constitute the core of China’s zombie firms but receive more than 75% of loans from 
commercial banks (Lardy, 2014; Tsai, 2015). The reasons are the market-wide 
expectation that the central government would compensate creditors in the case of a 
default and the five biggest banks are not allowed to lend to SMEs, other than SOEs 
(Lu et al., 2005). All-China Federation of Industry and Commerce (ACFIC) conducted 
a national survey in 2010 and found that only 10% of small enterprises and 5% of 
micro firms could obtain bank loans. Similarly, an NBS survey in 2011 shows that 
only 15.5% of small and micro companies have access to bank credit. Hence, SMEs 
must rely on alternative sources of credit to operate their business: this has brought the 
shadow banking sector into the spotlight. SMEs financing and bank-dominated 
financial system that prefer lending to SOEs are thus fundamental triggers of the 
development of China’s shadow banking system. 
Supporting the state sector and maintaining social stability has been a political concern 
for the Chinese government since the 1990s (Lardy, 1998). Local governments have 
pressured state banks to support SOEs by providing ‘cheap finance’ to avoid mass 
unemployment. However, China’s big commercial banks have accumulated a large 
amount of non-performing loans (NPLs) because of stimulus-induced bank lending 
(Zhang et al., 2012; Weinland, 2015). The heavy bank regulation is another reason 
interacting with the demand of SMEs financing that pushes business away from 
traditional banking towards shadow banking. There are two main policies that affect   
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Table 1 Standards of Classifying SMEs 
Source:http://www.gov.cn/zwgk/2011-07/04/content_1898747.htm 
 
Sectors 
 
Medium Small Micro 
Operating 
Income (RMB) 
Number of 
Workers 
Operating 
Income (RMB) 
Number of 
Workers 
Operating 
Income (RMB) 
Number of 
Workers 
Agriculture, Forestry, Animal 
Husbandry and Fishery 
5m-20m -- 500k – 5m -- < 500k  -- 
Manufacturing Industry 20m-400m 300-1000 3m-20m 20-300 < 3m  1-20 
Construction Industry 60m-800m -- 50m-60m -- < 50m 1-10 
Wholesale Businesses 50m-400m 20-200 10m-50m 5-20 < 10m 1-5 
Retail Industry 5m-200m 50-300 1m-5m 10-50 < 1m 1-10 
Transportation Industry 30m-300m 50-300 2m-30m 20-300 < 2m 1-20 
Warehousing Industry 10m-300m 100-200 1m-10m 20-100 < 1m 1-20 
Postal Industry 10m-300m 100-1000 1m-10m 20-100 < 1m 1-20 
Hotel Service Industry, 
Catering Industry 
20m-100m 100-300 1m-20m 10-100 < 1m 1-10 
Information Transmission 
Industry 
10m-1b 100-2000 1m-10m 10-100 < 1m 1-10 
Software and Information 
Service Industry 
10m-100m 100-300 500k-10m 10-100 < 500k 1-10 
Real Estate Industry 10m-2b -- 1m-10m -- < 1m -- 
Estate Management 10m-50m 300-1000 5m-10m 100-300 < 5m 1-100 
Leasing and Business Service 
Industry 
80m-1.2b 100-300 1m-80m 10-100 < 1m 1-10 
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bank credit: the first is the legal ceiling of bank lending volumes or the loan-to-deposit 
ratio imposed by the People’s Bank of China (PBoC); the second is the prohibition of 
lending funds to certain risky industries, such as real estate, coal mining, and 
shipbuilding, issued by the Chinese Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC). 
Commercial banks are not allowed to lend more than 75% of the total stock of their 
deposits. However, shadow banks do not subject to such limitations and can also lend 
to risky enterprises.  
Shadow banking system plays an essential role in the Chinese economy. The benefits 
are to satisfy the demand of SMEs financing and fuel economic growth; otherwise, it 
is difficult for SMEs to contribute more than 60% of the GDP if the private sector is 
excluded from official credit. However, less restriction in the shadow banking sector 
also comes with substantial economic costs, which may cause financial instability. 
Besides financial consequence, political consequences also play a minor role in SME 
financing. The result of Tsai’s (2017) field interviews during 1996-2016 show that use 
of party-state resources to support capitalist ventures has always been of concern. Loan 
officers believe that the problem is contained within the public sector if an SOE 
defaults on a loan. However, bank managers explain that if it were loaned to SMEs, 
they might be criticised by their superiors. 
2.3.3 The Status of the Shadow Banking Sector  
The share of China’s shadow banking assets to the global financial assets ranks the 
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second largest (16%) that follows the US shadow banking, with 31% (FSB, 2016)9. 
According to the latest report from Moody’s10 (2018), the total stock of shadow 
banking assets reached RMB 62.1 trillion ($ 10 trillion) by the end of September in 
2018, which accounts for 70% of the country’s GDP.  
There are several notable differences between the US and China’s shadow banking 
system. Firstly, the traditional banking sector plays a dominant role in driving the 
growth of shadow banking in China. Dang et al. (2015) point out that due to high 
inflation, real deposit rate in traditional banks is close to zero and even negative in 
recent years, which discourages depositor from saving money in a bank account. To 
compensate for the reduction in bank deposits, banks create the so-called wealth 
management product (WMPs) to attract more funds by structuring them off banks’ 
balance sheet. WMPs offer higher interest payment and propagate mainly by 
traditional banks, which is more attractive than the bank deposit and creates the 
impression that it is subject to small risks. 
Secondly, the reason for banks creating WMPs on the off-balance-sheet is to 
circumvent burdensome bank regulation from the central bank. This consists of one of 
the motivations for the development of the US shadow banking, regulatory arbitrage. 
Since shadow banking funds are not subject to the loan-to-deposit ceiling, in principle, 
banks can lend out all the funds collected from WMPs. Also, there is no reserve 
 
9 https://www.fsb.org/2017/05/global-shadow-banking-monitoring-report-2016/ 
10
https://www.moodys.com/research/Moodys-China-shadow-banking-activity-increasingly-reveals-challenging-trade-off--
PR_392443 
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requirement on shadow funds; therefore, by conducting shadow banking activities and 
cooperating with shadow banks, traditional banks can extend their credit without 
restricted regulation and exempt from most of the macro-prudential policies. The role 
of foreign financial entities can be neglected since domestic institutions act the 
dominant role in conducting shadow banking activities. Furthermore, due to the main 
driving force of shadow credit activities in China is the traditional banks, China’s 
shadow banking is normally labelled as the ‘shadow of the banks’ (Ehlers et al., 2018).       
From the funding demand side of the firms financing, shadow banking provides an 
essential source for private enterprises, especially for SMEs who usually can hardly 
gain access to bank credit. Since the majority of SMEs have higher productivity 
compared with SOEs, sufficient funding from the shadow banking sector for them can 
lead to economic gains (Hale and Long, 2011; Lu et al., 2015; Tsai, 2016). 
The last difference is the complexity of the structure of the system. Unlike the US, 
securitisation and wholesale funding are barely operated in China’s shadow credit 
intermediation. China’s shadow banking normally involves one or two steps in the 
whole intermediation process, whereas the US contains seven steps (Pozsar et al., 2010; 
Adraina and Aschcraft 2016). In the meantime, since WMPs are mainly sold by the 
traditional banking sector, this creates a vague impression for households that banks 
should provide compensation in case of default. However, there is no such legal 
obligation (Ehlers et al., 2018). 
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2.3.4 Shadow Banking Instruments   
2.3.4.1 Wealth Management Products 
As already mentioned above, one of the main shadow banking instruments is WMPs. 
WMPs are investment products that provide higher yields than formal deposits, and 
the return is based on the performance of a pool of underlying assets. Although mainly 
operated by traditional banks and viewed as a close substitute for bank deposits, it is 
not risk-free (Elliot et al., 2015). According to the latest report from the Global 
Economics & Markets Research11 (2018), the total outstanding value of WMPs issued 
by banks was RMB 29.5 trillion in 2017. Large state-owned banks used to be the 
leading participant in WMPs market; however, in recent years, there has been a shift 
towards joint-stock banks. The share of outstanding WMP by joint-stock banks 
accounts for 40.5% and followed by state-owned banks 33.8%. In addition, smaller 
city commercial banks expanded their WMPs issuance activity overtime to reach 16%. 
Agriculture banks and foreign banks remained relatively more minor players in the 
business that accounts for 5.3% and 1.3% respectively.  
WMPs are rarely recorded on banks’ balance sheets since banks use another financial 
institution as a ‘channel’ firm, usually trust companies. Specifically, trust companies 
issue WMPs and pass on to banks who propagate the products. Investors purchase 
WMPs via banks, and the funds are transferred to the trust companies to keep the 
 
11 https://www.uobgroup.com/web-resources/uobgroup/pdf/research/MIR-20180808.pdf 
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transaction off the banks' balance sheet. Trust companies then lend out the money to a 
company that cannot gain access to bank credit due to heavy regulation (Perry and 
Weltewitz, 2015). The channel firm acts as a passive administrator while the bank 
retains control over the investment decisions and can extend credit to certain risky 
sectors without the restriction of the loan-to-deposit ratio.  
2.3.4.2 Entrusted Loans 
These are loans made from one company that often has excess cash to another 
company that cannot obtain approval for bank loans. Meanwhile, companies with easy 
access to bank credit can borrow from banks and re-lend the money out at much higher 
rates. These companies are usually SOEs (Elliott et al., 2015). Commercial banks 
prefer SOEs for loans because they are low risk. The market-wide expectation in China 
is that the central government would compensate creditors in case of a default in SOEs 
(Lu et al., 2005). However, there are no such guarantees for SMEs. In addition, large 
commercial banks are state-owned themselves and managers at these banks can be 
exempted from being criticised for making bad loans to SOEs. Hence, one of the routes 
for the shadow banking system is that SOEs obtain ‘cheap loans’ and then on-lend 
excess funds to SMEs. Several large SOEs, for example, Baosteel (steel company) and 
China Shenhua (coal miner), have engaged in the entrusted lending business in the 
past years. 
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According to the Moody’s estimation12 in 2017, almost 70% of shadow banking assets 
fall into two categories, entrusted loans and wealth management products (WMPs). 
Specifically, the size of entrusted loans and WMPs reached RMB13.8 trillion and 
RMB 29.54 trillion, which jointly accounts for 48% of Chinese GDP. The growth rates 
of entrusted loans were 21% and 4.5% in 2015 and 2016.  
2.3.4.3 Bankers’ Acceptances  
These are certificates issued by banks that promise and specify the amount of money, 
the date, and the person to whom the payment is due in the future. The duration is 
usually six months and backed by the deposit in a bank. The holder of these certificates 
is permitted to trade prior to the maturity date at a discounted rate (Elliott et al., 2015). 
It is called undiscounted bankers’ acceptance if the trade does not occur before the due 
date. An example of using bankers’ acceptances as a form of ‘money’ is commercial 
transactions, such as purchases of inventory. Buyers who own the bankers’ 
acceptances can use these to purchase inventory from sellers and sellers can claim 
money from the bank that issued the certificate. These instruments are included in the 
shadow banking because borrowers can take a loan based on the discounted value of 
the bankers’ acceptances and re-deposit the money into their bank account to further 
back a larger certificate. Thus, the borrower can create considerable leverage by 
‘double’ using the same amount of deposit.  
 
12 https://www.moodys.com/research/Moodys-China-shadow-bank-activity-stops-growing-records-first-ever--PR_374868 
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2.3.4.4 Interbank Entrusted Loan Payment 
There is another form of entrusted loans that operate in the interbank market, which is 
the so-called interbank payment. This is a loan made by one bank to another bank or 
nonbanking financial institutions, usually from state banks to small banks (Sun, 2018). 
It is initially motivated by different risk weight. Specifically, lending money to a 
financial institution contains a lower risk than lending to an enterprise. The credit risk 
weight of interbank payment is 25% compared to the loans to firms, which is 100%. 
State banks can lend money to another financial institution and then on-lend to 
enterprises as entrusted loans. 
2.3.4.5 Trust Products 
Traditionally, trust companies are subject to the relatively looser regulation in 
comparison to the heavy banking regulation, and they issue trust products that aim to 
create the credit channel to riskier borrowers with limited access to bank credit, 
especially smaller private firms (Ehlers et al., 2018). However, since 2007, regulators 
have begun to transform trust companies into professional third-party wealth managers 
and proposed a series of regulatory measures that changed the framework under which 
trust companies could operate (Zhu and Conrad, 2014). There are three main products 
issued by trust companies, including single-investor trust products, collective-investor 
trust products and non-pecuniary property trust products, and the share of each product 
account for 50%, 36% and 14% respectively in 2016.   
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Single-investor trust product implies there is only one large-scale investor, such as 
securities firms, pension funds and insurance companies. These investors want to 
invest in a small number of underlying assets but prefer to hold them off their balance 
sheet. While collective-investor trust product channels a large number of assets and 
various investors who are usually wealthy individuals and retail investors, a single 
client can invest in physical or other illiquid assets via non-pecuniary property trust 
products. This product is typically used to achieve bankruptcy isolation instead of 
investment management purposes (Ehlers et al., 2018). 
2.3.4.6 Online Shadow Banking Platforms 
E-commerce (electronic commerce) refers to commercial transactions conducted on 
the internet. More than 40% e-commerce transaction takes place in China nowadays, 
which is in a leading position in the world. The most famous companies in the rapidly 
growing e-commerce ecosystem are Alibaba Group and Tencent (Woetze et al., 2017). 
‘Ant’, which is an online platform associated with Alibaba, provides a small-loan 
program to SMEs without the need for a banking license and it also obtains permission 
to securitise these loans (Montlake, 2013). Alibaba also set up a money-market product 
similar to a bank account, named Yu’e Bao, which requires no minimum amount on 
the account for each customer but offers higher-yield than banks’ deposit rate (Lu et 
al., 2015). Customers can either save their money into their Yu’e Bao account and earn 
interest rate or use it to do normal commercial transactions. Since Alibaba has 
accumulated a considerable customer base, it can easily obtain an enormous amount 
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of cash and use the money to conduct investment, such as lending money to SMEs and 
other borrowers.  
Peer-to-peer lending (P2P) platform is another type of online shadow banking service. 
It is a method that directly connects borrowers and lenders. The world’s first P2P 
online platform, Zopa, was founded in the UK in 2005, while credit ease.cn (Yi Xin) 
is the first P2P platform in China, which was launched in 2006 (Huang, 2018). In June 
2018, total outstanding loans reached RMB 1.3 trillion (Liu, 2018). The majority of 
P2P platforms were able to pool funds from investors and grant loans to borrowers 
before 2018. However, the regulation became much tighter after the collapse of the 
P2P industry in 2018, which we will discuss in detail in the next section.   
2.3.4.7 Microfinance Companies 
These companies are licensed financial institutions that help encourage credit for rural 
and small borrowers (Ellott et al., 2015). Using microfinance project to reduce national 
poverty in China has been an important topic since 1998. However, before 2008, 
microfinance industry had struggled in unstable legal status, only a few companies 
having obtained permission to operate microfinance business from the central bank, 
while other financial entities had conducted informal business between borrowers and 
fund donors (Britzelmaier et al., 2013). In order to boost the performance of 
microfinance project, the Chinese communist government had proposed a program in 
May 2018, which the so-called ‘Guiding Opinions’ granted legal status for 
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microfinance companies and developed a platform for private capital to help SMEs, 
micro-enterprises and individuals (HKEXnews, 2014) 13 . The overall scale of the 
industry remained very small; by the end of 2015, there were only 8910 microfinance 
companies with outstanding loans of RMB 941.2 billion (GDS LINK, 2016).  
2.3.4.8 Other Instruments 
Credit Guarantees: These companies take responsibility for the default risk for 
borrowers by providing financial guarantees to commercial banks and investors, 
especially when borrowers are small and medium firms. From 1993 to 2000, the credit 
guarantee companies mainly served government investment. After China joined the 
World Trade Organisation (WTO) in 2001, it began to grow rapidly and provided 
services for SMEs. According to CBRC, there were 6030 credit guarantee institutions 
by the end of 2010 providing a total guaranteed amount of RMB 1.15 trillion (Li and 
Lin, 2017) for more than 1.15 million enterprises (Articlebase, 2010). Credit guarantee 
companies in China participate in shadow banking by lending money directly to risky 
borrowers. They are considered useful in risk controlling (Scheelings, 2006; Ortiz-
Molina and Penas, 2008). However, they have faced increasing difficulties and 
challenges by disputes and lawsuits (Wang et al., 2015) in the case of failing to 
guarantee the repayment.   
Pawnshops: This is a shadow banking instrument that exists in both legal and illegal 
 
13 http://www3.hkexnews.hk/listedco/listconews/sehk/2014/1230/06866_2130394/e114.pdf 
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business. Individual households and small businesses can use their assets, such as 
jewellery, electric appliances, watches etc., to exchange for quick cash. This is also 
the earliest form of the credit institution that first appeared in China in the fifth century 
(Skully, 1994). It is difficult to obtain data about this segment. However, the share of 
pawnshops in total shadow banking assets is believed not to be high compared with 
other instruments (Elliott al., 2015).  
Trust Beneficiary Rights (TBRs): This is a simple form of derivative in which the 
buyer of this product receives returns of the underlying trust. For example, banks can 
purchase TBRs from a third party, such as trust companies, and this third party then 
extend funds to corporate borrowers who have difficulty accessing formal bank loans. 
Hence, banks can clarify this activity as ‘investment’ on their balance sheet rather than 
‘loans’ (Elliott et al., 2015). The benefit of applying this activity is that banks do not 
restrict by the loan-to-deposit ratio and can keep a lower level of the NPLs since this 
activity is not identified as lending behaviour.   
2.3.5 The Risk of Shadow Banking Activities and the Collapse of P2P Lending 
Platforms 
Sheng et al., (2015) categorise three layers of shadow banking in China and the 
underlying risks, including the bank off-balance-sheet financing layer, the credit 
enhancement layer and the non-bank lending layer.  
Banks extend credit through off-balance WMPs to evade regulatory restrictions on 
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loan-to-deposit ratio, capital and reserve ratio requirements. Consumers who purchase 
WMPs very likely do not understand the risks associated with the products. In fact, 
they may not even know where their money has been invested. Hence, the main source 
is the mismatch between asset risk and investors’ tolerance for risk. The second layer 
of shadow banking relates loans to lower credit companies or borrowers unable to 
access formal bank credit. Shadow banking in China is greatly intertwined with 
traditional banking sector; if the loans that extend to risky borrowers face the challenge 
of repaying the debt, it would be very likely to transfer the risks to traditional banks. 
Furthermore, in a case of the reciprocal loan guarantee network, when one business 
finds difficulty in meeting the obligation, all the other bank loans guaranteed by the 
business are also exposed at risk, either directly or indirectly. The non-bank lending 
layer relates risks directly with those shadow banks, such as pawnshops, P2P lending 
platform, financial leasing companies and microfinance companies. These financial 
intermediaries do not have rights to access the ‘lender of last resort’; thus, they are 
vulnerable to dealing with massive investment losses. The recent collapse of P2P 
platforms is an example that reflects the risks contained in the shadow banking system. 
In the past decade, the online lending market in China has dramatically undergone 
growth. As of January 2016, there were 2388 P2P platforms in total, and the trading 
volume reached USD 67 billion (Huang, 2018). The author explains three reasons for 
rapid growth in the P2P market, including high online penetration rate, a large supply 
of available funds and financial constraints of SMEs. China has 730 million internet 
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users, and online penetration rate exceeds 53.2% by the end of 2016, which helped 
boost popularity in the e-commerce and online financial platforms. Furthermore, since 
traditional bank deposit has been gradually losing attraction for Chinese investors, P2P 
lending normally promises 8-12 per cent interest rates, becoming famous overnight. 
Compared with traditional banking sector, P2P lending platforms are much friendlier 
to smaller businesses and become one of the most convenient sources of financing for 
SMEs; yet with insufficient regulation, this causes a dramatic fall in the industry.  
According to the Interim Measures on Administration of Business Activities of Online 
Lending Information Intermediaries which were jointly announced by CBRC, the 
Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, the Ministry of Public Security and 
the State Internet Information Office (2016), P2P platforms should only be information 
intermediaries, rather than cash pool, and all the platforms need to register with local 
authorities. The interim measures were first introduced in August 2016, and local 
government agencies were told to complete the implementation of the framework by 
June 2018. However, in order to attract more capital locally, provincial governments 
failed to implement interim measures efficiently. As of the end of August, the work 
still has not finished. Since there was no established regulatory framework, most 
platforms had been involved in cash pooling activities and resulted in Ponzi schemes.  
Huoq.com (a P2P lending platform backed by SOEs that was founded in December 
2016) announced that it went into liquidation in July 2018. Tianfu Lanyu - partly 
owned by an SOE in Xinjiang Province - owns one-third of Xinjiang Tianfu Lanyu 
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Optoelectronics Technology, which is the owner of the Huoq.com. However, the 
platform suddenly disappeared on July 10, and neither investors nor the company 
could be found them. According to the Home of Online Lending (Wangdai Zhijia), 
there were only ten platforms considered in trouble in May 2018. However, the 
number had increased to 63 in June and 163 by the end of July. One hundred and eight 
P2P platforms were shut down within 42 days (Li, 2018). 
Although the P2P lending industry only accounts for approximately 2% of total 
shadow banking assets in China, it is the riskiest and most unregulated part of the 
system (Bloomberge, 2018). Experts from China International Capital Corporation 
predict that only 10% of the P2P platform at present can survive in the next three years. 
The failure of regulating this industry may trigger systematic risks (Liu, 2018).  
2.4 The Reason for Using DSGE Framework 
Lucas (1976) criticises that reduced-form models are not reliable for policy evaluation. 
When a new economic policy is introduced, agents in the economy may also alter their 
expectations and behaviour, which will change the parameters of the corresponding 
reduced-form model. Consequently, such model frameworks may provide inefficiently 
and even no useful information about the actual impact of alternative economic 
policies. For example, if policymakers want to exploit the trade-off between 
unemployment and inflation based on a Phillips curve, such as increasing inflation to 
decrease unemployment, agents will adjust their expectations of high future inflation, 
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and alter their employment decisions, which will result in a smaller effect on output 
than policymakers predicted. Once policymakers estimate the model with the new data, 
they may find that the trade-off was less significant than initially thought. In other 
words, the negative association between unemployment and inflation does not 
guarantee low unemployment under alternative monetary policy regime. In order to 
perform policy evaluation, the solution should use models that are structural and 
policy-invariant, micro-founded with deep parameters, such as the coefficients of the 
utility function of consumers and producing sectors. When the micro-foundations are 
specified correctly, then parameters will have a stable value across different policy 
regimes.  
The first generation of models that has micro-foundations, rational expectations and 
general equilibrium framework is the real business cycle (RBC) models, which focus 
on the impact of the technology shock. Although RBC models show the potential of 
not being subject to the Lucas critique, it leaves no space for monetary policy analysis. 
By encompassing a role for economic policy with an emphasis on monetary policy, 
and including various nominal rigidities, DSGE models have been constructed and 
became the workhorse framework of macroeconomic analysis. Once possible to treat 
DSGE models to the latest vintage in the evolution of macroeconomic models, it 
makes certain updates comparison to previous generations. This does not mean that 
older vintage models should be abandoned, they still have their followers, and indeed, 
may even be better in some dimensions. 
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DSGE frameworks have been widely used by researchers both in academic research 
and in policy institutions, especially in central banks, as the baseline framework of 
reference for studying fluctuations in economic activities and their association to 
monetary and fiscal policies. DSGE models are powerful tools that can be widely 
adopted to examine a variety of macroeconomic phenomena flexibly and for policy 
discussion and analysis. In addition, it has been proved that DSGE models can fit data 
successfully (Smets and Wouters., 2003; Christiano et al., 2005). However, 
considerable criticism has been raised against DSGE models built upon the New 
Keynesian framework. The arguments mainly focus on the failure of these models to 
predict the crisis and the lack of financial block in the model structure, which should 
account for key determinants behind the crisis.  
Trichet (2010) discusses the role of DSGE models in the European central bank and 
points out that ‘‘when the crisis came, the serious limitations of existing economic and 
financial models immediately became apparent. … Macro models failed to predict the 
crisis and seemed incapable of explaining what was happening to the economy in a 
convincing manner. As a policymaker during the crisis, I found the available models 
of limited help. In fact, I would go further: in the face of the crisis, we felt abandoned 
by conventional tools.’’ He further argues that ‘‘[t]he keys lesson I would draw from 
our experience is the danger of relying on a single tool, methodology or paradigm. 
Policy-makers need to have input from various theoretical perspectives and from a 
range of empirical approaches. Open debate and a diversity of views must be 
cultivated – admittedly not always an easy task in an institution such as a central bank.’’  
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Dotsey (2013) and Hendry and Mison (2014) highlight that some ‘deep parameters’, 
for instance, the degree of price stickiness, turns out not to be deep enough as it 
displays little stability when the shocks hit the economy. A further reason that DSGE 
models have been criticised is the lack of effective communication devices. Blanchard 
(2017) argues that the presence of various distortions makes DSGE models interesting; 
however, it also makes it difficult to understand about the impact of these distortions 
on the results and the related reaction, especially for those who do not have experience 
of building these models. DSGE models are only one of many tools used at many 
central banks. For example, Brayton et al. (1997) document some more traditional 
structural models like FRB/US and FRB/Global, which coexist with the use of the 
number of DSGE models. Levin et al. (1999) and Levin and Williams (2003) emphasis 
that no policy institutions should place too much faith in any single model. From the 
perspective of a robustness check, more tools should work better than single tool. Gali 
(2017) points out several dimensions that need to be filled in DSGE models, including 
the standard assumptions of rational expectations, infinitely lived representative 
household and perfect information. 
Despite the shortcomings of DSGE models, they still arguably remain the dominant 
role in macroeconomic research. From the experience of using DSGE models in 
central banks, although these models are not the perfect forecast tools, the performance 
remains sufficiently strong. It has been proved that DSGE models are useful in 
replicating and explaining the historical experience and allow for the estimation of 
unobservable but important variables, such as the natural rate of interest. In addition, 
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the models are allowed to conduct counterfactual experiments, which may provide 
meaningful outcomes for ‘what if’ analysis. As Coenen, Motto, Rostagno, Schmidt 
and Smets stress in their comment chapter of the Ebook edited by Gurkaynak and Tille 
(2017), regardless explicit or implicit, counterfactual analysis is always the core of 
effective policy experiment. Policymakers constantly ask questions, such as ‘‘What 
risk does a protracted period of low inflation entail for the anchoring of inflation 
expectations? How have structural reforms affected the Phillips curve and the outlook 
for inflation? What is the contribution of our new credit easing measures to current 
credit and money market developments? How will a certain fiscal consolidation 
package affect the economy and the need for monetary policy action? What would be 
the impact of a supply-driven rise in oil prices?’’ There are mainly two reasons 
estimated DSGE models are suitable to conduct counterfactual analysis: first, 
structural interpretation is well identified in these models; second, these models fit 
data reasonably well.    
Justiniano, Primiceri, and Tambalotti review the empirical performance related to the 
DSGE frameworks in the comment chapter. They describe the DSGE models as a 
staple in the toolkit that connects central banks with the world. Christiano et al. (2005) 
and Smets and Wouters (2007) demonstrate how estimated medium-scale DSGE 
models play a useful and successful role in explaining hidden information of aggregate 
data. From the policymakers’ point of view, one important appeal of using DSGE is 
the ability to combine good empirical analysis and the ability to tell stories behind the 
economic phenomenon. The substantial progress of estimating DSGE models with 
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Bayesian technique proves that the estimated results based on DSGE models can 
provide as accurate a forecasting analysis as the rich parameterised statistical models; 
for example, VAR models. In the meantime, decomposed forecast error analysis in the 
micro-founded DSGE frameworks makes it possible for researchers to understand 
what primitive shocks may play substantial role in the future, which is difficult to 
implement in those reduced-form models. With these obvious appeals, DSGE models 
have become the standard tool to interpret historical data, to investigate the sources of 
economic fluctuations, and to conduct counterfactual policy experiments. The authors 
point out one growing gap between central bank analysis and academic modelling 
style. On the one hand, central banks develop DSGE models with increasing scale and 
complexity to capture more observable variables and shocks. They are trying to 
explain empirical questions by using one coherent but complicated structure. On the 
other hand, researchers in academia are trying to simplify the framework and make it 
more transparency and easy to be interpreted. In this respect, the trade-off between 
integrating more features into a large-scale framework and simplified models with 
transparent laboratories is ongoing progress in the field.  
Since the latest financial crisis, policymakers around the world have been calling for 
some comprehensive policy packages that may be helpful in recovering the economy. 
Fabio Ghironi believes that DSGE models are the most suitable tools. The reason is 
that DSGE settings can include all different features across various policies and 
understand how they might with each other. Moreover, the dynamic feature of the 
model allows researchers to understand the difference between short-run and long-run 
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effects of various policy implementations and investigate whether different policy 
packages are complementing or substituting for each other. The stochastic 
characteristic allows the model to recognise uncertain environment and conduct policy 
experiments. Each sector in the model, e.g. consumers, firms, governments etc. can 
make their own decisions without knowing the knowledge of the external environment 
and business cycle conditions. Finally, the nature of general equilibrium framework is 
to jointly determine prices and quantities in the goods market, money market and other 
markets by imposing the constraints and optimality conditions of different sectors in 
the structural model. Such models do not set any prior assumptions on how price or 
quantity should be affected by certain policies.  
Over the past ten years, the New Keynesian frameworks have kept expanding by 
encompassing new phenomena and addressing some of the criticisms that we 
mentioned above. For example, research in recent years has been incorporating 
financial frictions to the baseline DSGE models (Bernanke et al., 1999; Del Negro and 
Schorfheide, 2013); heterogeneous agents and incomplete markets are included in the 
model to address the representative household and perfect information criticisms 
(Werning, 2015; Kaplan et al., 2018; Auclert, 2019); overlapping generation models 
are used to replace the infinite lived household in the regular DSGE framework (Gali, 
2014; Del Negro et al., 2017; Gali 2017). 
To briefly conclude, the criticisms of New Keynesian models notwithstanding, the 
DSGE models arguably remain the mainstream in the macroeconomic school of 
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thoughts. The nature of DSGE models allows policymakers to conduct counterfactual 
analysis with various policy packages in one structural framework. It is not difficult 
to imagine that millions of criticisms would raise up immediately if central banks or 
any policy institution claims that they want to build a model that relies on static rather 
than dynamic, deterministic rather than stochastic, and partial rather than general 
equilibrium. As Blanchard (2016) concludes ‘‘there are many reasons to dislike current 
DSGE models…[but] they are eminently improvable and central to the future of 
macroeconomics.’’    
2.5 Literature on Modelling Shadow Banking System 
This thesis draws from different strands of literature associated with modelling 
financial system in DSGE frameworks and related policy implications. As the 
illustration from the previous section, we know that DSGE models still remain the 
mainstream of macroeconomics models currently, which originally elaborated from 
the fusion of the Real Business Cycle (RBC) models and the New Keynesian sticky-
price frameworks during 1980s to the early 1990s (Verona et al., 2013). Before the 
2007-2009 financial crisis, most of the DSGE model incorporates no role for the 
financial sector and assume frictionless financial markets so that financial 
intermediaries play a passive role. The DSGE models used by the most influential 
central banks to analyses monetary policy, such as the SIGMA model at the Federal 
Reserve Board (Erceg et al., 2006), the Smets and Wouters model at the European 
Central Bank (Smets and Wouters, 2003) and the Bank of England’s Quarterly Model 
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(Harrison et al., 2005), all exclude the prominent role of the financial sector.  
After learning the lesson from the crisis, many studies argue that financial 
intermediaries should play more important roles in influencing the performance of the 
economy through the transmission of central bank policies (Erceg et al., 2006; 
Harrison et al., 2005; Smets and Wouters, 2003; Wang, Deng, Yang, 2015). The very 
first attempt to incorporate a frictional financial sector in a New Keynesian DSGE 
framework is developed by Bernanke et al. (1999), in which risky enterprises use both 
net worth (internal finance) and bank loans (external finance) to finance capital 
investment. In their model, financial friction is derived from the spread between the 
risk-free lending rate and the rental rate of capital, which denoted as the risk premium. 
Another way to consider financial friction is the consideration of the collateral 
constraint (Iacoviello, 2005). There are two types of agents assumed in this string of 
DSGE models, where impatient households use housing as collateral to borrow money 
from patient households. Imperfect competition in the banking sector is also 
considered to model the set of banks’ interest rate (Kobayashi, 2008; Gerali et al., 
2010). Curdia and Woodford (2010) model a time-varying spread between banks’ 
deposit and lending rates. Moreover, the role of bank capital in the transmission 
mechanism of different macroeconomic shocks are studied in a number of papers; for 
instance, Van den Heuvel (2008), Gertler and Karadi (2011) and Meh and Moran 
(2010). 
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Together with the increasing amount of research that includes financial sector (Gertler 
and Karadi, 2011; Brunnermeier and Sannikov, 2014; He and Krishnamurthy, 2013; 
Du et al., 2014), the subprime crisis also reminds researchers that the behaviour of the 
financial intermediaries themselves needs to be analysed carefully. They have been 
involved in risky activities that surge the development of the US shadow banking 
system, where the shadow banks are treated as the culprit of the financial crisis. There 
have been more attempts to include the shadow banks and investigate the related 
policy implications of the shadow banking sector in the DSGE frameworks in recent 
decades.  
Verona et al. (2013) follow the framework of the financial accelerator model described 
in Bernanke et al. (1999), Christiano et al. (2010) and modify it with an extra financial 
intermediator, shadow banking sector. Households are permitted to purchase two types 
of financial instruments offered by banks, time deposits and corporate bonds, where 
time deposits are used to finance riskier entrepreneurs through retail banks, and 
corporate bonds are used to fund safer entrepreneurs via investment banks. In the paper, 
they argue that a long period of loose monetary policy remarkably amplifies the 
fluctuations in both real and financial variables when optimism and perverse 
incentives are taken into account in the financial sector. Thus, the ‘too low for too long’ 
interest rate policy creates the preconditions for a boom-bust cycle.  
The idea that the growing amount of shadow banking activities increase the difficulty 
in implementing monetary policy is supported by empirical studies. Sunderam (2013) 
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presents a model, which includes three types of claims that provide money services, 
deposits, Treasury bills, and ABCP. Households maximise utility by choosing their 
consumption level as well as the holdings of three different claims. The author 
emphasises that the increasing demand for money-like claims 14  is one of the 
explanations of the rise of shadow banking. Empirically, the paper proves that short-
term debt, such as ABCP, indeed has properties of quasi money, which positively 
correlated with the growth of households’ money demand before the 2007-2009 crisis.   
Meeks et al. (2017) introduce two types of financial intermediaries, commercial banks 
and shadow banks in a dynamic general equilibrium model. The key element is that 
commercial banks purchase claims (make loans) from the economy’s ultimate 
borrowers, nonfinancial firms, then optimally decide how much loan books maintain 
on their own balance sheet and how much sell it to the shadow banking sector. In turn, 
shadow banks issue claims against the loans they acquire to fund their purchase. This 
model consists with the function of the shadow banking activities in practice that we 
explained in Section 2.2.2, where shadow banks take the raw material of loan books 
produced by commercial banks and transform it into ABS. Their model indicates that 
traditional bank credit is negatively associated with shadow bank credit; in addition, 
traditional bank credit shows procyclical while shadow bank credit is countercyclical. 
However, they do not control for the loan quality in their shadow banking environment.  
Faia (2012) considers the case that commercial banks can transfer credit risk to 
 
14 The term ‘money-claim’ is used to indicate very short-term, fixed-principle debt owed.  
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secondary market which reduces the impact of liquidity shocks on bank balance sheets. 
However, the author argues that although secondary market can release bank capital 
and amplify the effect of macroeconomic shocks on output and inflation, by providing 
the channel of capital recycling, secondary market allows banks to take on more risk, 
which results in financial instability. This brings the moral hazard issue to traditional 
banking sector. Nevertheless, the paper does not consider the shadow banking sector, 
which may underestimate the impact of credit risk transfer to the financial system.  
Mazelis (2014) builds a DSGE framework that includes both commercial banks and 
shadow banks and investigates the impact of monetary policy shocks on aggregate 
loan supply. The author assumes that formal banks have no friction of acquiring 
deposits from depositors, while shadow bank raises deposits via search and marching 
for available deposits by households. Thus, the reaction of the same monetary policy 
shock is different in two different sectors. When monetary policy becomes tighter, 
commercial banks raise up deposit rates and lending rate, which discourage loan 
supply and encourage savings. However, since depositors save money both in the 
traditional bank account and shadow bank account, thus the higher savings aggregately 
also indicate the higher saving in the shadow banking sector. The key difference is that 
a higher saving in the non-bank sector reduce funding market tightness for shadow 
banks, which allows them to increase lending. This opposite behaviour then alleviates 
credit squeeze and mitigates the fall in loan supply, which in turn offsets the fall in 
investments and output.  
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Despite monetary policy rule, this thesis is also closely related to studies that analyse 
macroprudential policies. For example, Kannan et al. (2012) bring housing market into 
a DSGE framework and ask whether macroprudential rules can help with the financial 
stability rather than solely rely on monetary policy and what are the tradeoffs between 
inflation and output stabilisation and the risk of asset price crashes. The model is 
extended based on Iacoviello (2005) and Iacoviello and Neri (2010) with financial 
accelerator effects. They simulate the model and find that macroprudential policies are 
helpful to alleviate financial shocks that lead to credit and housing price boom; 
however, there is a possibility in making policy mistakes. Specifically, if the boom is 
due to financial or housing demand shocks, macroprudential policies can help to 
stabilise the market and improve welfare; but if the boom results from higher 
productivity shock, the same macroprudential rules may decrease welfare.   
Similarly, Rubio and Carrasco-Gallego (2014) evaluate the implications of interaction 
among macroprudential policy, LTV ratio, and monetary policy for the business cycle, 
social welfare and financial stability. They build a DSGE model with a 
macroprudential Taylor-type rule for the LTV ratio. Unlike the standard LTV ratio that 
is fixed, their assumption follows the spirit of the Basel III regulation which allows 
the macroprudential policy responses to the credit boom automatically and may avoid 
excess credit growth. Social welfare is improved in the cases of macroprudential 
regulator coordinate and not coordinated with a central bank when both 
macroprudential and monetary policies exist, especially in the case of a non-
coordinated case. In addition, they find that macroprudential authorities would 
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decrease the LTV ratio when there is positive technology shock or positive housing 
demand shock, and it stabilises the economic system unambiguously.  
Angelini et al. (2014) present a medium-scale DSGE model with another type of 
macroprudential policy, time-varying capital requirements, and study the effects of the 
countercyclical capital requirement policy. Similar to Rubio and Carrasco-Gallego 
(2014), this paper also posits two cases of interaction between monetary and 
macroprudential policies, i.e. corporative and non-corporative scenarios. Their results 
suggest that the impacts of time-varying capital requirements on output and inflation 
volatility can be neglected when the dynamic of the economy is mainly driven by the 
supply shock, such as TFP shock. In other words, co-existence of both 
macroprudential and monetary policies is no better than monetary policy only when 
supply shock is important. In addition, lack of cooperation between macroprudential 
authorities and central bank may result in higher volatility of the policy instruments. 
The reason is that both types of policies have different objectives but with similar 
related variables, such as bank rates and credit; therefore, due to different purpose, 
different policies may push these variables toward different directions. In a nutshell, 
an improper macroprudential policy may eventually exaggerate macroeconomic 
instability. However, if financial shock plays ranks important role in driving economic 
dynamic, macroprudential would reduce the volatility of output regardless of the 
cooperation between different policymakers.   
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Nevertheless, the literature I reviewed above has not touched the macroprudential 
effects with the existence of the shadow banking system. It is necessary to evaluate 
the policy implications when shadow banks become larger since shadow banks differ 
from commercial banks in two aspects. First, they are not restricted by capital 
requirements; second, they have no liquidity backup, such as deposit insurance from 
the government, in the case of bankrupt, which may increase the financial instability. 
For example, Luck and Shempp (2014) find that the size of shadow banking plays a 
crucial role in determining the stability of the financial system. They build a simple 
banking model in which regulated banks and unregulated shadow banks exist due to 
regulatory arbitrage and conclude that if the shadow banking system is independent of 
the traditional banking sector, then, the shadow bank run would not induce systemic 
risk. But if the two banking sectors are intertwined with each other, the crash in the 
risky banking sector may enhance the overall financial instability.  
Begenau and Landvoigt (2018) build a tractable general equilibrium model to quantify 
the benefits and costs of tight bank regulation and study the implications of optimal 
capital requirements policy with regulated commercial banks and unregulated shadow 
banks. Consistent with the practical circumstances, their model assumes that 
commercial banks are insured and can always fulfil the obligation of the interest 
payment to depositors but subject to capital requirements. On the other hand, shadow 
banks are not restricted by regulation, but face the probability of bank runs. They 
calibrate the model and claim that tighter bank regulation (higher capital requirement) 
drives up the size of the shadow banks along with the underlying risks. However, this 
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does not mean that the aggregate financial system becomes fragile; instead, riskiness 
in the shadow banking sector is largely offset by the greater stability in commercial 
banks. They further conduct the welfare analysis and conclude that when capital 
requirement reaches approximately 17%, the welfare is maximised with the existence 
of both commercial and shadow banking sectors. One important aspect of their model 
that drives the conclusion is that deposits in shadow banks generate liquidity services. 
Shadow banks become larger in size against the tighter commercial bank regulation. 
This does not indicate higher leverage in the shadow banking system since higher 
demand for shadow banking deposits decreases the funding costs, which in turn 
decreases the incentive to search for higher yields. Another similar practice from 
Durdu and Zhong (2018) highlights that shadow banks can mitigate the effects of an 
increase in capital requirements. Using their model, they find that the commercial bank 
annual default rate decreases from 0.75% to 0.05% in the long run when capital 
requirements increase by one percentage point. And the higher capital requirements 
slow down the real economy with a 0.6% decrease in GDP in short-run and 0.2% 
decrease in long-run. Moreover, total lending declines by 0.9%.  
Another important segment of the crisis is the disruption of wholesale funding markets 
where banks lend to each other. In these models, the source of shadow banking funds 
is commercial banks. By augmenting the model of Gertler and Kiyotaki (2012) that 
only considers retail banks, Gertler et al. (2016) incorporate wholesale banking 
alongside the retail sector, where the credit amount is raised endogenously. 
Furthermore, they allow for the possibility of wholesale bank runs. The flow of the 
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funds in the model is that retail banks obtain deposits from households, and 
endogenously determine the funds provided to wholesale banks. Wholesale banks then 
allocate the funds to productive nonfinancial sectors. They argue that during the 
‘normal’ times, the existence of wholesale funding increases both efficiency and 
stability in the banking system. However, the growth of wholesale banking system 
makes the economy more vulnerable to a crisis.  
Nelson et al. (2017) emphasise the securitisation aspect of shadow banks. They 
develop a macroeconomic model in which risky loan books are offloaded to the 
shadow banking sector from commercial banks’ balance sheet. Then shadow banks 
bundle it as the form of ABS and sell it in the bond market. Commercial banks can 
take on higher leverage with the help of the securitisation market since holding ABS 
instead of loans releases the burdensome regulation in the traditional banking sector. 
The model reproduces the negative co-movement between the commercial bank and 
shadow bank, in which a contractionary monetary policy shock persistently slows 
down the growth of commercial banks but increases the shadow banking activities. 
Feve and Pierrard (2017) develop a similar model with the interaction between shadow 
banks and commercial banks. Commercial banks make loans to nonfinancial firms, 
and at the same time, purchase the ABS issued by shadow banks. The reason is that 
ABS is tradable and backed by a pool of loan books but subject to less regulation. The 
authors focus on the regulatory implications and find that commercial banks substitute 
away from traditional loans and towards ABS to relax regulatory constraints.   
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Another important paper in the shadow banking literature is Moreira and Savov (2017), 
who present a microfinance model in which macrocycle is driven by liquidity 
transformation in the financial sector. The authors consider the issuance of money, 
which only provides liquidity in the states with lower uncertainty. The dynamic model 
shows that the buildup of shadow money during low uncertainty times boosts asset 
prices and economic growth since producing liquid securities requires less collateral. 
But the cost is the increased fragility, which raises uncertainty and leads to the collapse 
of the shadow banking sector. The occurrence of the collapse of the sector shrinks the 
liquidity provision and rises liquidity premia and discount rates, which in turn lower 
the asset prices and investment.  
To combat the spillover effect of the 2007-2009 financial crisis, Chinese authority 
launched the well-known ‘four-trillion’ stimulus package that fueled by bank loans. 
The stimulation plan largely attributes the fast development of Chinese shadow 
banking activities. Since then, there is a burgeoning literature on the shadow banking 
system in China, and the relationship between shadow banking and policy 
implementations in China has also been considered by scholars. Zhou (2011) claims 
that the existence of the shadow banking sector would weaken traditional monetary 
policy since he believes funds from regular depositors can, to some extent, flow into 
the shadow banking sector. In the meantime, the effectiveness of the money supply is 
dampened through macro-control and generates external effects on the money market. 
Similarly, Wang (2010) investigates trust wealth investment and concludes that the 
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transmission mechanism of window guidance 15  is ambiguous with the shadow 
banking system and new money supply is increased substantially. This would make 
the central banks’ decision less effective. Li (2013) takes the effect of both short 
periods and longer periods into account. The author finds that money supply is 
relatively stable in the long-run and would be dramatically affected by the shadow 
banks. This conclusion suggests that the impact of shadow banking system could be 
reduced if government adopts credit-oriented policies. By opposing short-term 
constraints on an SVAR model, Chen and Zhang (2012) indicate that shadow banking 
can stimulate economic growth as well as money supply significantly but with a 
negligible impact on inflation. 
Hachem and Song (2017) add two features into the standard banking models that 
engage in maturity transformation. First, big versus small banks, in which big banks 
can influence the rest of the economy with their operation, while small banks cannot. 
Second, both types of banks are free to choose to operate the business on a regulated 
balance sheet or on an unregulated off-the-balance sheet, which features shadow 
banking activities. The bank regulation they discuss in the paper is liquidity minimum 
requirement which requires banks to keep the liquid assets to short-term funding ratio 
above a certain threshold. The theoretical framework predicts that small banks are 
more constrained by the liquidity requirements; therefore, when the regulation 
becomes tighter, small banks prefer manage funds on an off-balance sheet vehicle that 
 
15 The central bank asks banks to issue or not issue loans to specific industrial sector or companies.  
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is not subject to liquidity regulation. This activity raises the interest rates on the 
instruments above the regular deposit rates. Funds are poached from big banks since 
households find the deposit is less attractive. Big banks can react in two ways: first, 
they can create their own high return instruments; second, they can tighten interbank 
market for emergency liquidity which may be against small banks in the case of 
shortage of liquid asset during bad periods. By applying their theory to the Chinese 
case, they find that the tight regulation accounts for one-third of credit boom between 
2007 and 2014.  
Several empirical studies have studied different segments of the Chinese shadow 
banking system. Acharya et al. (2019) examine the scale and the effect of WMPs on 
the banking system. By using a large, product-level data, the authors track the response 
of small-and-medium banks (SMBs) to the competition from the big four banks. The 
stimulation package is mainly supported by the big four banks. As the loan amount 
increases, big four banks need to increase the deposit in order to keep obeying the 
loan-to-deposit ratio. The increasing competition in the deposit market pushes down 
the level of the SMBs’ deposit amount. In order to attract more depositors, SMBs react 
by issuing more WMPs, which normally offer higher yield compared to the bank 
deposit. However, this does not finalise the competition; the four big banks also issue 
more WMPs to regain the depositors, which causes a surge in the development of 
WMPs’ market. The authors confirm that the issuance behaviour of WMPs is 
regulatory arbitrage and further provides evidence that the rising in the WMPs’ market 
is triggered by the stimulus plan.  
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Allen et al. (2019) provide a large-sample transaction-level analysis and focus on the 
second-largest component of the Chinese shadow banking system, entrusted loans. 
They find that large firms with access to cheap finance from commercial banks tend 
to be entrusted lenders in the market and most of these firms are SOEs. The entrusted 
lending activities are very likely to occur during the periods of tight credit regulation. 
They categorise two types of entrusted loans: affiliated loans that normally indicate 
the loans between parent companies and subsidiaries and non-affiliated loans that 
imply no relationship between lenders and borrowers. Furthermore, the pricing of the 
affiliated loans is very close to the official bank loan rate, while the pricing of the 
nonaffiliated loans is about twice the average official bank lending rate. Finally, they 
argue that, unlike other shadow banking instruments, entrusted loans may enhance 
financial stability. The reason is that entrusted lenders are normally well capitalised 
and have higher equity ratios than banks. Thus, the large equity provides, to some 
extent, the safety buffers against potential risk from the risky loans.  
Chen et al. (2018) explore the implications of shadow banking for monetary policy. 
Their evidence shows that commercial banks have not only been operating off-the-
balance-sheet shadow banking activities but also engaging in on-the-balance sheet. On 
the bank’s asset side of the balance sheet, there is a special category, named account-
receivable investment (ARI), which implies all the bank’s non-loan investment. 
Initially, it only includes central bank bills and government bonds, but ARI is not 
restricted by the two bank regulations above since it is clarified as an investment rather 
than a bank loan. By taking advantage of this segment, commercial banks have been 
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purchasing back the beneficial rights of entrusted loans and report the activity as an 
investment behaviour instead of lending16. Recalling that, initially, commercial banks 
act only as a middle man to channel funds between companies, but now, once they 
purchase the beneficial rights, the repayment from the borrowing enterprises will 
directly go to the bank’s on-the-balance sheet. They build a partial equilibrium 
framework for a banking sector and argue that the tight regulation pushes the 
commercial banks to increase the risk lending activities, which is the reason that raises 
the overall shadow banking credit. In addition, they empirically test that nonstate 
banks to behave differently from state banks in their responses to monetary policy in 
terms of their shadow banking activities. Specifically, shadow banking activities in 
state banks react insignificantly against the contractionary monetary policy, while 
nonstate banks tend to increase shadow banking activities with the purpose of 
circumventing the tight regulation.   
To sum up, in this sub-section, I review both theoretical and empirical literature of 
modelling and testing shadow banking sectors both in the Chinese and US markets. 
This thesis is closely related to several different strands of the shadow banking 
literature, including the effectiveness of different policies, such as monetary, fiscal and 
macroprudential policies, with the existence of shadow banking system, and the 
related issues of financial stability.   
 
16 Chen et al., (2018) named this as ARIX, which is the investment excluding central bank bills and government bonds.  
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2.6 Bayesian and Indirect Inference Estimation 
2.6.1 Bayesian Approach 
Conventional statistical estimations always assume no relationship between variables. 
Thus, the null hypothesis normally indicates no relationship and no prior knowledge 
of variables. However, it is often the case that researchers do have some understanding 
of the relationship between variables, which may be based on earlier research and 
investigations. It is different from the conventional approach (frequentist framework) 
that relies on the notion of repeating the same experiment many times. Instead, with 
the Bayesian technique, researchers can encompass the background knowledge and 
take it into the process of estimation of parameters. Hence, the key difference between 
Bayesian and conventional statistics, for example, maximum likelihood, is the 
different views of unknown parameters in a model.  
For example, consider a regression  𝑦 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑥1 + 𝛽2𝑥2 + 𝜀 , where 𝑦  is the 
dependent variable, 𝑥1 and 𝑥2 are the independent variables, 𝜀 is the residual, 𝛼, 
𝛽1  and 𝛽2  are the unknown parameters that we need to estimate. Conventional 
approaches assume that all parameters have only one true fixed value but unknown 
before estimation. Bayesian methods do not provide on value but rather a probability 
distribution, which implies each parameter is estimated to have a distribution that 
includes uncertainty about the value. Such uncertainty is specified before taking the 
model to the data and is called prior distribution. Then these prior distributions of all 
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estimated parameters are combined with the observed data that is expressed in terms 
of the likelihood function to obtain the posterior distribution, which is the estimated 
results of the parameter values. Thus, these three ingredients, i.e. prior distribution, 
data and posterior distribution, constitute the Bayes’ theorem (Van de Schoot and 
Depaoli, 2014).   
Prior distribution of Bayesian statistics reflects prior knowledge of the underlying 
parameters, which can be stemmed from previous studies and investigations (O’Hagan 
et al., 2006). The variance of the prior distribution implies the level of uncertainty 
about the value of the parameters, the smaller the variance, the more certain about the 
value of the parameter. There are three types of prior distribution regarding the level 
of certainty of the parameter value, non-informative priors, weakly-informative priors 
and informative priors. Non-informative priors simply imply a great deal of 
uncertainty or have no prior knowledge about the value. Weakly-informative priors 
contain some useful information but typically have limited influence on the final 
parameter estimate. Finally, the priors that include the most amount of information 
about the values are informative priors. The last type of prior has a large impact on the 
final estimates. After specifying the priors, Bayes’ theorem then takes it to the data 
that contain new and true information and obtain the posterior distribution, which 
reflects one’s updated knowledge about the estimated parameters (Van de Schoot and 
Depaoli, 2014).       
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Comparing with the conventional frequentist approach, the major difference is that 
only Bayes can incorporate background knowledge into the estimation and allow for 
updating the previous understanding after analysing with the new data. Another 
advantage of Bayesian statistic is that it does not require testing the same null 
hypothesis repeatedly. One can pick up the theory from prior literature and conduct 
further analysis. In addition to theoretical advantages, one practical advantage of using 
Bayesian methods is that it can deal with small sample size, which is not based on the 
central limit theorem as in the frequentist approach. The prior distribution only reflects 
the background knowledge of the theory and is not based on sample size. The 
maximum likelihood function of the data is scaled by the size of the sample. With 
more data in the sample, the likelihood function contains more information and may 
have a larger influence on the final estimation. For a small sample, prior distribution 
plays heavier role in the estimation, while with large sample, data have a larger impact 
on the posterior distribution. Many papers have shown the benefits of using Bayesian 
methods when large data set is not available (Zhang et al., 2007; Lee and Song, 2004; 
Hox et al., 2012). 
Bayesian estimation has been substantially applied in macroeconomics research in the 
last three decades. Querron-Quintana and Nason (2013) explain the reason that 
Bayesian method becomes popular is that it offers researcher the chance to estimate 
and evaluate macro models where frequentist approach often finds challenge to 
implement, especially for DSGE models. Another attractive aspect of the popularity 
of the Bayesian approach is the increasing computational power to estimate medium 
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and large scale DSGE frameworks. In addition, frequentist econometricians argue that 
DSGE models are misspecified versions of the true model, even though these models 
are always seen as abstractions of economies. Hence, Bayes’ theorem is favoured in 
estimating DSGE models as it eschews the existence of such true model and claims 
that all models are false, but one can be better than another.  
2.6.2 Indirect Inference Estimation 
Berger and Wolpert (1988) state that Bayes’ theorem, based on the likelihood principle, 
does not assume the existence of a true or correctly specified DSGE model. The 
likelihood principle implies that all evidence about a DSGE model is contained in its 
likelihood conditional on the data. Therefore, from a Bayesian economist perspective, 
one model can be more likely to be better compared with the benchmark model. Indeed, 
there is no model can be literally true since the ‘real world’ is too complex to be 
explained by one model, which implies all DSGE models are false or ‘misspecified’. 
Nevertheless, as argued in Le et al. (2015), an abstract model with implied residuals 
may still be able to mimic the data. For example, a model with the assumption of 
perfect competition may never exist in reality, but can still be able to predict the 
behaviour of industries with a high degree of competition. Thus, although the DSGE 
model maybe just a simplified version of a complex reality, it should be tested on its 
explanatory power against the real data.  
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Bayesian estimation can evaluate the model by creating a likelihood ratio, which 
essentially states that one model is better or worse than the other. It does not directly 
test the model against the real data. Thus, indirect inference technique is applied in 
this thesis for judging whether the model is partially rejected or not rejected by the 
data. Indirect inference estimation has been widely used in history (see Smith, 1993; 
Gregory and Smith, 1991; Gourieroux et al., 1993; Gourieroux and Monfort, 1996; 
Canova, 2007). Le et al. (2011) refine the method with Monte Carlo simulation, which 
is adopted in this research. The basic idea of indirect inference estimation is to 
compare the simulated data generated from the DSGE model with the actual data. 
Specifically, a different set of model parameters would generate different simulated 
moments from the same model. If the simulated moments are sufficiently close to the 
moments generated by the actual data, the model can be viewed as to pass the indirect 
inference test, and the set of model parameter that passes the test is the final estimated 
parameters.  
To obtain the moments of the actual data, we need to choose the auxiliary model. 
Meenagh et al. (2009) demonstrate that the Vector Autoregressive model (VAR) can 
be used as an approximation of the reduced form of the DSGE models. Hence, we use 
the VAR model as the auxiliary model and incorporate with the chosen actual data to 
calculate the moments of the real data. The simulated moments from the model are 
used to compare with the moments from the auxiliary model. To determine whether 
two sets of moments are close to each other, we need to compute the Wald statistic. 
According to Le et al. (2011), there are two different types of Wald statistics: the ‘Full 
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Wald’ which considers all endogenous variables in the DSGE model and the ‘Directed 
Wald’ which mainly focuses on some aspects of the model performance. One should 
notice that the more variables and lags are included in the auxiliary model, the higher 
power of the indirect inference test and the higher chance that the model can be 
rejected. Therefore, it is arguably sufficient that if we mainly focus on the key 
endogenous variables in our model, which including output, inflation and interest rate.  
The purpose of the indirect inference testing is to find out whether a certain set of 
model parameters can compute the Wald statistics that pass the critical value, while 
the indirect inference estimation is aimed to find out at least one set of model 
parameters that can finally pass the test. This implies to simulate the model and test 
different sets of parameters a hundred or even a thousand times.  
2.7 Conclusion 
In this chapter, I explain what is shadow banking (Section 2.1) and review shadow 
banking systems in both the US and Chinese market (Sections 2.2 and 2.3). Shadow 
banking activities are mainly operated in the capital market via securitisation before 
the 2007-2009 financial crisis in the US, while in China, it is undertaken dominately 
in the traditional banking sector. After the appeal of the Glass-Steagall Act in 1978, 
commercial banks merged with investment banks in America. However, in order to 
avoid the same crisis occurring in the Great Depression, combined with the 
development of the money market funds, the US banks created the way to bundle the 
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mortgage loan books, issue asset-backed securities and sell it to investors. The main 
underlying assets of the securities are houses since the market treats it as solid 
collateral.  
The development of the Chinese shadow banking is triggered by the heavy bank 
regulation interacted with the difficulty of SMEs financing. Ninety-seven per cent of 
registered firms in China are small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), and they 
contribute more than 60% of the Chinese GDP. However, they can rarely gain access 
to funding from the formal banking sector since the status of SMEs is not transparent 
to the lender and the government has restricted the funding that goes to certain 
industries. State-owned enterprises (SOEs) obtain more than 75% of loans from 
commercial banks. Chinese shadow banking activities rely less on securitisation; 
instead, it is a very good example of direct lending, i.e. the ultimate lender lends money 
directly to the ultimate borrower. According to the Moody's estimation, total shadow 
banking assets accounted for more than 70% of Chinese GDP in 2017, in which 
entrusted loans and wealth management products (WMPs) jointly contributed almost 
70% of total shadow banking assets (approximately 50% of the GDP). Therefore, it is 
sufficient to capture the main picture of the Chinese shadow banking system by 
considering these two products. The aim of this thesis is to then build the dynamic 
stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) frameworks with these two shadow banking 
activities, in order to understand what the main driving factors for the economy are 
and how important shadow banking is in China. 
Chapter 2 Shadow Banking System and Related Literature 
80 
 
In Section 2.4, I carefully explain the reason for using a DSGE framework to conduct 
this research. DSGE models are still the mainstream model frameworks in studying 
macroeconomics with policy implications. It is difficult to believe that a static model 
can be the better choice since it is impossible to understand the policy effect within 
one period. Similarly, deterministic model is definitely not the choice if we need to 
take uncertain environment into account. Furthermore, I am interested in the overall 
reaction in the entire economy rather than only focusing on one sector; therefore, 
general equilibrium models have, no doubt, outweighed partial equilibrium 
frameworks.  
Section 2.5 provides a literature review of how researchers model both the US and 
China shadow banking sectors with different policy implications, including monetary, 
fiscal and macroprudential policies. The estimation techniques are introduced in 
Section 2.6. I first apply Bayesian estimation in this research because there is similar 
prior research in this area and it is convenient for me to pick them up and conduct 
further research. Using indirect inference estimation is to test whether our model is 
rejected or not rejected by the actual data.  
The model frameworks in this thesis are introduced in the following three chapters. 
Chapter 3 focuses on modelling the entrusted lending market, and Chapter 4 
incorporates WMPs into the model framework. Chapter 5 extends the model from 
Chapter 4 by adding the Chinese housing market.  
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Chapter 3 Entrusted Loans and SOEs Lending Activities 
3.1 Introduction  
The first model in the thesis is a framework to study the entrusted lending market. One 
of the core shadow banking activities is entrusted loans, which are loans made by cash-
rich companies to cash-strapped companies through a third party (usually a traditional 
bank in China). The entrusted loans were the largest component of the Chinese shadow 
banking system before 2014 and ranked second after the rapid growth of wealth 
management products (WMPs). 
Unbalanced economic structure and the heavy bank regulation by the PBoC are the 
fundamental triggers of the rapid growth of entrusted loans (Lu et al., 2015). SOEs are 
large companies in which at least half of the shares are owned by the Chinese 
government. Since SOEs are perceived as ‘safe’ and are backed by the government in 
the case of default, the traditional Chinese banks favour SOEs for loans and often put 
less effort when evaluating the creditworthiness of SOEs (Elliot and Yan, 2013). 
However, private-owned enterprises (POEs), especially small-and-medium-sized 
enterprises (SMEs), face severe restriction of getting access to bank credit. This is 
because these firms usually lack sophisticated accounting reporting system and proper 
risk assessment mechanism, which makes it difficult for banks to monitor and 
evaluates the performance and underlying risks of their business. Moreover, the central 
government discourages lending to high-risk companies (Elliot et al., 2015). This 
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further push business away from the formal banking sector to shadow banking system.  
Allen et al. (2019) reveal that entrusted loans allow large SOEs which have access to 
cheap finance from banks to provide liquidity to credit-constraining companies, in 
particular, SMEs. Their evidence highlights that during the period 2004-2013, 73.8 
per cent of lenders who engage in entrusted loans are SOEs. SOEs behave risk-neutral 
and given their central role in the entrusted lending business, I investigate the 
following research questions: (1) Does the existence of the shadow banking system 
reduce the effectiveness of monetary policy in tightening credit constraints faced by 
SOEs? (2) Does an increase in government spending add to the conventional 
crowding-out mechanism by worsening the credit conditions of SMEs?  
To seek answers to the above research questions, I construct a dynamic stochastic 
general equilibrium (DSGE) framework with entrusted lending behaviour of SOEs. 
The model shows that SOEs who receive affiliated loans 17  from their parent 
companies tend to have a lower marginal product of capital than SMEs who obtain 
non-affiliated loans from SOEs entrusted lenders. Through running experiments under 
different levels of bank credit tightness, I find that in the steady-state, SOEs engage 
more in non-affiliated loans to SMEs when the reserve ratio requirement increases. 
 
 
17 There are two distinct types of entrusted loans, including affiliated and nonaffiliated loans (Allen et al., 2019). 
Affiliated entrusted loans are loans to subsidiaries from their parent company, while nonaffiliated loans require no 
prior relationship between lenders and borrowers. 
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I then estimate the model by using a Bayesian approach for the period 1992Q1-
2015Q4. The model dynamic shows that a contractionary monetary policy exerts a 
more negative impact on the SMEs’ output than that of SOEs. This is because SMEs 
are credit-constrained firms and are required to pay a risk premium to get financed. 
Instead, SOEs only pay the risk-free rate18. When the market becomes tighter, external 
financial sources become more costly and difficult for SMEs to access, which results 
in a higher risk premium and lower output. Furthermore, the effectiveness of the 
monetary policy is lower when SOEs entrusted lenders are free to adjust the allocation 
of holding affiliated and non-affiliated loans. This implies that when monetary policy 
becomes tighter, SOEs entrusted lenders can choose to allocate more funds to SMEs 
in order to generate a higher return on the loans. 
The first model also incorporates the transmission mechanism of government spending 
into the investigation of the shadow banking system. Government spending is vital in 
China and has a nonnegligible impact on the Chinese economy. The results show that 
although government spending immediately stimulates the economy, it crowds out 
private capital investment by SMEs, which further restricts the financial market and 
makes SMEs pay a higher risk premium when accessing financial sources. Due to the 
limited capital investment and capital inputs, the only way for SMEs to increase output 
is through incurring additional costs to hire more labours.  
 
18  The main difference between affiliated and non-affiliated loans is the interest rate. Specifically, the interest 
rate on affiliated loans is lower since lending from the parent company to a subsidiary is less risky. Thus, the 
lending rate charged by the parent SOEs is set be equal to the risk-free rate of bank loans. 
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This chapter is organised in the following way. Section 3.2 briefly introduces the 
background and the literature of modelling shadow banking in China. Section 3.3 
presents the New Keynesian framework. In Section 3.4, I calibrate the model and 
estimate it using Bayesian methods. Section 3.5 concludes.  
3.2 Related Literature 
Research in this area has grown rapidly in recent years. Elliott et al. (2015) and Ehlers 
et al. (2018) provide a detailed review about the development, structure, size and 
potential risks of China’s shadow banking sector. Lu et al. (2015) and Tsai (2017) 
document the heavy reliance of the SMEs on informal financing due to their limited 
formal credit. Wang et al. (2018) develop a general equilibrium model of China’s 
shadow banking from the perspective of dual-track interest rate liberalisation. The 
authors argue that if credit misallocation persists and low productivity of SOEs cannot 
be improved, full interest rate liberalisation does not guarantee a Pareto improvement. 
Chen et al. (2018) suggest that banks’ continuous engagements in risky entrusted loans 
strongly link shadow banking to commercial banks. They show that the entrusted loan 
provision increases as the tightening of bank credit resulted from the contractionary 
monetary policy. Allen et al. (2019) use transaction-level analysis and find that the 
interest rates of non-affiliated loans indicate market rate, while the rate of affiliated 
loans is closer to that of the bank loans.  
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This study differs from the previous literature by incorporating the SOEs risk lending 
behaviour within a DSGE framework. The objective is to evaluate the impact of bank 
credit regulation, monetary policy and fiscal policy on China’s economy. The model 
follows the spirit of ‘financial accelerator’ literature, in which risky firms (SMEs) 
borrow money by using their net worth as collateral. There is growing interest in BGG 
type model studying the effect of the shadow banking sector. Verona et al. (2013) 
follow the framework of the financial accelerator model described in Bernanke et al. 
(1999), and Christiano et al. (2010)  modify it with an extra financial intermediator, 
and a shadow banking sector. Households are permitted to purchase two types of 
financial instruments offered by banks, time deposits and corporate bonds, where time 
deposits are used to finance riskier entrepreneurs through retail banks, and corporate 
bonds are used to fund safer entrepreneurs via investment banks. Funke et al. (2015) 
augment the framework from Funke and Paetz (2012) by adding a shadow banking 
sector in the China’s economy and develop a BGG type DSGE framework to capture 
the interface between qualitative and quantitative monetary policy versus shadow 
banking.  
Two main DSGE frameworks incorporate financial friction in a macroeconomic model, 
which are the financial accelerator type (BGG) and collateral-based models, such as 
Iacoviello (2005) and Iacoviello and Neri (2010). The collateral-based model is not 
adopted in my models based on two reasons; first, I do not include housing market in 
my first two models; second, Iacoviello type housing model only consider residential 
property rather than commercial property. In my third model, the producer sector, 
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mainly the SME sector use housing as collateral to borrow money. Therefore, the 
patient and impatient households sectors are not appropriate in my model framework. 
Differing from the standard framework, for example, Bernanke et al. (1999), my 
model includes two production sectors, i.e., SOEs and SMEs, where SOEs can borrow 
at the risk-free rate, while SMEs need to pay extra risk premium. My model differs 
from their approach since SOEs are the centre and the shadow banker in the entrusted 
lending business. Wang et al. (2018) include a competitive banking system with the 
presence of WMPs and trust loans (shadow banking instruments) and focus on interest 
rate liberalisation. I, instead, treat SOEs as the entrusted lenders ‘financial 
intermediaries’ to SMEs and study the effectiveness of the policies under this structure. 
3.3 Model Framework 
The spirit of my framework is the financial accelerator model proposed by Bernanke 
et al. (1999). Entrusted loan is embedded in my model by adding a SOEs entrusted 
lenders sector and two intermediate goods producers, including SOEs producing 
branches19 and SMEs, which require external finance to invest in capital. SOEs obtain 
bank loans from commercial banks and determine the allocation of affiliated and non-
affiliated loans in each period. The model features nominal price rigidity and capital 
adjustment costs. There are seven structural shocks: a reserve ratio shock, a monetary 
policy shock, a government spending shock, two TFP shocks and two investment-
 
19 The producing branches can be treated as the subsidiaries of the SOEs entrusted lenders.  
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specific technology shocks in both SOEs’ and SMEs’ sectors.  
The model contains eight agents. These are; households, commercial banks, SOEs 
entrusted lenders and producers, SMEs, final goods producers (retailers), government 
sector and capital goods producers. Figure 1 provides a simplified graphical depiction 
of the links and process.  
Figure 1 Model Structure (Entrusted Loans) 
 
Households live forever, they work, consume, pay tax and deposit money in the 
commercial banks. I exclude WMPs in the first model by solely focusing on how to 
link shadow banking activity to the formal banking sector via the SOE-SME link. 
Commercial banks lend money directly to SOEs entrusted lenders. SMEs play a key 
role in the model that cannot gain access to bank credit; instead, they borrow from 
SOEs entrusted lenders. SMEs are assumed to have finite life. The expected lifetime 
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of an SME is 
1
1−𝛾
, in which 𝛾 is a constant probability of surviving to the next period. 
This assumption takes the phenomenon of births and deaths of firms into account. In 
the meantime, it rules out the probability that an SME can be fully self-financed by 
accumulating sufficient net worth. Therefore, the core idea of the model is that SMEs 
can only access external finance from SOEs by paying an extra risk premium. SMEs’ 
net worth accumulated from their profit is the key determinant of the cost of external 
finance. Firms with higher levels of net worth require less external funding and 
mitigate the agency problems related to external finance, which in turn decreases the 
risk premium. Moreover, SOEs producers and SOEs entrusted lenders are just two 
branches of SOEs; therefore, the producing branch can borrow money from their own 
branch without paying extra premium.  
Both SOEs producing branches and SMEs are intermediate goods producers that use 
capital and labour inputs. They sell their heterogeneous goods to final goods producers 
who collect all the intermediate goods and bundle them as final homogeneous goods. 
Finally, households, capital goods producers and government consume all the final 
goods. In addition, government spending is financed by tax payment of households, 
and households are the final owner of all the entities in the economy except the 
government.  
3.3.1 Households 
There is a continuum of households indexed by 𝑙, who maximises the lifetime utility 
which is separable in the current level of real consumption, 𝐶𝑙,𝑡, and leisure (1 −
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𝑁𝑙,𝑡):  
 𝐸0 ∑ 𝛽
𝑡[ln(𝐶𝑙,𝑡) + ln (1 − 𝑁𝑙,𝑡)]
∞
𝑡=0
 (1) 
where 𝐸0 is the rational expectation operator, 𝛽 ∈ (0,1) is the discount factor, 𝑁𝑙,𝑡 
is the hours worked. The 𝑙-th household faces an inter-temporal budget constraint in 
each period,  
 
𝐶𝑙,𝑡 + 𝐷𝑙,𝑡 ≤ 𝑤𝑙,𝑡𝑁𝑙,𝑡 + 𝑅𝑡−1
𝐷
𝐷𝑙,𝑡−1
𝜋𝑡
− 𝑇𝑡 + Π𝑡
𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑙 
(2) 
where 𝐷𝑙,𝑡 is the level of real financial wealth in the form of real bank deposits with a 
riskless gross rate of return 𝑅𝑡
𝐷. 𝜋𝑡 is the inflation and 𝑤𝑙,𝑡 is the real wage of labour 
supply. Households receive the interest payment of their deposits from the previous 
period and the real lump sum profit from the final goods producers Π𝑡
𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑙 . 
Furthermore, households pay the real lump-sum transfer tax 𝑇𝑡 every period. To save 
on notation, I drop the index 𝑗 on Π𝑡
𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑙 and 𝑇𝑡 as the optimal conditions are the 
same across different households. Hence, household chooses 𝐶𝑙,𝑡, 𝐷𝑙,𝑡 and 𝑁𝑙,𝑡 to 
maximise equation (1) subject to the budget constraint (2). The optimization problem 
can be written as a Lagrangian equation, 
 
ℒ = 𝐸0 ∑ 𝛽
𝑡
{[ln(𝐶𝑙,𝑡) + ln(1 − 𝑁𝑙,𝑡)]
∞
𝑡=0
+ 𝜆𝑡
𝐻
[𝑤𝑙,𝑡𝑁𝑙,𝑡 + 𝑅𝑡−1
𝐷 𝐷𝑙,𝑡−1
𝜋𝑡
− 𝑇𝑡 + Π𝑡
𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑙 − 𝐶𝑙,𝑡 − 𝐷𝑙,𝑡]} 
(3) 
The first-order conditions (F.O.Cs) are, 
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 ∂𝐶𝑙,𝑡 :         
1
𝐶𝑙,𝑡
= 𝜆𝑡
𝐻              (4) 
         ∂𝑁𝑙,𝑡 :     
1
1 − 𝑁𝑙,𝑡
= 𝜆𝑡
𝐻 𝑤𝑙,𝑡      (5) 
 ∂𝐷𝑙,𝑡:      𝜆𝑡
𝐻 =  𝛽𝜆𝑡+1
𝐻  𝑅𝑡
𝐷
 (6) 
 ∂𝜆𝑡
𝐻: 𝑤𝑙,𝑡𝑁𝑙,𝑡 + 𝑅𝑡−1
𝐷 𝐷𝑙,𝑡−1
𝜋𝑡
− 𝑇𝑡 + Π𝑡
𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑙 − 𝐶𝑙,𝑡 − 𝐷𝑙,𝑡 = 0 (7) 
𝜆𝑡
𝐻 is the Lagrangian multiplier, which is interpreted as the shadow price of income 
in the equations and the equation (7) is the budget constraint. The consumption Euler 
equation can be obtained by combining conditions (4) and (6) which implies the inter-
temporal substitution in consumption,  
 𝐸𝑡 [𝛽 (
𝐶𝑙,𝑡+1
𝐶𝑙,𝑡
)
−1
1
𝜋𝑡+1
] 𝑅𝑡
𝐷 = 1 (8) 
It states that the marginal utility of consumption in period 𝑡 equals the present value 
of the marginal cost of giving up one unit of consumption in period 𝑡 + 1 
(incorporate with the gross inflation rate 𝜋𝑡+1). The wage equation can be obtained 
by combining equation (4) and (5). 
 
𝐶𝑙,𝑡
1 − 𝑁𝑙,𝑡
= 𝑤𝑙,𝑡 (9) 
3.3.2 Commercial Banks 
I assume commercial banks collect deposits from households at the gross deposit rate 
𝑅𝑡
𝐷  and make loans to SOEs with the real risk-free lending rate  𝑅𝑡
𝐿 , therefore, 
aggregately, it satisfies the following profit function, 
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 𝜋𝑡
𝐶𝐵 = 𝐵𝑡𝑅𝑡
𝐿 − 𝐷𝑡𝑅𝑡
𝐷 (10) 
where 𝐵𝑡 is the total loan amount. To motivate a nontrivial but simple banking sector, 
I impose the reserve requirement of a constant ratio20, 𝜏, imposed by the regulators; 
therefore, only a proportion of the total deposits is allowed to be lent out,  
 𝐵𝑡 = (1 − 𝜏𝜀
𝑒𝑡
𝜏
)𝐷𝑡 (11) 
where 𝜀𝑒𝑡
𝜏
 is an exogenous reserve ratio shock and 𝑒𝑡
𝜏 follows an AR (1) process.  
3.3.3 State-owned Enterprises Entrusted Lenders 
Although SOEs entrusted lenders can be a production sector, the main purpose of this 
paper is to understand their entrusted lending behaviour; therefore, for model 
convenience, I only target the resource allocation of SOEs entrusted lenders in this 
section and leave the producing behaviour to their subsidiaries, denoted as SOEs.  
In each period, the representative SOEs entrusted lender borrows money from 
commercial banks and choose the number of affiliated loans to  an SOE, indexed by 
𝑗 , and the non-affiliated loans to an SME, indexed by 𝑖. Recalling the differences 
between the two types of loans are the underlying risks and interest rates. SOEs charge 
risk-free rate to their subsidiaries but require a higher rate on non-affiliated loans since 
SMEs are risky borrowers. SMEs are fraught with risk because their return to capital 
 
20
 A higher reserve ratio implies a tighter bank credit regulation.  
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investment is subject to the idiosyncratic shock 𝜔𝑖 , which is a random variable 
assumed to be log-normally distributed and i.i.d. across time and firms, with E(𝜔𝑖) = 1, 
 log(𝜔) ~ 𝑁 (−
1
2
𝜎𝜔
2  , 𝜎𝜔
2  ) (12) 
At the end of period 𝑡 , the amount of non-affiliated loans to SME 𝑖 , 𝐵𝑖,𝑡+1
𝑆𝑀𝐸  , is 
determined by the difference between the expenditure on physical capital and the 
SMEs’ net worth, 
 𝐵𝑖,𝑡+1
𝑆𝑀𝐸 = 𝑄𝑡
𝑆𝑀𝐸𝐾𝑖,𝑡+1
𝑆𝑀𝐸 − 𝑁𝑒𝑡𝑖,𝑡+1 (13) 
where 𝑄𝑡
𝑆𝑀𝐸 is the price paid per unit of capital in period 𝑡, 𝐾𝑖,𝑡+1
𝑆𝑀𝐸  is the quantity of 
capital purchased, and 𝑁𝑒𝑡𝑡+1 is the net worth accumulated by the survived SME. 
The amount of the affiliated loans to SOEs follows similar condition, 
 𝐵𝑗,𝑡+1
𝑆𝑂𝐸 = 𝑄𝑡
𝑆𝑂𝐸𝐾𝑗,𝑡+1
𝑆𝑂𝐸
 (14) 
where 𝐵𝑗,𝑡+1
𝑆𝑂𝐸  is the amount of the affiliated loans and is determined by the expenditure 
on capital 𝑄𝑡
𝑆𝑂𝐸𝐾𝑗,𝑡+1
𝑆𝑂𝐸 . SOEs production sectors are different from SMEs because they 
can easily obtain funds from their parent company without friction which do not 
require using net worth as collateral to borrow money. 
SOE entrusted lenders that act as a financial intermediary to SOEs and SMEs face an 
opportunity cost of funds between 𝑡 and 𝑡 + 1, which equals to the risk-free rate, 
𝑅𝑡+1
𝐿 . The idiosyncratic risk involved in lending is perfectly diversified in equilibrium 
in our model; thus, the optimal contract arrangement is determined by the following 
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equation,  
 
[1 − 𝐹(?̅?𝑖)]𝑅𝑡+1
𝑁𝐴 𝐵𝑖,𝑡+1
𝑆𝑀𝐸 + (1 − 𝜇) ∫ 𝜔𝑖𝑅𝑡+1
𝐾
?̅?
0
𝑄𝑡
𝑆𝑀𝐸𝐾𝑖,𝑡+1
𝑆𝑀𝐸 𝑑𝐹(𝜔)
+ 𝑅𝑡+1
𝐿 𝐵𝑗,𝑡+1
𝑆𝑂𝐸  = 𝑅𝑡+1
𝐿 (𝐵𝑖,𝑡+1
𝑆𝑀𝐸 + 𝐵𝑗,𝑡+1
𝑆𝑂𝐸 ) 
(15) 
which implies the total expected return on both non-affiliated and affiliated loans 
equals the opportunity costs of the total funds21.  The first item on the left-hand side 
of the equation implies the yield on the non-defaulted loans to SMEs. 𝐹(?̅?𝑖) is the 
default probability with a continuous and once-differentiable CDF function. 𝑅𝑡+1
𝑁𝐴  is 
the contractual rate on the non-affiliated loans. The SME is able to repay the loan if 
the idiosyncratic shock is higher or equal to the threshold, ?̅?𝑖. That is, ?̅?𝑖 is defined 
by, 
 ?̅?𝑖𝑅𝑡+1
𝐾 𝑄𝑡
𝑆𝑀𝐸𝐾𝑖,𝑡+1
𝑆𝑀𝐸 = 𝑅𝑡+1
𝑁𝐴 𝐵𝑖,𝑡+1
𝑆𝑀𝐸
 (16) 
when 𝜔𝑖 ≥ ?̅?𝑖 , the SME repay the promised amount 𝑅𝑡+1
𝑁𝐴 𝐵𝑖,𝑡+1
𝑆𝑀𝐸   and keeps the 
difference, i.e. 𝜔𝑖𝑅𝑡+1
𝐾 𝑄𝑡
𝑆𝑀𝐸𝐾𝑖,𝑡+1
𝑆𝑀𝐸 − 𝑅𝑡+1
𝑁𝐴 𝐵𝑖,𝑡+1
𝑆𝑀𝐸 = (𝜔𝑖 − ?̅?𝑖)𝑅𝑡+1
𝐾 𝑄𝑡
𝑆𝑀𝐸𝐾𝑖,𝑡+1
𝑆𝑀𝐸 . While 
it declares bankrupt and exits the market if 𝜔𝑖 < ?̅?𝑖. The second item thus implies the 
value left in the account of the bankrupt SME subject to a monitoring cost22, 𝜇. The 
idea here is SOE entrusted lender needs to pay an extra cost to observe the borrower’s 
realised return on capital, i.e. the monitoring cost equals  𝜇 ∫ 𝜔𝑖𝑅𝑡+1
𝐾?̅?
0
𝑄𝑡
𝑆𝑀𝐸𝐾𝑖,𝑡+1
𝑆𝑀𝐸 , in 
 
21 The total funds of SELs, 𝐵𝑡, are obtained from the commercial banks, which equals 𝐵𝑡+1
𝑃𝑂𝐸 + 𝐵𝑡+1
𝑆𝑃𝐵 aggregately.  
22 This is the so-called ‘costly state verification’ (CSV), and there are several important contributions in business 
cycle literatures that incorporate with CSV, such as Townsend (1979), Williamson (1987), Carlstrom and Fuerst 
(1997), Fisher (1999), Christiano, Motto and Rostagno (2004), Arellano et al. (2012) and Jermann and Quadrini 
(2012). 
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which 𝑅𝑡+1
𝐾  indicates the capital return. Equation (15) indicates that SOEs entrusted 
lenders are risk-neutral as the risk in the portfolio is perfectly diversified.  
3.3.4 Small-and-medium Sized Enterprises 
Before turning to the optimization problem in the SME sector, one needs to be clear 
that the key difference between SMEs and SOEs is the financial condition. SOEs can 
borrow funds at a risk-free rate, while SMEs cannot. SMEs need to pay an extra risk 
premium to offset the potential loss in case of a default. Hence, the purpose of this 
sector is to first determine the risk premium for a specific loan contract and solve the 
maximization problem. SMEs are permitted to keep the retained profit once they fulfil 
the interest payment to SOEs. Therefore, the expected return of a surviving SME from 
the capital investment can be defined as, 
 𝐸 {∫ 𝜔𝑖𝑅𝑡+1
𝐾 𝑄𝑡
𝑆𝑀𝐸𝐾𝑖,𝑡+1
𝑆𝑀𝐸 𝑑𝐹(𝜔)
∞
?̅?
− [1 − 𝐹(?̅?𝑖)]?̅?𝑖 𝑅𝑡+1
𝐾 𝑄𝑡
𝑆𝑀𝐸𝐾𝑖,𝑡+1
𝑆𝑀𝐸
} (17) 
The expectation operator 𝐸 indicates the expected return on investment, 𝑅𝑡+1
𝐾 . The first part 
in equation (17) implies the total return from the investment and the second part is the 
interest payment on the loans with the non-default probability 1 − 𝐹(?̅?𝑖). The above 
equation can be simplified as,  
 [1 − 𝛤(?̅?𝑖)]𝑅𝑡+1
𝐾 𝑄𝑡
𝑆𝑀𝐸𝐾𝑖,𝑡+1
𝑆𝑀𝐸
 (18) 
Where  
 𝛤(?̅?𝑖) = ∫ 𝜔𝑖𝑑𝐹(𝜔)
∞
?̅?
+ 𝐺(?̅?𝑖) (19) 
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And  
 𝐺(?̅?𝑖) = ∫ 𝜔𝑖𝑑𝐹(𝜔)
?̅?
0
 (20) 
Rearranging the SOE entrusted lenders’ participation constraint (15),  
 ∫ 𝜔𝑖𝑑𝐹(𝜔)
∞
?̅?
+ (1 − 𝜇) ∫ 𝜔𝑖𝑑𝐹(𝜔)
?̅?
0
=
𝑅𝑡+1
𝐿
𝑅𝑡+1
𝐾
𝐵𝑖,𝑡+1
𝑆𝑀𝐸
𝑄𝑡
𝑆𝑀𝐸𝐾𝑖,𝑡+1
𝑆𝑀𝐸  (21) 
Combining with the notation in equation (19) and (20), the constraint can then be 
written as, 
 𝛤(?̅?) − 𝜇𝐺(?̅?) =
𝑅𝑡+1
𝐿
𝑅𝑡+1
𝐾
𝐵𝑖,𝑡+1
𝑆𝑀𝐸
𝑄𝑡
𝑆𝑀𝐸𝐾𝑖,𝑡+1
𝑆𝑀𝐸  (22) 
Where 𝛤(?̅?) − 𝜇𝐺(?̅?) represents the net share of profits going to the SLB. The 
optimization problem is then to maximise the objective function (18) of the SME, 𝑖, 
subject to the participation constraint of the SOE entrusted lenders (22), and the 
Lagrangian is,  
 
ℒ = [1 − 𝛤(?̅?𝑖)]𝑅𝑡+1
𝐾 𝑄𝑡
𝑆𝑀𝐸𝐾𝑖,𝑡+1
𝑆𝑀𝐸
+ 𝜆𝑡
𝑆𝑀𝐸
[𝛤(?̅?) − 𝜇𝐺(?̅?) −
𝑅𝑡+1
𝐿
𝑅𝑡+1
𝐾
𝐵𝑖,𝑡+1
𝑆𝑀𝐸
𝑄𝑡
𝑆𝑀𝐸𝐾𝑖,𝑡+1
𝑆𝑀𝐸
] 
(23) 
Simplifying the notation by denoting 𝑠𝑡 =
𝑅𝑡+1
𝐾
𝑅𝑡+1
𝐿 , and ℵ𝑡 =
𝑄𝑡
𝑆𝑀𝐸𝐾𝑖,𝑡+1
𝑆𝑀𝐸
𝐵𝑖,𝑡+1
𝑆𝑀𝐸 . The F.O.Cs with 
respect to ?̅?𝑖, ℵ𝑡 and 𝜆𝑡
𝑆𝑀𝐸 are, 
 ∂?̅?𝑖:         𝛤′(?̅?𝑖) = 𝜆𝑡
𝑆𝑀𝐸
[𝛤′(?̅?) − 𝜇𝐺′(?̅?)] (24) 
 ∂ℵ𝑡: [1 − 𝛤(?̅?𝑖)]𝑠𝑡 + 𝜆𝑡
𝑆𝑀𝐸
[𝛤(?̅?) − 𝜇𝐺(?̅?)]𝑠𝑡 = 𝜆𝑡
𝑆𝑀𝐸
 (25) 
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 ∂𝜆𝑡
𝑆𝑀𝐸
:     [𝛤(?̅?) − 𝜇𝐺(?̅?)] 𝑠𝑡 ℵ𝑡 =  ℵ𝑡 − 1   (26) 
Rearranging equation (26), we can obtain a critical link between capital expenditure 
and financial conditions, which indicates the risk premium, denoted as 𝑠𝑡, of the non-
affiliated loan contract, 
 𝑠𝑡 = 𝐸𝑡 (
𝑅𝑡+1
𝐾
𝑅𝑡+1
𝐿 ) =
1 − 𝑁𝑒𝑡𝑖,𝑡/𝑄𝑡
𝑆𝑀𝐸𝐾𝑡+1
𝑆𝑀𝐸
𝛤(?̅?) − 𝜇𝐺(?̅?)
 (27) 
Equation (27) indicates the relationship between risk premium and the net worth (or 
retained earnings) of an SME, 𝑖, in period 𝑡. The risk premium is defined as the spread 
between the expected return on capital, 𝑅𝑡+1
𝐾 , and the risk-free rate, 𝑅𝑡+1
𝐿 . The risk 
premium 𝑠𝑡 is greater than 1 and it is clearly seen that the higher the net worth, 𝑁𝑒𝑡𝑖,𝑡, 
the lower the risk premium the SME needs to pay with ceteris paribus laws. 1 −
𝑁𝑒𝑡𝑖,𝑡/𝑄𝑡
𝑆𝑀𝐸𝐾𝑡+1
𝑆𝑀𝐸  indicates the firm’s leverage ratio. Intuitively, firms with more 
retained earnings tend to have lower default probability as they can use more internal 
finance instead of external funds, or equivalently, firms with less probability of default 
can take on debt with a lower cost of funds.  
I then need to determine the net worth accumulation of the SMEs. In each period, 
SMEs face a survival ratio23 , 𝛾, therefore (1 − 𝛾) SMEs exit the market. Let 𝑉𝑡  be 
equity in period 𝑡, then the aggregate net worth in period 𝑡 + 1, 𝑁𝑒𝑡𝑡+1 is given by, 
 
23 This assumption is to rule out the case that one SME may accumulate net worth sufficiently in the future and 
never require borrowing from the financial intermediary. Empirically, it is well accepted that substantial number 
of start-ups firms end in failure and this is a common situation globally, for example, Hall and Woodward (2010) 
investigate the extreme cross-sectional dispersion in entrepreneurs’ payoffs.   
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 𝑁𝑒𝑡𝑡+1 = γ𝑉𝑡 (28) 
with 
 𝑉𝑡 = 𝑅𝑡
𝐾𝑄𝑡−1
𝑆𝑀𝐸𝐾𝑡
𝑆𝑀𝐸 − [𝑅𝑡
𝐿 +
𝜇 ∫ 𝜔𝑅𝑡
𝐾𝑄𝑡−1
𝑆𝑀𝐸𝐾𝑡
𝑆𝑀𝐸𝑑𝐹(𝜔)
?̅?
0
𝐵𝑡
𝑆𝑀𝐸 ] 𝐵𝑡
𝑆𝑀𝐸  (29) 
where γ𝑉𝑡 is the equity held by entrepreneurs at 𝑡 − 1 who are still in business at 𝑡. 
Entrepreneurial equity 𝑉𝑡  equals gross earnings of capital investment, 
𝑅𝑡
𝐾𝑄𝑡−1
𝑆𝑀𝐸𝐾𝑡
𝑆𝑀𝐸 , on holdings of equity from 𝑡 − 1 to 𝑡, less repayment of borrowings 
(repayment of the loans, 𝑅𝑡
𝐿𝐵𝑡
𝑆𝑀𝐸 plus the risk premium). The ratio of defaults costs 
to quantity borrowed reflects the premium for external finance, 
 
𝜇 ∫ 𝜔𝑅𝑡
𝐾𝑄𝑡−1
𝑆𝑀𝐸𝐾𝑡
𝑆𝑀𝐸𝑑𝐹(𝜔)
?̅?
0
𝑄𝑡−1
𝑆𝑀𝐸𝐾𝑡
𝑆𝑀𝐸 − 𝑁𝑒𝑡𝑡
 (30) 
After determining the risk premium and net worth of SMEs, I then turn to the 
production phase, SMEs borrow money from SOEs entrusted lenders and purchase 
capital in period 𝑡 for use in the following period 𝑡 + 1. Capital and hired labour are 
used to produce intermediate goods, 𝑌𝑖,𝑡+1
𝑆𝑀𝐸 , which follows a Cobb-Douglas function, 
 𝑌𝑖,𝑡+1
𝑆𝑀𝐸 = 𝐴𝑡+1
𝑆𝑀𝐸(𝐾𝑖,𝑡+1
𝑆𝑀𝐸 )
𝛼1
(𝑁𝑖,𝑡+1
𝑆𝑀𝐸 )
(1−𝛼1)
 (31) 
where  𝐴𝑡+1
𝑆𝑀𝐸 is an exogenous TFP shock in the SME’s sector. 𝐾𝑖,𝑡+1
𝑆𝑀𝐸  is the amount of 
capital purchased by the SME in period 𝑡, 𝑁𝑖,𝑡+1
𝑆𝑀𝐸 is the labour demand, and 𝛼1 is the 
income share of capital. SMEs maximise profit by selling intermediate goods to the 
final goods producers, paying the wage and interests on the loans. At the end of each 
period, they sell back undepreciated capital to the capital goods producers. The profit 
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function of the SME, 𝑖, is 
 
𝜋𝑖,𝑡+1
𝑆𝑀𝐸 =
𝑃𝑡+1
𝑤,𝑆𝑀𝐸
𝑋𝑡+1𝑃𝑡+1
𝑤 𝑌𝑖,𝑡+1
𝑆𝑀𝐸 − 𝑤𝑡+1𝑁𝑖,𝑡+1
𝑆𝑀𝐸 − 𝑅𝑡+1
𝐾 𝐵𝑖,𝑡+1
𝑆𝑀𝐸
+ 𝑄𝑡+1
𝑆𝑀𝐸
(1 − 𝛿𝑆𝑀𝐸) 𝐾𝑖,𝑡+1
𝑆𝑀𝐸
 
(32) 
Recalling that 𝐵𝑖,𝑡+1
𝑆𝑀𝐸 = 𝑄𝑡
𝑆𝑀𝐸𝐾𝑖,𝑡+1
𝑆𝑀𝐸 − 𝑁𝑒𝑡𝑖,𝑡+1 (the amount the SME borrows depends on 
the value of the capital investment minus the net worth they have). 𝑋𝑡+1 is the relative 
price of intermediate goods which is between the aggregate wholesale price 𝑃𝑡+1
𝑤  and 
the nominal price for the final good 𝑃𝑡+1. 
𝑃𝑡+1
𝑤,𝑆𝑀𝐸
𝑃𝑡+1
𝑤  is the relative wholesale price of 
goods produced in the SME sector which is between the sectoral wholesale price and 
the aggregate wholesale price.  𝑤𝑡+1 is the real wage. Assuming SMEs need to sell 
the undepreciated capital back to the capital goods producers at the end of the period 
𝑡 + 1, hence, they need to purchase new capital for the production in the subsequent 
period.  
Taking the F.O. Cs with respect to 𝐾𝑖,𝑡+1
𝑆𝑀𝐸  and 𝑁𝑖,𝑡+1
𝑆𝑀𝐸 , we obtain, 
 ∂𝐾𝑖,𝑡+1
𝑆𝑀𝐸 : 𝐸𝑡 (𝑅𝑡+1
𝐾
) =
𝑀𝑃𝐾𝑖,𝑡+1
𝑆𝑀𝐸 + 𝑄𝑡+1
𝑆𝑀𝐸
(1 − 𝛿𝑆𝑀𝐸)
𝑄𝑡
𝑆𝑀𝐸
 (33) 
 ∂𝑁𝑖,𝑡+1
𝑆𝑀𝐸 : 𝑤𝑡+1 = (1 − 𝛼1)
𝑃𝑡+1
𝑤,𝑆𝑀𝐸
𝑋𝑡+1𝑃𝑡+1
𝑤
𝑌𝑖,𝑡+1
𝑆𝑀𝐸
𝑁𝑖,𝑡+1
𝑆𝑀𝐸
 (34) 
Where 𝑀𝑃𝐾𝑖,𝑡+1
𝑆𝑀𝐸represents the marginal product of capital in the SMEs’ sector, which 
is equal to 𝛼1
𝑃𝑡+1
𝑤,𝑆𝑀𝐸
𝑋𝑡+1𝑃𝑡+1
𝑤
𝑌𝑖,𝑡+1
𝑆𝑀𝐸
𝐾𝑖,𝑡+1
𝑆𝑀𝐸. 𝛿
𝑆𝑀𝐸  is the capital depreciation rate. Equation (33) states 
the expected gross return to holding a unit of capital from period 𝑡 to 𝑡 + 1. 𝑅𝑡+1
𝐾  is 
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the return on capital investment. Equation (34) states the marginal product of labour 
in the SMEs’ sector.   
3.3.5 State-owned Enterprises 
In each period 𝑡, the SOE 𝑗 purchases physical capital by borrowing money from 
their parent company at the risk-free rate 𝑅𝑡+1
𝐿  . Combining capital, 𝐾𝑗,𝑡+1
𝑆𝑂𝐸  with the 
hired labour, 𝑁𝑗,𝑡+1
𝑆𝑂𝐸 , in period 𝑡 + 1, SOE produces intermediate output and resell the 
underappreciated capital back to the capital good producers. The Cobb-Douglas 
production function is specified as, 
 𝑌𝑗,𝑡+1
𝑆𝑂𝐸 = 𝐴𝑡+1
𝑆𝑂𝐸(𝐾𝑗,𝑡+1
𝑆𝑂𝐸 )
𝛼2
(𝑁𝑗,𝑡+1
𝑆𝑂𝐸 )
(1−𝛼2)
 (35) 
where 𝐴𝑡+1
𝑆𝑂𝐸 is the exogenous technology shock, which is the same across all SOEs, 
and it follows an AR (1) process. 𝛼2 is the income share of capital in SOES’ sector.   
The profit function of the SOE producing sector is given by,  
 
 
𝜋𝑗,𝑡+1
𝑆𝑂𝐸 =
𝑃𝑡+1
𝑤,𝑆𝑂𝐸
𝑋𝑡+1𝑃𝑡+1
𝑤 𝑌𝑗,𝑡+1
𝑆𝑂𝐸 − 𝑤𝑡+1𝑁𝑗,𝑡+1
𝑆𝑂𝐸 − 𝑅𝑡+1
𝐿 𝐵𝑗,𝑡+1
𝑆𝑂𝐸
+ 𝑄𝑡+1
𝑆𝑂𝐸
(1 − 𝛿𝑆𝑂𝐸) 𝐾𝑗,𝑡+1
𝑆𝑂𝐸
 
(36) 
Where 𝐵𝑖,𝑡+1
𝑆𝑂𝐸 = 𝑄𝑡
𝑆𝑂𝐸𝐾𝑖,𝑡+1
𝑆𝑂𝐸 , indicating that SOEs do not need to accumulate net worth to 
finance their capital investment. 𝐾𝑗,𝑡+1
𝑆𝑂𝐸  is the capital purchased in period 𝑡 for the use 
in period 𝑡 + 1. 𝑁𝑗,𝑡+1
𝑆𝑂𝐸  is the labour hired in period 𝑡 + 1. 𝑃𝑡+1
𝑤,𝑆𝑂𝐸
𝑃𝑡+1
𝑤  is the relative price 
between SOEs wholesale price and the general wholesale price level. 𝑤𝑡+1 is the real 
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wage which is the same across different sectors (both SOEs and SMEs). The capital 
return in the SOEs sector equals the risk-free lending rate, 𝑅𝑡+1
𝐿 , since the producing 
sector borrow money from their own lending branch (SOEs entrusted lenders) without 
any friction. 𝛿𝑆𝑂𝐸 is the capital depreciation rate in the SOEs sector. 𝑄𝑡
𝑆𝑂𝐸 implies 
the price of the capital and the undepreciated capital is sold back to the capital goods 
producers at the end of period 𝑡 + 1 at price 𝑄𝑡+1
𝑆𝑂𝐸. Taking the F.O.Cs with respect 
to 𝐾𝑗,𝑡+1
𝑆𝑂𝐸  and 𝑁𝑗,𝑡+1
𝑆𝑂𝐸  yield, 
 ∂𝐾𝑗,𝑡+1
𝑆𝑂𝐸 : 𝑅𝑡+1
𝐿 =
𝑀𝑃𝐾𝑗,𝑡+1
𝑆𝑂𝐸 + 𝑄𝑡+1
𝑆𝑂𝐸
(1 − 𝛿𝑆𝑂𝐸)
𝑄𝑡
𝑆𝑂𝐸
 (37) 
 ∂𝑁𝑗,𝑡+1
𝑆𝑂𝐸 : 𝑤𝑡+1 = (1 − 𝛼2)
𝑃𝑡+1
𝑤,𝑆𝑂𝐸
𝑋𝑡+1𝑃𝑡+1
𝑤
𝑌𝑗,𝑡+1
𝑆𝑂𝐸
𝑁𝑗,𝑡+1
𝑆𝑂𝐸
 (38) 
Equation (37) implies the gross return to holding a unit of capital in the SOEs, which 
equal to the risk-free lending rate from the commercial banks. 𝛿𝑆𝑂𝐸  is the 
depreciation rate and 𝑀𝑃𝐾𝑗,𝑡+1
𝑆𝑂𝐸   is the marginal product of capital in SOE’s sector, 
which takes the form as 𝛼2
𝑃𝑡+1
𝑤,𝑆𝑂𝐸
𝑋𝑡+1𝑃𝑡+1
𝑤
𝑌𝑗,𝑡+1
𝑆𝑂𝐸
𝐾𝑗,𝑡+1
𝑆𝑂𝐸 . Comparing the gross capital return in SMEs 
sector, i.e. equation (33), when capital inputs are homogeneous across sectors, the 
marginal product of capital of private firms is clearly higher than that of state firms as 
𝑅𝑡+1
𝐾 > 𝑅𝑡+1
𝐿  . Intuitively, this implies a higher efficiency in the credit-constrained 
firms; in other words, the MPK in the SMEs’ sector is higher than the state sector. 
Equation (38) indicates the real wage level equals the marginal product of labour in 
the SOEs’ sector.  
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3.3.6 Capital Goods Producers 
There is a representative capital goods producer who purchases final output as 
materials inputs, 𝐼𝑡
𝑆𝑂𝐸 and 𝐼𝑡
𝑆𝑀𝐸 , and produce new capital goods for both SOEs and 
SMEs. the new capital goods are sold at price 𝑄𝑡
𝑆𝑂𝐸 and 𝑄𝑡
𝑆𝑀𝐸. The profit function 
is,  
 𝜋𝑡
𝐼 = 𝐾𝑡+1
𝑆𝑂𝐸𝑄𝑡
𝑆𝑂𝐸 + 𝐾𝑡+1
𝑆𝑀𝐸𝑄𝑡
𝑆𝑀𝐸 − 𝐼𝑡
𝑆𝑂𝐸 − 𝐼𝑡
𝑆𝑀𝐸
 (39) 
Subject to the capital accumulation with adjustment costs in both sectors, which 
implies increasing marginal adjustment costs in the production of capital,   
 𝐾𝑡
𝑆𝑂𝐸 = (1 − 𝛿1)𝐾𝑡−1
𝑆𝑂𝐸 + 𝑒𝑡
𝐼𝑆𝑂𝐸 [𝐼𝑡
𝑆𝑂𝐸 −
𝜙𝐾
𝑆𝑂𝐸
2
(
𝐼𝑡
𝑆𝑂𝐸
𝐾𝑡−1
𝑆𝑂𝐸 − 𝛿
𝑆𝑂𝐸
)
2
𝐾𝑡−1
𝑆𝑂𝐸] (40) 
 𝐾𝑡
𝑆𝑀𝐸 = (1 − 𝛿1)𝐾𝑡−1
𝑆𝑀𝐸 + 𝑒𝑡
𝐼𝑆𝑀𝐸 [𝐼𝑡
𝑆𝑀𝐸 −
𝜙𝐾
𝑆𝑀𝐸
2
(
𝐼𝑡
𝑆𝑀𝐸
𝐾𝑡−1
𝑆𝑀𝐸 − 𝛿
𝑆𝑀𝐸
)
2
𝐾𝑡−1
𝑆𝑀𝐸] (41) 
𝑒𝑡
𝐼𝑆𝑂𝐸  and 𝑒𝑡
𝐼𝑆𝑀𝐸  are the investment-specific shocks, which both follow AR (1) 
processes. The Lagrangian equation is,  
 
ℒ = 𝐾𝑡+1
𝑆𝑂𝐸𝑄𝑡
𝑆𝑂𝐸 + 𝐾𝑡+1
𝑆𝑀𝐸𝑄𝑡
𝑆𝑀𝐸 −  𝐼𝑡
𝑆𝑂𝐸 − 𝐼𝑡
𝑆𝑀𝐸
+ 𝜆𝑡
𝐼𝑆𝑂𝐸 [(1 − 𝛿1)𝐾𝑡−1
𝑆𝑂𝐸 + 𝑒𝑡
𝐼𝑆𝑂𝐸 [𝐼𝑡
𝑆𝑂𝐸 −
𝜙𝐾
𝑆𝑂𝐸
2
(
𝐼𝑡
𝑆𝑂𝐸
𝐾𝑡−1
𝑆𝑂𝐸 − 𝛿
𝑆𝑂𝐸)
2
𝐾𝑡−1
𝑆𝑂𝐸]
− 𝐾𝑡
𝑆𝑂𝐸]
+ 𝜆𝑡
𝐼𝑆𝑀𝐸 [(1 − 𝛿1)𝐾𝑡−1
𝑆𝑀𝐸 + 𝑒𝑡
𝐼𝑆𝑀𝐸 [𝐼𝑡
𝑆𝑀𝐸 −
𝜙𝐾
𝑆𝑀𝐸
2
(
𝐼𝑡
𝑆𝑀𝐸
𝐾𝑡−1
𝑆𝑀𝐸 − 𝛿
𝑆𝑀𝐸)
2
𝐾𝑡−1
𝑆𝑀𝐸]
− 𝐾𝑡
𝑆𝑀𝐸] 
(42) 
The F.O.Cs with respect to 𝐼𝑡
𝑆𝑂𝐸 , 𝐼𝑡
𝑆𝑀𝐸 , 𝐾𝑡
𝑆𝑂𝐸 and 𝐾𝑡
𝑆𝑀𝐸 are, 
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 ∂𝐼𝑡
𝑆𝑂𝐸 : 𝜆𝑡
𝐼𝑆𝑂𝐸𝑒𝑡
𝐼𝑆𝑂𝐸 [1 − 𝜙𝐾
𝑆𝑂𝐸 (
𝐼𝑡
𝑆𝑂𝐸
𝐾𝑡−1
𝑆𝑂𝐸 − 𝛿
𝑆𝑂𝐸
)] = 1 (43) 
 ∂𝐼𝑡
𝑆𝑀𝐸 : 𝜆𝑡
𝐼𝑆𝑀𝐸𝑒𝑡
𝐼𝑆𝑀𝐸 [1 − 𝜙𝐾
𝑆𝑀𝐸 (
𝐼𝑡
𝑆𝑀𝐸
𝐾𝑡−1
𝑆𝑂𝐸 − 𝛿
𝑆𝑀𝐸
)] = 1 (44) 
 ∂𝐾𝑡
𝑆𝑂𝐸: 𝑄𝑡
𝑆𝑂𝐸 = 𝜆𝑡
𝐼𝑆𝑂𝐸  (45) 
 ∂𝐾𝑡
𝑆𝑀𝐸: 𝑄𝑡
𝑆𝑀𝐸 = 𝜆𝑡
𝐼𝑆𝑀𝐸  (46) 
Combining equations (43) with (45), and equations (44) with (46) respectively yield 
the Tobin’s Q equations,  
 
1
𝑄𝑡
𝑆𝑂𝐸 = [1 − 𝜙𝐾
𝑆𝑂𝐸 (
𝐼𝑡
𝑆𝑂𝐸
𝐾𝑡−1
𝑆𝑂𝐸 − 𝛿
𝑆𝑂𝐸)] 𝑒𝑡
𝐼𝑆𝑂𝐸  (47) 
  
1
𝑄𝑡
𝑆𝑀𝐸 = [1 − 𝜙𝐾
𝑆𝑀𝐸 (
𝐼𝑡
𝑆𝑀𝐸
𝐾𝑡−1
𝑆𝑀𝐸 − 𝛿
𝑆𝑀𝐸)] 𝑒𝑡
𝐼𝑆𝑀𝐸 (48) 
 
3.3.7 Final Goods Producers: Retailers 
To incorporate sticky prices in the model, I introduce a unit mass of monopolistic 
competitive retailers. They purchase intermediate wholesale goods from SMEs and 
SOEs at aggregate wholesale price 𝑃𝑡
𝑊, then bundle them into the homogeneous final 
products. Let 𝑌𝑧,𝑡 be the quantity of output sold by a retailer 𝑧, measured in units of 
wholesale goods, then the total final usable goods, 𝑌𝑡, are the following composite of 
individual retail goods, 
 𝑌𝑡 = [∫ (𝑌𝑧,𝑡)
𝜖−1
𝜖 𝑑𝑧
1
0
]
𝜖
𝜖−1
 (49) 
where 𝜖 > 1 is the elasticity of substitution among different types of intermediate 
goods that captures the markup to the intermediate goods’ prices. The wholesale output, 
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𝑌𝑧,𝑡, is composed of sectoral output according to, 
 𝑌𝑧,𝑡 = [𝑎(𝑌𝑖,𝑡
𝑆𝑀𝐸)
𝜌
+ (1 − 𝑎)(𝑌𝑗,𝑡
𝑆𝑂𝐸)𝜌]
1
𝜌 (50) 
where 𝑎 implies the weight of using SMEs’ goods in bundling the final goods and 𝜌 
is the substitutability between two types of intermediate goods. Final output can be 
transformed into consumption good that purchased by households, capital goods 
producers and government or used up in monitoring costs and reserve requirement at 
the price 𝑃𝑡. the corresponding price index is given by,  
 𝑃𝑡 = [∫ (𝑃𝑧,𝑡
𝑊 )
1−𝜖
𝑑𝑧
1
0
]
1
1−𝜖
 (51) 
Following the Calvo (1983) price setting, I introduce sticky-price in the retail sector. 
With probability (1 − 𝜃), a given retailer is assumed to be able to reset its price (𝑃𝑡
∗) 
at period 𝑡.  
 ∑ 𝜃𝑘
∞
𝑘=0
𝐸𝑡[𝛬𝑡,𝑘
𝑃𝑡
∗ − 𝑃𝑡+𝑘
𝑊
𝑃𝑡+𝑘
𝑌𝑡+𝑘
𝑊 (𝑧)] (52) 
The expected discounted profit is maximised by the stochastic discount factor, 
𝛬𝑡,𝑘  𝛽
𝐶𝑡
𝐶𝑡+𝑘
 , which is the ratio of marginal utility between period 𝑡 + 𝑘  and 𝑡 
incorporate with the probability of being able to adjust the price, 𝑃𝑡
∗. there is no sticky-
price if 𝜃 = 0. the nominal marginal cost of a retailer is the general wholesale price 
𝑃𝑧,𝑡
𝑊 , therefore, the objective is to maximise equation (52) by choosing the optimal reset 
price. Taking the F.O.C with respect to 𝑃𝑡
∗, we obtain,  
 
Chapter 3 Entrusted Loans and SOEs Lending Activities 
104 
 
 ∑ 𝜃𝑘
∞
𝑘=0
𝐸𝑡 {[𝛬𝑡,𝑘 (
𝑃𝑡
∗
𝑃𝑡+𝑘
)
𝜖
𝑌𝑡+𝑘
𝑊 (𝑧) [
𝑃𝑡
∗
𝑃𝑡+𝑘
− (
𝜖
𝜖 − 1
)
𝑃𝑡+𝑘
𝑊
𝑃𝑡+𝑘
]]} = 0 (53) 
Rearranging the equation above, we obtain the function for the optimal reset price, 
 𝑃𝑡
∗ =
𝜖
𝜖 − 1
𝐸𝑡 ∑ 𝜃
𝑘∞
𝑘=0 𝛬𝑡,𝑘(𝑃𝑡+𝑘
𝑊 𝑃𝑡+𝑘
−(1−𝜖)
𝑌𝑡+𝑘)
𝐸𝑡 ∑ 𝜃𝑘
∞
𝑘=0 𝛬𝑡,𝑘(𝑃𝑡+𝑘
−(1−𝜖)
𝑌𝑡+𝑘)
 (54) 
Or  
 𝑃𝑡
∗ =
𝜖
𝜖 − 1
𝐸𝑡 ∑(𝛽𝐷𝜃)
𝑘
∞
𝑘=0
(𝑃𝑡+𝑘
𝑊 ) (55) 
Where 𝑃𝑡+𝑘
𝑊  can be treated as the marginal cost of the retailer. According to the 
aggregate price level (51), we can split it into a combination of the optimal reset price 
and the previous price24,  
 𝑃𝑡 = [∫ [(1 − 𝜃)(𝑃𝑡
∗)1−𝜖 + 𝜃𝑃𝑡−1
1−𝜖]𝑑𝑧
1
0
]
1
1−𝜖
 (56) 
Which can be simplified as,  
 𝑃𝑡 = [(1 − 𝜃)(𝑃𝑡
∗)1−𝜖 + 𝜃𝑃𝑡−1
1−𝜖]
1
1−𝜖 (57) 
Dividing both sides by 𝑃𝑡−125, 
 
 
𝑃𝑡
𝑃𝑡−1
= [(1 − 𝜃) (
𝑃𝑡
∗
𝑃𝑡−1
)
1−𝜖
+ 𝜃 (
𝑃𝑡−1
𝑃𝑡−1
)
1−𝜖
]
1
1−𝜖 (58) 
 
24 All firms that can reset their price will choose the same level, and the rest of firms will have the same aggregate price level as 
the previous period. 
25 We need to allow for the existence of steady state inflation (zero steady state inflation in the linearization), by dividing the 
lagged price level, the steady state is then well defined. 
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Defining 
𝑃𝑡
𝑃𝑡−1
= 1 + 𝜋𝑡, equation (58) becomes, 
      1 + 𝜋𝑡 = [(1 − 𝜃) (
𝑃𝑡
∗
𝑃𝑡−1
)
1−𝜖
+ 𝜃] 
1
1−𝜖 (59) 
Substituting equation (55) into equation (59) and log-linearising the inflation equation 
around the zero-inflation steady state26 , we are able to obtain the New Keynesian 
Phillips curve,  
 ?̃?𝑡 = 𝛽𝐸𝑡?̃?𝑡+1 +
(1 − 𝜃)(1 − 𝜃𝛽)
𝜃
(−?̃?𝑡) (60) 
Where ?̃?𝑡 = 𝑝𝑡 − 𝑝𝑡
𝑤̃  implies the relative price between the aggregate wholesale price 
and retail price. The aggregate resource constraint takes the form as, 
 𝑌𝑡 = 𝐶𝑡 + 𝐼𝑡 +  𝐺𝑡 + 𝜏𝐷𝑡 + 𝜇 ∫ 𝜔𝑅𝑡
𝐾𝑄𝑡−1
𝑃𝑂𝐸𝐾𝑡
𝑃𝑂𝐸𝑑𝐹(𝜔)
?̅?
0
 (61) 
Where 𝐼𝑡 = 𝐼𝑡
𝑆𝑂𝐸 + 𝐼𝑡
𝑆𝑀𝐸   and 𝜇 ∫ 𝜔𝑅𝑡
𝐾𝑄𝑡−1
𝑃𝑂𝐸𝐾𝑡
𝑃𝑂𝐸𝑑𝐹(𝜔)
?̅?
0
  reflects aggregate 
monitoring costs. 
3.3.8 Government Sector and Monetary Policy 
To close the model, I specify the government budget constraint by assuming that 
government spending is financed by households’ tax payment, 
 𝐺𝑡 = 𝑇𝑡  (62) 
and it follows the AR (1) process. In addition, there is a central bank implement 
monetary policy according to the conventional Taylor rule, 
 
26 The detailed log-linearisation process is included in the appendix.  
Chapter 3 Entrusted Loans and SOEs Lending Activities 
106 
 
 
𝑅𝑡
𝑅
= (
𝑅𝑡−1
𝑅
)
𝜌𝑚
[(
𝛱𝑡
𝛱
)
𝑎𝜋
(
𝑌𝑡
𝑌
)
𝑎𝑦
]
1−𝜌𝑚
𝑒𝑡
𝑚 (63) 
where 𝑅𝑡 , 𝛱𝑡  are the nominal interest rate and inflation rate, respectively. The 
parameter 𝜌𝑚 captures the degree of interest rate smoothing,  𝑎𝜋 and 𝑎𝑦 are the 
elasticities of the policy target with respect to inflation and output gap. 𝑒𝑡
𝑚 is a 
random shock to the nominal interest rate.  
3.4 Data and Bayesian Estimation 
In the empirical analysis, I estimate our model with China’s quarterly data by Bayesian 
methods. Based on the estimation results, I investigate the implications of impulse 
responses.  
3.4.1 Data Description  
The sample period for the estimation is 1992Q1-2015Q4 due to the data availability. I 
use eight observable macroeconomic variables, as there are eight structural shocks in 
the model. Five common macroeconomic variables are used in the estimation, 
including GDP, consumption, investment, labour and inflation, and three variables of 
our interests27 , risk premium, capital investment return in SMEs’ sector and SOEs 
output in real term. The sources of GDP, consumption, inflation and labour are from 
Datastream28.  
 
27 We consider these observed variables because the SOEs’ lending activities to SMEs are the centre of this paper. 
28 The codes of the variables are provided in the appendix.  
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All the data are seasonally adjusted, and nominal variables are converted to the real 
terms by using the consumer price index. I then take natural logarithm on the real GDP, 
real consumption, real investment, real SOEs’ output and labour and times 10029. 
3.4.2 Calibrated Parameters 
I first calibrate some parameters that are difficult to identify from the data (Table 2). 
The values I choose are consistent with literature about the Chinese economy. The 
discount factor 𝛽 is set to be 0.99, which can be used to pin down the steady-state 
quarterly real deposit rate of 0.01 or four per cent expressed at an annual frequency. 
The steady-state reserve ratio is set to be 0.15, which is the average value of the reserve 
ratio in China between 1992-2015. I choose the quarterly depreciation rate equals 
0.035 to be consistent with the literature, which implies an annual rate of 14% (Li and 
Liu, 2017). I take the steady-state government spending to total output, 𝐺 𝑌⁄ , to be 
0.14, which is the historical average of nominal consumption over nominal GDP ratios 
between 1992-2015. There is no literature for the parameters regarding the CES 
aggregator in the retailers’ sector, therefore, I choose the weight parameter 𝑎 = 0.5, 
which implies the final goods producers have no preference between SMEs and SOEs 
intermediate goods, and the substitutability of the goods 𝜌 is set to be 0.95. The value 
of the survival ratio is calibrated as 0.97 (Zhuang et al., 2018). The risk spread, 𝑅𝐾 −
𝑅𝐿, equal to four hundred basis points, which is the average value of the risk premium 
in our data. I set a higher value of realised payoffs lost in bankruptcy, 𝜇 equals 0.2 
 
29 This converts the fraction number to percentage.  
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(Carlstrom and Fuerst, 1997), as previous literature provides no relevant information 
about the magnitude of the parameter value in the Chinese market. 
Table 2 Calibrated Parameters 
Parameters Values Definitions 
𝜷 0.99 Discount Factor 
𝝉 0.15 Reserve Ratio in Steady State  
𝜹𝑺𝑴𝑬 0.035 Quarterly Depreciation Rate in SMEs’ Sector 
𝜹𝑺𝑶𝑬 0.035 Quarterly Depreciation Rate in SOEs’ Sector 
𝑮 𝒀⁄  0.14 Government Spending to GDP Ratio 
𝒂 0.5 Weight Parameter in Retailers’ CES Aggregator 
𝝆 0.95 Substitutability in Retailers’ CES Aggregator 
𝛄 0.97 Quarterly Survival Ratio in Steady State 
𝑹𝑲 − 𝑹𝑳 0.04 Quarterly Risk Premium in Steady State 
𝝁 0.20 Monitoring Cost in Steady State 
3.4.3 Estimated Parameters and Priors 
The rest of the parameters are estimated by using Bayesian methods in Dynare. The 
prior densities, means and standard deviations are shown in Table 3. I follow most of 
the literature to set the priors in order to capture the main features of the Chinese 
economy. The serial correlation parameters of the shock processes (𝜌𝜏 , 𝜌𝑎
𝑃𝑂𝐸  , 𝜌𝑎
𝑆𝑂𝐸  , 
𝜌𝑘
𝑃𝑂𝐸  ,  𝜌𝑘
𝑆𝑂𝐸  , 𝜌𝑠 , 𝜌𝐺 ) are all follow Beta distributions with mean 0.5, and standard 
deviations 0.2. All the standard errors of the innovations are assumed to have Inverse-
gamma distribution with a mean of 0.010 and degree of freedom 2, which implies an 
infinite standard deviation (Li and Liu 2018).  
The prior of the parameter determines nominal price rigidity, 𝜃, follows Beta density 
with mean 0.5 and standard deviation 0.2, which is different with Li and Liu30 (2017) 
 
30 In their paper, the prior they use for this parameter suffers unbounded density in Dynare (Beta density with mean 
0.5 and standard deviation 0.1). 
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and implies the expected duration between price changes is about 2 quarters31. Chinese 
research, such as Liu (2008), Tong (2010) and Li and Liu (2017) calibrate the capital 
share in the Cobb-Douglas function since they only have one intermediate goods 
producer. As different levels of capital intensity may be observed between two 
producing sectors, my analysis is different from their approach and choose to estimate 
these parameters. The priors of  𝛼1 and 𝛼2 are Beta (0.4,0.10) and Beta (0.5,0.10), 
the capital share in SOEs is set to be 0.50 to reflect a higher level of capital intensity 
in the state sector. Our model uses the same investment adjustment cost function with 
Bernanke et al. (1999), therefore, I follow their assumption to set the prior means for 
𝜙𝐾
𝑆𝑀𝐸 and 𝜙𝐾
𝑆𝑂𝐸 as 0.25 and allow wide variation in estimating these values by setting 
the standard deviation as 1.5. As for the monetary policy rule, the 
parameters 𝜌𝑚, 𝑎𝜋, 𝑎𝑦 are all conventional with one exception that the prior mean of 
𝑎𝑦 is set to be 0.5, indicating a higher reaction on output stabilisation in China (Funke 
et al., 2015).  
3.4.4 Posterior Estimates 
The capital shares in SMEs and SOEs are estimated to be 0.4236 and 0.4519, 
indicating a higher level of capital intensity in the state sector. Our estimates favour a 
strong rigidity in nominal price setting (𝜃=0.8256), which is close to 0.84 in Zhang 
(2009). In terms of the monetary policy, the mean of the coefficient on the lagged 
 
31 Bils and Klenow (2004) find the duration is between 6 months and 1 year. We choose 2 quarters, which suggests 
that 𝜃 = 0.5. 
Chapter 3 Entrusted Loans and SOEs Lending Activities 
110 
 
interest rate is estimated to be less persistent, 0.5283, and the mean of the long-run 
reaction to inflation appears to be lower, 1.2248, then the prior. While the reaction to  
Table 3 Prior Distributions 
Parameters Prior Density Prior Mean Prior Standard 
Deviation 
𝜶𝟏 Beta 0.4 0.10 
𝜶𝟐 Beta 0.5 0.10 
𝜽 Beta 0.5 0.20 
𝝓𝑲
𝑺𝑴𝑬 Normal 0.25 1.5 
𝝓𝑲
𝑺𝑶𝑬 Normal 0.25 1.5 
𝒂𝝅 Normal 1.5 0.15 
𝒂𝒀 Normal 0.5 0.05 
𝝆𝒎 Beta 0.5 0.20 
𝝆𝝉 Beta 0.5 0.20 
𝝆𝒂
𝑺𝑴𝑬 Beta 0.5 0.20 
𝝆𝒂
𝑺𝑶𝑬 Beta 0.5 0.20 
𝝆𝒌
𝑺𝑴𝑬 Beta 0.5 0.20 
 𝝆𝒌
𝑺𝑶𝑬 Beta 0.5 0.20 
𝝆𝒔 Beta 0.5 0.20 
𝝆𝑮 Beta 0.5 0.20 
𝝈𝒎 Inverse-Gamma 0.01 2 
𝝈𝝉 Inverse-Gamma 0.01 2 
𝝈𝒂
𝑺𝑴𝑬 Inverse-Gamma 0.01 2 
𝝈𝒂
𝑺𝑶𝑬 Inverse-Gamma 0.01 2 
𝝈𝒌
𝑺𝑴𝑬 Inverse-Gamma 0.01 2 
𝝈𝒌
𝑺𝑶𝑬 Inverse-Gamma 0.01 2 
𝝈𝒔 Inverse-Gamma 0.01 2 
𝝈𝑮 Inverse-Gamma 0.01 2 
the output gap is slightly higher with a mean value of 0.5256. This is consistent with 
the scenario in China that the PBoC assigns a higher weight to stabilizing output. The 
parameters of the adjustment costs are estimated to be lower than the prior mean with 
the values of 0.1700 (𝜙𝐾
𝑃𝑂𝐸) and 0.2030 (𝜙𝐾
𝑆𝑃𝐵).  
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Table 4 Posterior Distributions 
Parameters Posterior Mean Posterior Standard Deviation 
𝜶𝟏 0.4236 0.0031 
𝜶𝟐 0.4519 0.0029 
𝜽 0.8256 0.0125 
𝝓𝑲
𝑺𝑴𝑬 0.1700 0.0073 
𝝓𝑲
𝑺𝑶𝑬 0.2030 0.0018 
𝒂𝝅 1.2248 0.0079 
𝒂𝒀 0.5256 0.0027 
𝝆𝒎 0.5283 0.0024 
𝝆𝝉 0.5526 0.0064 
𝝆𝒂
𝑺𝑴𝑬 0.5457 0.0088 
𝝆𝒂
𝑺𝑶𝑬 0.7032 0.0097 
𝝆𝒌
𝑺𝑴𝑬 0.9837 0.0030 
 𝝆𝒌
𝑺𝑶𝑬 0.6010 0.0025 
𝝆𝒔 0.7604 0.0144 
𝝆𝑮 0.4835 0.0051 
𝝈𝒎 0.8619 0.0457 
𝝈𝝉 4.6991 0.1339 
𝝈𝒂
𝑺𝑴𝑬 3.6357 0.1827 
𝝈𝒂
𝑺𝑶𝑬 2.3407 0.1154 
𝝈𝒌
𝑺𝑴𝑬 5.7795 0.1135 
𝝈𝒌
𝑺𝑶𝑬 2.6479 0.0625 
𝝈𝒔 2.7604 0.0758 
𝝈𝑮 4.2909 0.0820 
 
Regarding the parameters of the exogenous shock processes, I find that investment 
shock in SMEs’ sector, productivity shocks in the state sector and risk premium shock 
are estimated to be the most persistent with mean values of coefficient of 0.9837, 
0.7032 and 0.7604 respectively. While the productivity shock in the private sector has 
relative lower persistence with an AR (1) coefficient of 0.5457. The posterior means 
of the government spending shock is 0.4835, the investment shock in SPBs is 0.6010, 
and the reserve ratio shock is 0.5526, which also appears to be less persistence.  
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3.4.5 Credit Allocation of with Different Level of Bank Credit Tightness 
The other and perhaps more important, reason for the rapid growth in China's shadow 
banking is regulatory arbitrage. This is a major reason for the rapid growth of shadow 
banking in China since 2012, when the Chinese authorities started to counter inflation 
after the large-scale stimulus program in response to the global financial crisis 2008–
2010. Furthermore, PBoC raised the bank reserve requirement ratios 12 times in 2010 
and 2011 to a record high of 21.5 per cent for large institutions in June 2011. To explain 
the effect of bank credit tightness on the decision of the SOE entrusted lenders’ credit 
allocation, I run experiments under different levels of reserve ratio but keep everything 
else the same. The higher value of the reserve ratio implies a tighter level of bank 
credit regulation.  
Table 5 Bank Credit Tightness 
 𝝉 = 𝟎. 𝟎𝟓 𝝉 = 𝟎. 𝟏𝟎 𝝉 = 𝟎. 𝟏𝟓 
𝑩/𝒀 171% 109% 78% 
𝑩𝑺𝑶𝑬 𝑩⁄  83% 81% 80% 
𝑩𝑺𝑴𝑬 𝑩⁄  17% 19% 20% 
Table 5 shows the steady-state values of the total quantity of bank loans to GDP 
ratio (𝐵/𝑌), the share of the affiliated loans in the total credit, 𝐵𝑆𝑂𝐸 𝐵⁄ , and the ratio 
of non-affiliated loans to total, 𝐵𝑃𝑂𝐸 𝐵⁄ . The steady state value of bank loans to GDP 
ratio decreases from 171 per cent to 78 per cent when the reserve ratio increases from 
5 per cent to 15 per cent, permanently. However, the proportion of non-affiliated loans 
to SMEs increases from 17 per cent to 20 per cent. The finding from our model 
indicates that tighter bank, while reducing overall credit availability increases SOE 
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engagement in more lending to SMEs, partially muting the effect of tighter regulation 
on SMEs.   
3.4.6 Nowcasting Versus Data 
To see the performance of our model, I implement nowcasting on the main 
macroeconomic variables, including output, consumption, investment and inflation. 
Blue lines depict the mean estimate of the filtered endogenous variables, which implies 
the best guess for the variables at the estimated periods between 1992Q1 and 2015Q4 
(96 quarterly periods) given information up to the current observations. The orange 
lines are the filtered raw data. It can be seen that the nowcasted variables from our 
model track the real data very well during the estimated periods (Figure 2).  
 
 
Figure 2 Nowcasting Versus Data 
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3.4.7 The Effectiveness of the Monetary Policy 
Chinese GDP growth rate fell from 14 per cent in 2007 to 9.6 per cent in the fourth 
quarter of 2008 due to the latest financial crisis. To combat the pressure of economic 
downturn, the PBoC engineered a series of loose monetary policies, including lower 
interest rates by three times in 2009. During the same period, the central government 
announced a ‘four-trillion’ stimulation package that injected multitrillion RMBs into 
the Chinese market. In 2010, the economy bounced back to 10 per cent GDP growth 
rate. 
To prevent the potentially overheated market, by the end of 2009, the PBoC persuaded 
contractionary monetary policy with the aim of tightening the credit supply. The 
standard transmission of monetary policy through interest rate mechanisms indicates 
a tighter monetary policy leading to a rise in real interest rates, which in turn increases 
the cost of borrowing, thus causing a decline in credit supply and capital investment 
and resulting in a fall in output. Since our model contains two types of producing 
sectors and SOEs’ entrusted lending behaviour, the questions I want to find out are 1) 
which production sector is affected more by the tightened policy? 2) whether the 
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effectiveness of monetary policy is dampened due to the entrusted lending to SMEs. 
Figure 3 shows the impulse responses of a temporary monetary policy shock. As can 
be seen, a tighter monetary policy exerts a more negative impact on SMEs’ output 
(ysme) compared to that of SOEs (yspb). Private investment (i) decreases since higher 
interest rate increases the cost of borrowing in both sectors that cause the decline of 
credit supply. Fewer aggregate bank loans to the state sector decrease the output and 
the money flow into the private sector. Turning to private firms, besides the similar 
impact of reductions in the output level, it also triggers the ‘financial accelerator’ effect 
(Bernanke et al., 1999). Less credit causes a lower level of net worth in the credit-
constrained companies, which means SMEs have less collateral for their loans and 
become riskier. Hence, to compensate a higher default probability, SOEs entrusted 
lenders charge a higher risk premium, which further discourages the borrowing and 
investment spending (ipoe) by the private firms. Total households’ consumption (c) 
and inflation rate (pi) decrease due to the tighter monetary policy. Private capital input 
(ksme) decreases along with the decreasing in private investment (ipoe). Output in 
both sectors decreases cause firms to hire fewer labour inputs in total (n). 
Comparing the IRFs of a monetary policy shock in Bernanke et al. (1999), my model 
exhibits similar patterns for output, investment and risk premium but with relatively 
more ‘kinked’ reactions. In my model, the two sectors react differently to tighter policy 
shocks. SMEs’ output decreases by approximately 0.4% and goes back to the steady 
state gradually. However, the state sector reduces production at first and quickly 
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              Figure 3 Contractionary Monetary Policy Shock 
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bounces back to the steady-state level. Bernanke et al. (1999) only illustrates the 
aggregate output reaction, which shows a smoother pattern compare to the IRFs in my 
model. Similarly, the output, private investment and risk premium exhibit a ‘kinked’ 
response to the shock, while it is smoother and more persistent in Bernanke et al. 
(1999). 
To understand the effectiveness of the monetary policy, I impose the same monetary 
policy under two different scenarios, higher versus lower default probabilities of the 
private sector. Figure 4 shows that the effectiveness of the policy is dampened when 
the default probability is higher. The contractual rate of nonaffiliated loans is higher 
to compensate for the higher risk level; therefore, the return on the non-default loans 
increases. From the perspective of the SOE entrusted lenders who are risk-neutral, the 
higher return increases their incentive to engage in more non-affiliated loans to SMEs. 
The overall impact on SMEs’ output is still negative, but the magnitude is smaller 
when the default risk is higher, indicating that the effectiveness of monetary policy is 
attenuated. 
Figure 4 The effectiveness of the Monetary Policy 
                     A                             B 
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Panel A plots the output responses in the private sector under different default risks. The blue line indicates default 
risk equals 8 per cent, while the red line implies 3 per cent. The SMEs output responses with less magnitude and 
persistence when the default risk is higher. Risk premium increases only by 1.5 per cent when default risk is higher, 
compared to a 3 per cent increase when default risk is lower (panel B). 
3.4.8 The Effect of the Fiscal Policy 
To support the economic recovery in 2009 and 2010, the Chinese central government 
undertook a fiscal stimulus program worth four trillion RMB. It approximately equals 
11 per cent of the annual GDP in that year (Bai et al., 2016). In a typical Ricardian-
type closed economy, when the government conducts an expansionary fiscal policy, 
i.e., increases government spending, it may induce the ‘crowding out effect’. Our 
model follows the same rule that private investment decreases after the expansionary 
policy (Figure 5, panel i). The temporary shock increases the output in aggregate level 
and in both sectors, which explains the economic recovery after the stimulus program. 
However, the less private investment in the economy decreases the net worth in the 
SMEs sector (net), which in turn triggers the ‘financial accelerator’ effect. The lower 
the net worth, the higher the risk premium (s) SMEs need to pay. Thus, a positive fiscal 
policy shock raises the cost of borrowing in the private sector, which may explain the 
economic slowdown after 201032. The private sector contributes more than 60 per cent 
of China’s GDP growth and providing over 70 per cent of employment (Elliot et al., 
2015). Hence, SMEs are the backbone and play an essential role in the Chinese 
economy. If the ‘stimulus’ package leads to a lower level of private investment, it is 
not surprising to observe a fall in GDP growth rate. Since capital investments are  
 
32 According to the World Bank, China’s GDP growth rate has been decreased from 10.6 per cent in 2010 to 6.9 
per cent in 2015.  
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Figure 5 Positive Government Spending Shock 
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driven down by the positive government spending, which causes fewer capital inputs 
in the production sectors, the only way for firms to increase their output temporarily 
is to increase the other input, labour. Hence, labour inputs in both sectors (nsme and 
nspb) increase.   
3.5 Conclusion 
I build a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) framework of the entrusted 
lending market, which constitutes one of the main segments of China’s shadow 
banking system. Credit misallocation has been an ongoing issue in China. Commercial 
banks strongly favour state-owned enterprises (SOEs) for loans because of 
government endorsement. By taking advantage of the privileged access to the formal 
banking system, state sectors obtain over 75 per cent of bank loans (Tsai, 2015). On 
the contrary, private-owned enterprises (SMEs) face severe financial constraints in 
accessing the bank credit, compelling them to rely on shadow banking for funds, 
mainly entrusted loans. In the meantime, SOEs have a long history of suffering in low 
productivity and inefficiency, which creates an incentive for them to engage in 
entrusted lending market to seek extra profit. The latest evidence shows that 
approximately 74 per cent of entrusted lenders is SOEs (Allen et al., 2019). 
The research findings of this study can provide several policy implications. First, I 
find that a tighter bank credit regulation, particularly a higher reserve ratio, pushes 
SOEs to raise the proportion of risky loans to SMEs. SOEs’ profit decreases due to the 
shortage of bank loans (higher reserve ratio). To compensate for the lost, SOEs are 
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willing to increase lending to SMEs, which provides higher return on loans. However, 
high return is always accompanied by high risk. Without controlling SOEs’ risk 
lending activities, the default probability of entrusted loans may induce systemic risk 
may be a potential way to attenuate the expansion of SOEs’ entrusted lending activities 
in the first place. 
Second, I find that the effectiveness of the monetary policy is dampened since SOEs 
entrusted lenders (SELs) are free to adjust the credit allocation to SMEs regardless of 
the underlying risks. The credit-constrained (private) sectors have to bear a higher cost 
of borrowing when monetary policy becomes tighter. However, with the opportunities 
to borrow from the SOEs, SMEs can offer a higher return and offset their shortage of 
funds proportionally, which in turn makes the monetary policy less effective. 
According to this finding, I suggest that reforming the state sector by restricting the 
provision of government guarantees might be an effective method to curtail the risk 
behaviour of SOEs and enhance the efficacy of monetary policy. 
Third, provisional positive government spending increases the output in both the 
private and the state sectors. However, it crowds out private investment, which reduces 
the net worth and increases the risk premium of the private sector. Consequently, 
SMEs must reduce external finance and slow down their production. Bai et al., (2016) 
document that, at the end of 2010, approximately 75 per cent of fiscal stimulus funds 
were spent on public infrastructure projects. Hence, most of the liquidity released by 
banks flows into government projects rather than into the real economy, which results 
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in a subsequent fall in the private investment. As mentioned earlier, SMEs are the 
engine of Chinese economic growth. Without sufficient funds flowing to the private 
sector, it is not surprised to observe an economic slowdown after 2010. Therefore, 
fiscal policy needs to be implemented with cautious as it may harm the real economy 
unless regulators can target the private sector for funds. Specifically, if the fiscal 
stimulus can provide more funding opportunities to the private firms rather than 
mainly focus on infrastructure projects, SMEs may not have to turn to the entrusted 
lending market, and the economy might be improved in the longer term.   
Appendix 3A Log-linearised Equations 
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Taylor Rule and Fisher Equation 
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Appendix 3B List of F.O.Cs 
Households 
𝐸𝑡 [𝛽 (
𝐶𝑙,𝑡+1
𝐶𝑙,𝑡
)
−1
1
𝜋𝑡+1
] 𝑅𝑡
𝐷 = 1 
𝐶𝑙,𝑡
1 − 𝑁𝑙,𝑡
= 𝑤𝑙,𝑡 
 
Commercial Banks 
𝐵𝑡 = (1 − 𝜏𝜀
𝑒𝑡
𝜏
)𝐷𝑡 
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SMEs 
 
𝛤′(?̅?𝑖) = 𝜆𝑡
𝑆𝑀𝐸[𝛤′(?̅?) − 𝜇𝐺′(?̅?)] 
 
[1 − 𝛤(?̅?𝑖)]𝑠𝑡 + 𝜆𝑡
𝑆𝑀𝐸
[𝛤(?̅?) − 𝜇𝐺(?̅?)]𝑠𝑡 = 𝜆𝑡
𝑆𝑀𝐸
 
 
[𝛤(?̅?) − 𝜇𝐺(?̅?)] 𝑠𝑡 ℵ𝑡 =  ℵ𝑡 − 1 
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𝑅𝑡+1
𝐾
𝑅𝑡+1
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𝑆𝑀𝐸𝐾𝑡+1
𝑆𝑀𝐸
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𝐸𝑡(𝑅𝑡+1
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𝑃𝑡+1
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𝑋𝑡+1𝑃𝑡+1
𝑤
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𝑆𝑀𝐸
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𝑄𝑡
𝑆𝑀𝐸  
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𝑤
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𝑆𝑀𝐸
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𝑄𝑡
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𝑆𝑂𝐸
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𝑄𝑡
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Final Goods Producers 
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∗
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𝑃𝑡
∗ =
𝜖
𝜖 − 1
𝐸𝑡 ∑ 𝜃
𝑘∞
𝑘=0 𝛬𝑡,𝑘(𝑃𝑡+𝑘
𝑊 𝑃𝑡+𝑘
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𝑌𝑡+𝑘)
 
 
Appendix 3C Steady State Values From the Model 
 
Variables Steady State Values 
𝑪 0.0852 
𝑰 0.0073 
𝑮 0.0291 
𝒀 0.2080 
𝒀𝑺𝑴𝑬 0.0914 
𝒀𝑺𝑶𝑬 0.1371 
𝑰𝑺𝑴𝑬 0.0023 
𝑰𝑺𝑶𝑬 0.0050 
𝑲 0.2092 
𝑲𝑺𝑴𝑬 0.0661 
𝑲𝑺𝑶𝑬 0.1431 
𝑵 0.2448 
𝑵𝒆𝒕 0.0300 
𝑵𝑺𝑴𝑬 0.1135 
𝑵𝑺𝑶𝑬 0.1313 
𝑹𝑫 1.0101 
𝑹𝑲 1.2284 
𝑹𝑳 1.1884 
Appendix 3D Data 
Nominal GDP: Datastream (code: CHOEXP03A); 
Nominal consumption: Datastream (code: CHCNPER.); 
Inflation: Datastream (code: CHOCFCPIE); 
Total employment: Datastream (CHXEMPT.P); 
Output in SOEs: Total output multiplied by SOE output share.; 
SOE output share: Total State-Owned Industrial Output over total Industrial 
Output. (From Fudan University); 
Total investment: From Fudan University or Quandl (GDP multiplied by 
Investment to GDP ratio); 
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Risk premium: CEIC and city of Wenzhou; 
Capital return in SMEs: Lending rate of the commercial bank plus the risk premium. 
 
Raw Data Description (RMB) 
Variable Minimum Maximum Mean 
GDP (Billion) 795.30 19195.07 6862.9 
Consumption (Billion) 291.57 6891.48 2351.8 
Investment (Billion) 176.45 7656.95 2570.5 
Inflation (Per cent) -1.00 6.74 1.01 
Employment (Billion) 5.83E-06 1.92E-05 1.34E-05 
SOEs Output (Billion) 439.38 1219.04 718.906 
Risk Premium (Per cent)  2.79 7.76 4.49 
Capital Return (Per cent) 3.88 10.77 6.25 
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Chapter 4 Shadow Banking Activities in the Formal Banking Sector  
4.1 Introduction 
Many factors burgeon the development of shadow banking activities in China. In this 
chapter, I focus primarily on building a model of the shadow banking activities 
conducted by commercial banks. Since commercial banks in China sustain a better 
reputation and less credit failure in providing services and products to the financial 
market, they have preserved the dominant role in the entire Chinese financial system. 
Ehler et al. (2018) claim that shadow banking in China is the ‘shadow of the banks’, 
where commercial banks develop market-based deposit and lending rates outside the 
conventional system when credit amount and interest rate are strictly controlled by 
regulators and government.  
One of the main shadow banking instruments, wealth management products (WMPs) 
results from the initial undertaking to bypass regulation on deposit rates ceiling (Wang 
and Zhao, 2016). WMPs are generally treated as high yield alternatives to bank 
deposits, being usually of short-term investment for a duration of less than six months. 
Separately, trust loans and entrusted loans are alternatives to bank loans, in which trust 
companies and client funds invest according to a pre-specified objective, purpose, 
amount, maturity, and interest rates (which is not subject to interest rate control). 
Meanwhile, cash-rich enterprises, such as SOEs, lend their extra funding to SMEs 
through entrusted lending platforms. WMPs are operated on the banks’ off-balance-
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sheet and offer attractive yields to individual investors, while trust loans and entrusted 
loans do not face interest rate restrictions, loan-to-deposit ratio requirement, or safe 
loan regulation; these parallel channels have grown enormously and supported 
economic growth. In essence, the increasing operation of commercial banks’ off-the-
balance sheet activities results in the rapid development of the Chinese shadow 
banking system, which distorts the formal financial system and the effectiveness of 
monetary and regulatory policies. 
In the model section, the general equilibrium framework is altered by adding a risk 
lending channel in the banking sector, in which bankers offer both safe bank deposits 
and risk shadow banking products to households. The funds obtained from depositors 
are used to fund the risk-free SOEs, while the money from shadow banking products 
is used to finance risky SMEs.  
This chapter is organised in the following way: Section 4.2 is the detailed institutional 
background knowledge and WMPs. Section 4.3 presents the second DSGE model 
framework in this research. In Section 4.4, I describe the data used in this model. 
Section 4.5 illustrates the indirect inference estimated results. Section 4.6 concludes.  
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4.2 Monetary Policy, Institutional Background and Wealth Management 
Products 
4.2.1 Quantity-based Monetary Policy 
Taylor-type interest rate rule, developed by Taylor (1993), has been tested as a good 
way to capture monetary policy for the advanced economy, such as the US and Europe 
for the period between the post-World War II and the latest financial crisis. During the 
same period, New Keynesian DSGE models have developed dramatically and become 
the mainstream economic frameworks for monetary policy analysis. The most 
common method to capture sophisticated monetary policy behaviour in DSGE models 
for developed nations is using Taylor-type interest rate rule, which uses the nominal 
interest rate as the intermediate target. However, whether interest rate type Taylor rule 
is suitable for the monetary policy in large developing countries, such as China where 
the monetary policy is not fully market-oriented, is still questionable.   
US monetary authority uses the federal funds rate as the intermediate target to stabilise 
inflation and output (or employment). According to Chen et al. (2018), the 
intermediate target of Chinese monetary policy has been M2 growth since 2000. 
Unlike the US central bank, whose primary goal is inflation stability, the priority for 
PBoC is to achieve the annual GDP growth target. Money supply policy and interest 
rate policy are not fully decided by the PBoC as it has only limited operational 
independence from the State Council. The key decisions need to be approved by the 
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State Council33. Normally, by the end of each year, the Central Economic Work 
Conference, jointly organised by the State Council and the Central Committee of 
Communist Party of China (CPC), sets specific targets for GDP growth rate and M2 
growth rate for the coming year. However, if the key indicators deviate from the 
targets after one season, the PBoC proposes policy plans with the aim of achieving 
quarterly targets. The plans cannot be implemented until the State Council reviews 
and approves the implementation (Huang et al., 2018). To meet the target M2 growth, 
which is the intermediate target of monetary policy, the PBoC uses various 
instruments, including open market operations and two important banking regulations, 
loan-to-deposit ratio and safe-loan regulation (detailed information is included in 
Section 4.2.3).     
4.2.2 Chinese Banking System 
The scale of the Chinese banking system has expanded substantially over the past two 
decades, and the size is relatively larger than the Chinese economy. Banking assets 
that include both domestic and foreign branches and subsidiaries were equivalent to 
approximately 200% of GDP in 2012 (Turner et al., 2012) and it surpassed the US 
banking system and all euro area banking systems put together, with $35 trillion 
(approximately 300% of China’s annual GDP) in 2016 (Cerutti and Zhou, 2018). In 
addition to the People’s Bank of China (PBoC), which is the central bank in China, 
there are principally four other types of banks, comprising state-owned policy banks, 
 
33 See Article 2 of the General Rules in the PBoC Law.  
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six state-owned banks, national joint-equity commercial banks and urban and rural 
commercial banks.  
The first (policy banks) type of banks includes EXIM Bank of China, China 
Development Bank and Agriculture Development Bank of China, whose goal is to 
issue policy lending only. The second category of the six state-owned banks includes 
the ‘Big Five’ and a leading large retail bank, Postal Savings Bank of China (PSBOC). 
‘Big Five’ banks are Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC), China 
Construction Bank (CCB), Bank of China (BOC), Agricultural Bank of China (ABC) 
and the Bank of Communications (BCOM). The first four banks - ICBC, CCB, BOC 
and ABC - are known as the original ‘Big Four’ as their size constitutes the largest 
throughout the world. BCOM is one of the banks with the longest history (established 
in 1908) in China and the very first state-owned incorporated bank; therefore, it is 
consistently regarded as the fifth big bank. The ‘Big Five’ are majority-owned by the 
government but also have private shareholders since they are all publicly listed on the 
Hong Kong stock exchange. They are the predominant players in commercial loans 
and deposit market and jointly account for 35.5% of the total assets34 in the industry 
in 2018. Most of the time, these banks are market-oriented but also support policy 
lending during extreme periods. For example, the stimulation package, ‘four-trillion 
RMB’, was largely financed by the big state-owned banks in order to prevent the 
spillover effect of the 2007-2009 financial crisis. 
 
34 China banking sector’s assets up 7.5%: http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/201808/27/WS5b83e160a310add14f38804c.html 
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The third type of banks comprises 12 national joint-equity commercial banks. 
Compared to the big state-owned banks, these banks are usually young, mid-sized with 
mixed ownership, and the size is approximately 10% of the average size of the ‘Big 
Four’ and jointly account for around 18% of Chinese banking sector assets in 2014. 
Joint-equity banks operate a similar type of commercial banking business by targeting 
SMEs loans at the same time. The fourth category of banks includes several types of 
small-size city and rural commercial banks, and small local banks, such as rural 
cooperative banks, rural credit cooperatives, as well as village and township banks. 
These banks are normally founded by the city or the provincial governments to carry 
out local government lending operations. The total assets of these banks reached 
approximately 10% at the end of 2014 (Fungáčová et al., 2018).  
4.2.3 Regulations in the Banking System 
PBoC and China Banking and Insurance Regulatory Commission (CBIRC) are the 
official authorities to supervise and monitor all commercial banks. PBoC 35  was 
consolidated by the Huabei Bank, the Beihai Bank and the Xibei Farmer Bank in 1948 
and officially endowed with the function of a central bank by the State Council in 1983. 
The main responsible of PBoC is to carry out monetary policy and regulation of 
financial institutions in mainland China. CBIRC36 was merged by China Banking 
Regulatory Commission (CBRC) and China Insurance Regulatory Commission 
 
35 People’s Bank of China Official Website: http://www.pbc.gov.cn/english/130712/index.html 
36 China Banking and Insurance Regulatory Commission http://www.cbrc.gov.cn/chinese/newIndex.html 
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(CIRC) in April 2018. CBRC, established in 2003, was an agency of the People’s 
Republic of China (PRC) to regulate the banking sector excluding the special 
administrative regions, Hong Kong and Macau, while CIRC was an authority to 
regulate insurance product and services and manage the stable operation of the 
insurance industry.  
In conjunction with the Basel III Accords, all banks in China are required to comply 
with minimum capital requirements. PBoC has frequently altered banks’ reserve ratio 
to regulate the economy. The ratio was quite high during 2009 and 2012, and it has 
been decreasing since 2012 to spur the economy. The latest figure shows the ratio is 
14.5% for large institutions and 12.5% for smaller banks37 . PBoC has also tightly 
regulated interest rates. Before 2015, commercial banks adjusted their interest rates 
according to the base rate set by the central bank together with both upper and lower 
bounds. The upper bound of the deposit rates - up to 1.5 times of base rate – has been 
eliminated in recent years, which is helpful for banks to attract more deposits. In 
China’s investment-driven model, these interest rate policies are part of the model to 
transfer savers, such as large industrial enterprises, to borrowers (Song et al., 2011). 
The lower bound of the rates has also been gradually liberalised, which gives banks 
stronger incentives to increase their lending to stimulate the economy. CBRC has been 
limiting the total amount of bank lending by setting capital ratio following the Basel 
Accord and loan-to-deposit ratio. Loan-to-deposit ratio restricts total lending below 
 
37 China slashes banks' reserve requirements again as growth slows https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-economy-rrr-
cut/china-slashes-banks-reserve-requirements-again-as-growth-slows-idUSKCN1OY0RL 
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75% of their total deposits in each bank, which was first established in 1994 as a way 
to manage the quantity of bank loans. Nevertheless, this requirement is no longer 
binding following 2015.  
In addition to controlling the quantity of bank loans, the PBoC uses another regulation 
to control the quality of bank loans, the so-called safe-loan regulation. Both Eliott et 
al. (2015) and Chen et al. (2018) document that banks are discouraged from lending 
to certain industries, such as coal miners, shipbuilders and real estate developers. 
Concerned with potential financial risks related to bank lending to certain risk 
industries, in 2006, the State Council issued a notice regarding the restructuring of 
these industries. In 2010, the CBRC restricted bank lending to those industries, and all 
the actions were reinforced in the 2013 Guidelines by the State Council.  
Restricted regulations in the banking sector are the main reason for the growth of 
shadow banking in China. Banks can either increase capital by issuing new equity and 
bonds to meet the capital ratio requirements, or they can develop more off-balance 
sheet activities which do not increase assets on the balance sheet; for example, the 
issuance of WMPs, which has become the most important off-balance-sheet activity. 
Banks can surpass the loan-to-deposit ratio set by CBRC and deposit rate ceiling set 
by PBoC through attracting more depositors since WMPs normally offer a higher yield 
and conduct less on-balance lending.  
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4.2.4 Wealth Management Products 
The size of WMPs has surpassed entrusted loans since 2014 and become the largest 
component in China’s shadow banking system (Allen et al., 2019). It is mainly offered 
by commercial banks, but can also be offered by non-bank financial institutions, such 
as Alibaba. The most famous WMPs with money market fund issued by Alibaba is 
called Yu’e’Bao, which grew very rapidly from RMB 200 million in May 2013 to 
RMB 700 billion in April 2014 and reached RMB 1.58 trillion at the end of 201738. 
Another important component contributing to the stature of WMPs is trust loans, 
which provides a channel for banks to lend out their money that raised from WMPs to 
risky firms, such as SMEs, who do not have access to bank credit. Private credit 
agencies have also engaged in lending money to small firms that cannot borrow from 
banks (Allen et al., 2005).  
China’s financial market has become a ‘dual-track’ system with the growth of the 
shadow banking sector. On the one hand, interest rates control, capital requirements 
and loan-to-deposit rate make bank deposit less attractive and more difficult to access 
bank loans. On the other hand, the shadow banking sector has been largely unregulated 
compared to the formal banking system, creating an impetus for shifting business into 
more shadowy methods to circumvent tight regulations. Therefore, both commercial 
and non-bank institutions are willing to benefit from off-balance sheet funding. 
However, the rapid growth of shadow banking, especially WMPs, has acquired 
 
38 Investment limits tightened on $233 bn Yuebao https://fundselectorasia.com/investment-limits-tightened-233bn-yuebao/ 
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increasing attention from the regulation sector, CBRC. In fact, CBRC has been trying 
to restrict this shadow banking instrument, but banks persistently find a way to bypass 
monitoring.  
The early version of WMPs is produced through cooperation between banks and trust 
companies. Initially, trust companies purchase loan assets from banks and package 
them into trust plans. Then banks invest in these trust plans by using the money raised 
from WMPs. In this way, borrowers can borrow money that they cannot originally, 
and both banks and trust companies are paid by the interests of the trust plan without 
increasing banks’ on-balance sheet loan balance. Increasing apprehension about the 
effectiveness of monetary policy prompted the CBRC in July 2009 to forbid banks 
from investing their money raised from WMPs into their own banks’ loan assets. 
However, they failed to work. The trick here is that providing banks do not invest 
money into their own loan assets, and the policy is not binding. For example, bank A 
can sell its loan assets to trust companies and form a trust plan; bank B now purchases 
the trust plan by using the money raised from bank B’s WMPs. Similarly, bank A can 
initially purchase trust plan from bank B’s loan assets. By this means, borrowers can 
secure finance, both banks A and B and the trust companies can obtain payment by the 
interests from trust plans.  
It is difficult for CBRC to forbid this type of cooperation completely, while in turn, 
the regulator has tried to limit this amount of activity. In August 2010, CBRC required 
that the maximum amount of WMPs targeting loan assets is 30% of all bank-trust 
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cooperation MWPs (Acharya et al., 2019). Again, banks can circumvent the rule by 
investing money raised from WMPs into loan assets that do not belong to any bank. 
Specifically, trust companies first make loans to borrowers and form trust plans. Then, 
banks issue WMPs and delegate the money to investment banks. In this way, banks 
claim that they allow investment banks to manage the money. In fact, banks ask 
investment banks to invest money into the specific trust plan. CBRC cannot now 
criticise banks since banks’ WMPs are not targeted to banks’ loan assets. 
Once the situation was realised, CBRC passed a new policy in late March 201339. 
WMPs target any form of non-standard financial assets, including all trust assets that 
exceed 4% of total bank assets or 35% of all WMPs. To bypass this regulation, banks 
need to invest most of their WMPs money into standard financial assets, which can 
still generate a higher yield to WMPs investors higher than normal deposit account. In 
short, bank A places WMP money into bank B’s special contracted deposit account, 
which offers higher ‘deposit rate’ than a regular interest rate. Bank B then invests its 
own money into trust plans or delegates it to investment banks to purchase those trust 
plans issued by trust companies. The contracted deposits in bank B’s balance sheet 
acts as a guarantee for the trust plans and the return from the trust plans is substituted 
to the contracted deposit, which is higher than normal risk-free bank deposit rate. 
WMPs investors still earn a higher interest rate; bank A does not invest WMP money 
into any trust assets. Bank B does invest money to trust plans directly or indirectly but 
 
39 Article No. 8 http://www.cbrc.gov.cn/govView_2B22741AFBC446CF890636DACAB71166.html 
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does not use WMP money. Finally, the borrower is financed. All participants obey the 
CBRC rule, but the rule is completely ineffective.  
Banks can always find more complicated ways and cooperate with trust companies, 
directly or indirectly, to avoid CBRC’s rules; thus, the complicated interactions among 
banks make it difficult to prevent WMPs from channeling trust plans. The ongoing 
game between regulator and banks may reflect the inefficiency of the banking industry 
as these complicated channels make the transaction less transparency and increase 
agency problems. In fact, more inefficiency in the banking system may arise when the 
CBRC cannot-do list becomes longer. Apart from policy ineffectiveness, the 
underlying risk cannot be neglected. Risks can be swiftly accumulated due to maturity 
mismatch. Most loans to risky borrowers are long-term; however, all WMP investors 
want liquid assets. In addition, counterpart banks in the market also prefer short-term 
as they do not want to take long-term risks. In fact, the banks that issue the WMPs 
want short duration, as WMP money can transfer to deposit accounts to assist in 
meeting the loan-to-deposit ratio at the end of each year. In other words, all parties on 
the lender side of the market are impatient, but no one is willing to abandon the 
opportunities to make a profit. Therefore, banks can either issue new WMPs to 
refinance the loans or go to the interbank market for temporary liquidity. These 
activities will not only increase potential rollover risks but can also spread risks to the 
entire financial system as banks are closely connected to each other.  
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4.3 Model Framework 
4.3.1 Households 
In the model developed in the previous chapter, there is no role for money. Economics 
with that characteristic is illustrated as cashless economies. Since M2 serves as the 
intermediate target in the Chinese monetary policy, it is useful to incorporate a role 
for money other than that of a unit of account and how it can generate demand for 
money. The introduction of money in the utility function requires modifying the 
household’s problem in two ways. First, the representative infinitely lived household’s 
preferences are now given by,  
 max 𝐸0 ∑ 𝛽𝐻
𝑡 [𝑙𝑛𝐶𝑡
𝐻 + 𝑙𝑛(𝑀𝑡)]
∞
𝑡=0
 (64) 
Where 𝛽𝐻 < 1 is the discount factor, 𝐶𝑡
𝐻 denotes households’ consumption in each 
period, and 𝑀𝑡 is the real balances of money holding in period 𝑡. Note that I exclude 
the disutility from the labour supply for two reasons, first, it makes the model less 
complicated since I include one more element (money) in the model and release, to 
some extent, computation burden; second, all other variables can be treated as ‘per 
capita’, for example, consumption in this model can be interpreted as consumption per 
capita. Therefore, it does not affect the model by excluding labour. The second 
modification is the flow budget constraint incorporates monetary holdings explicitly, 
taking the form,  
 
 𝐶𝑡
𝐻 + 𝐷𝑡  +  𝑆𝐵𝑡 + 𝑀𝑡 =  
𝑅𝑡−1
𝐷
𝜋𝑡
𝐷𝑡−1 + [1 − 𝐹(?̅?𝑡)]
𝑅𝑡−1
𝑆𝐵
𝜋𝑡
𝑆𝐵𝑡−1 +  𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑡 +  
𝑀𝑡−1
𝜋𝑡
 (65) 
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The left-hand side of the equation (65) represents the expenditure of the households. 
Banks offer two ‘products’, which are risk-free deposits 𝐷𝑡, and risky products, 𝑆𝐵𝑡; 
therefore, the household chooses how much to consume, how much money they are 
willing to deposit, and how much they are willing to invest in the shadow banking 
products in period 𝑡. Recalling the entrusted loans, firms with extra cash40 can use 
commercial banks as the servicing agents to lend out their money and earn interests. 
The flow of funds has a similar feature with WMPs, which is operated on the bank’s 
off-the-balance sheet. The source of funds of WMPs is households, while the source 
is the entrepreneurs in entrusted loans. Therefore, for simplicity but without losing 
generality, we define all the funds as shadow banking products41 (including WMPs 
from regular households and lenders of entrusted loans), denoted as ‘𝑆𝐵’, which is the 
quantity of one-period nominally risky discount shadow banking products purchased 
in period 𝑡 and maturing in period 𝑡 + 1 with the interest rate 𝑅𝑡
𝑆𝐵. The last item on 
the expenditure side is the real money demand. 
The right-hand side implies the overall earnings, including earning from deposits, 
interest-earning from shadow banking products that subject to a default probability 
𝐹(?̅?𝑡) . The supply of the funds is from households who invest in WMPs and 
entrepreneurs who have extra credit, the demand of the funds is the SMEs who can 
not obtain bank loans, while banks only act as the channelling platform in between the 
demand and the supply. Thus we assume commercial banks do not bear the risk but 
 
40 The source of their extra cash can be varied, we do not specify it in our model.  
41 In other words, we define the entreprenuers who have extra cash to lend out also as a type of household. 
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transfer the risk from the demand side to the supply side. Therefore, aggregately, 
households can only get a proportion of their money back from investing the shadow 
banking products. Since the shadow banking activities are not restricted by the banking 
regulations, we assume, the default probability of the shadow banking products from 
the bank directly link to the idiosyncratic shock, 𝑤𝑡, of the SMEs’ capital investment. 
While ?̅?𝑡 implies the threshold of the risky investment, if 𝑤𝑡 > ?̅?𝑡, SMEs are able 
to pay back the loans to commercial banks, and in turn payback to the supply side of 
the funds; however, if 𝑤𝑡 < ?̅?𝑡 , SMEs default, the household will lose the entire 
money in their shadow banking account. The idiosyncratic risk follows a log-normal 
distribution with the mean value 𝐸(𝑤) = 1. 
 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑤𝑡~𝑁 (−
𝜎𝑤
2
2
, 𝜎𝑤
2 ) (66) 
Where 𝐹(?̅?𝑡) is a CDF function of the idiosyncratic risk. The last two terms in 
equation (65) are the dividend from retailers and real money balance they hold from 
the previous period. Household maximizes the lifetime utility (64) subject to the 
constraint (65) whose Lagrangian multipliers is denoted as 𝜆𝑡
𝐻 
 
𝐿 = 𝐸0 ∑ 𝛽𝐻
𝑡 {𝑙𝑛𝐶𝑡
𝐻 + 𝑙𝑛(𝑀𝑡)
∞
𝑡=0
+ 𝜆𝑡
𝐻 [
𝑅𝑡−1
𝐷
𝜋𝑡
𝐷𝑡−1 + [1 − 𝐹(?̅?𝑡)]
𝑅𝑡−1
𝑆𝐵
𝜋𝑡
𝑆𝐵𝑡−1 +  𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑡 + 
𝑀𝑡−1
𝜋𝑡
− 𝑀𝑡 − 𝐶𝑡
𝐻 − 𝐷𝑡 − 𝑆𝐵𝑡]} 
 
(67) 
 The F.O.Cs are, 
 
     ∂𝐶𝑡
𝐻 :       
1
𝐶𝑡
𝐻 = 𝜆𝑡
𝐻                 (68) 
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 ∂𝑀𝑡 :      
1
𝑀𝑡
+ 𝛽𝐻𝜆𝑡+1
𝐻 1
𝜋𝑡+1
= 𝜆𝑡
𝐻 (69) 
 
 ∂𝐷𝑡:      𝛽𝐻
𝑅𝑡
𝐷
𝜋𝑡+1
𝜆𝑡+1
𝐻   = 𝜆𝑡
𝐻     (70) 
 
        ∂𝑆𝐵𝑡:    𝛽𝐻[1 − 𝐹(?̅?𝑡)]
𝑅𝑡
𝑆𝐵
𝜋𝑡+1
𝜆𝑡+1
𝐻  = 𝜆𝑡
𝐻     (71) 
 
 
∂𝜆𝑡
𝐻:
𝑅𝑡−1
𝐷
𝜋𝑡
𝐷𝑡−1 + [1 − 𝐹(?̅?𝑡)]
𝑅𝑡−1
𝑆𝐵
𝜋𝑡
𝑆𝐵𝑡−1 +  𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑡 +  
𝑀𝑡−1
𝜋𝑡
− 𝑀𝑡 − 𝐶𝑡
𝐻 − 𝐷𝑡 −  𝑆𝐵𝑡
= 0 
(72) 
 
Combining equations (67) with (68), (69) and (70) respectively, we obtain, 
 
 
1
𝑀𝑡
+ 𝛽𝐻
1
𝜋𝑡+1
=
𝐶𝑡+1
𝐻
𝐶𝑡
𝐻  (73) 
 
 𝛽𝐻
𝑅𝑡
𝐷
𝜋𝑡+1
=
𝐶𝑡+1
𝐻
𝐶𝑡
𝐻  (74) 
 
 𝛽𝐻[1 − 𝐹(?̅?𝑡)]
𝑅𝑡
𝑆𝐵
𝜋𝑡+1
  =
𝐶𝑡+1
𝐻
𝐶𝑡
𝐻  (75) 
 
Equation (72) indicates the demand for money, in which higher current consumption 
associated with higher money demand. Equations (73) and (74) are Euler equations. 
A rise in either 𝑅𝑡
𝐷 or 𝑅𝑡
𝑆𝐵 reduces the next periods’ cost of consumption, relative to 
current consumption; hence, households have motivations to increase future 
consumption in relation to present consumption. Nevertheless, in equation (74), a rise 
in the default probability, 𝐹(?̅?𝑡) , would discourage households to consume in the 
future as the risk of losing money from the investment of risky shadow banking 
products is higher.  
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4.3.2 Bankers 
Unlike the banking system in the previous chapter, where the role is transferring 
money from households to entrepreneurs only, in this model, I introduce a 
representative banker42 who solves the following problem: 
 𝑚𝑎𝑥 𝐸0 ∑ 𝛽𝐵
𝑡 𝑙𝑛𝐶𝑡
𝐵
∞
𝑡=0
 (76) 
Where 𝛽𝐵 denotes bankers discount factor. The key difference between the first model 
and this one is the behaviour of the banker. I incorporate both on-the-balance and off-
the-balance sheet activities in the Chinese commercial banking system. The banks’ 
regular business is to accepting deposits and make loans. However, as we mentioned 
earlier, the burdensome bank regulation makes POEs, especially SMEs very difficult 
to get access to bank credit; while SOEs can easily get financed from the formal 
banking system. Thus, the creation of WMPs is used to circumvent the regulation and 
expand credit to the risky borrowers, i.e. SMEs. The funds from bank deposits are used 
to finance the risk-free state-owned sector, while the money from risky shadow 
banking assets is used to finance risky sector through banks’ off-the-balance sheet. 
The main difference of these two channels is loans on the banks’ balance sheet is 
heavily restricted by the regulation, including reserve requirement, loan-to-deposit 
ratio and low-risk loan regulation, while off-the-balance sheet activities have no 
restrictions. The bankers’ flow of budget is constructed as,  
 
 
42 Note that maximizing bankers’ utility can be treated as equivalent to maximizing a function of dividends in the banking system, 
discounted at rate 𝛽𝐵. 
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𝐶𝑡
𝐵 + 𝑅𝑡
𝐷𝐷𝑡−1 + [1 − 𝐹(?̅?𝑡)]𝑅𝑡
𝑆𝐵𝑆𝐵𝑡−1 + 𝐿𝑡
𝑆𝑂𝐸 + 𝐿𝑡
𝑆𝑀𝐸 =  𝐷𝑡 + 𝑆𝐵𝑡 
+ 𝑅𝑡
𝐿𝐿𝑡−1
𝑆𝑂𝐸 + [1 − 𝐹(?̅?𝑡)]𝑅𝑡
𝑆𝐵𝐿𝑡−1
𝑆𝑀𝐸  + (1 − 𝜇) ∫ 𝑤𝑡𝑑𝐹(𝑤) 𝑅𝑡
𝐾𝑄𝑡−1
𝑆𝑀𝐸𝐾𝑡
𝑆𝑀𝐸
?̅?𝑡
0
 
(77) 
In each period, banker decides how much to consume and the allocation of loans to 
both SOEs and SMEs. The left-hand side of the budget constraint implies the total 
expenditure, while the right-hand side is the total revenue. 𝐶𝑡
𝐵 is bankers’ private 
consumption, 𝐷𝑡  denotes household deposits and 𝑆𝐵𝑡  indicates the holding of 
household shadow banking assets. Loans to both sectors are 𝐿𝑡
𝑆𝑂𝐸  and 𝐿𝑡
𝑆𝑀𝐸 
respectively. The banker needs to pay back to households with an underlying interest 
rate, 𝑅𝑡
𝐷 for deposits and 𝑅𝑡
𝑆𝐵 for risky products, in the meantime, the banker also 
receive interests from the previous loans to firms with the risk-free rate to SOEs, 𝑅𝑡
𝐿, 
and the risky rate to SMEs, 𝑅𝑡
𝑆𝐵, subject to the default probability. The last two items 
on the right-hand side indicate the expected return on the loans to SMEs. with non-
default probability, 1 − 𝐹(?̅?𝑡), the banker can get back their money; while if the SMEs 
default on their borrowing, banker needs to pay extra monitoring cost 𝜇, to find out 
how much assets left in the SMEs’ account and collect them back to compensate 
proportionally the lost.   
In addition, bank loans to SOEs subject to the banking regulation, while loans to SMEs 
through shadow banking channel do not. For simplicity, we assume that the pooled 
funds from each individual household on the bank’s off-the-balance sheet are used to 
on-lend to private entrepreneurs who cannot get access to bank loans initially. The risk 
from the SMEs is thus transferred to households via commercial bank’s shadow 
Chapter 4 Shadow Banking Activities in the Formal Banking Sector 
146 
 
banking activities. More concretely, bank loans are restricted by both reserve ratio 
requirement, 𝑣, and the loan-to-deposit ratio, ℎ, which is 75% constantly, 
 
 𝐿𝑡
𝑆𝑂𝐸 ≤ (1 − 𝑣𝑒𝜀𝑡
𝑣
)ℎ𝐷𝑡 (78) 
 
While there is no restriction on shadow banking loans, banks can lend out all funds 
from shadow banking funds.  
 
 𝐿𝑡
𝑆𝑀𝐸 ≤ 𝑆𝐵𝑡 (79) 
 
To compensate for the potential loss from the loans to SMEs, commercial banks need 
to charge extra risk premium. To formulate the risk premium, I follow the financial 
accelerator model (Bernanke et al., 1999), the total return from the SMEs’ loans must 
equal to the opportunity costs of loans at the risk-free rate in the equilibrium, therefore,  
 
 [1 − 𝐹(?̅?𝑡)]𝑅𝑡
𝑆𝐵𝐿𝑡−1
𝑆𝑀𝐸 + (1 − 𝜇) ∫ 𝑤𝑡𝑑𝐹(𝑤) 𝑅𝑡
𝐾𝑄𝑡−1
𝑆𝑀𝐸𝐾𝑡
𝑆𝑀𝐸
?̅?𝑡
0
= 𝑅𝑡
𝐿𝐿𝑡−1
𝑆𝑀𝐸 (80) 
Maximising the bankers’ utility function (76) subject to the budget constraint (77), (78) 
and (79), the Lagrangian can be written as, 
 
ℒ =  𝐸0 ∑ 𝛽𝐵
𝑡 {𝑙𝑛𝐶𝑡
𝐵 + 𝜆𝑡
𝐵[𝐷𝑡 + 𝑅𝑡
𝐿(1 − 𝑣𝑒𝜀𝑡−1
𝑣
)ℎ𝐷𝑡−1
∞
𝑡=0
+ (1 − 𝜇) ∫ 𝑤𝑡𝑑𝐹(𝑤) 𝑅𝑡
𝐾𝑄𝑡−1
𝑃𝑂𝐸𝐾𝑡
𝑃𝑂𝐸
?̅?𝑡
0
− 𝐶𝑡
𝐵 − 𝑅𝑡
𝐷𝐷𝑡−1
− (1 − 𝑣𝑒𝜀𝑡
𝑣
)ℎ𝐷𝑡]} 
(81) 
   
In principle, the banker can lend out all the funds from the shadow banking assets 
through the off-the-balance sheet. Therefore, the loan amount to SMEs is not 
determined by the bankers’ maximisation problem. Hence, we take F.O.Cs with 
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respect to consumption, 𝐶𝑡
𝐵, and 𝐿𝑡
𝑆𝑂𝐸 (or 𝐷𝑡) to work out the loan amount to SOEs and 
the risk-free lending rate,  
 
 ∂𝐶𝑡
𝐵 :  
1
𝐶𝑡
𝐵 =  𝜆𝑡
𝐵 (82) 
 
 ∂𝐷𝑡: 𝜆𝑡
𝐵[1 − (1 − 𝑣𝑒𝜀𝑡
𝑣
)ℎ]  + 𝛽𝐵𝜆𝑡+1
𝐵 [𝑅𝑡+1
𝐿 (1 − 𝑣𝑒𝜀𝑡
𝑣
)ℎ − 𝑅𝑡+1
𝐷 ]  = 0  (83) 
 
Combining the two equations above, we obtain the spread between the deposit rate 
and risk-free lending rate in the banking sector,  
 
 
𝐶𝑡+1
𝐵
𝛽
𝐵
𝐶𝑡
𝐵  =
[𝑅𝑡+1
𝐷 − 𝑅𝑡+1
𝐿 (1 − 𝑣𝑒𝜀𝑡
𝑣
)ℎ]
[1 − (1 − 𝑣𝑒𝜀𝑡
𝑣
)ℎ]
 (84) 
There is no literature on the value of the bankers’ discount factor; therefore, I use data 
to back it out. The quarterly steady-state value of the deposit rate, 𝑅𝐷, and lending 
rate, 𝑅𝐿, are approximately 1.0135 and 1.0211, respectively. The steady-state reserve 
ratio, 𝑣, set by the central bank is 0.15. Hence, combining with the loan-to-deposit 
ratio, ℎ = 0.75, the bankers’ discount factor 𝛽𝐵 is calculated as 0.9999. The value is 
higher than the households’ discount factor, which implies banker is more patient than 
households in this case. The reason is that banker does not bear the risk from the risk 
lending to SMEs. The risk is eventually transferred to the households’ sector, as stated 
in the households’ budget constraint (64). In the case of SMEs default, as can be seen 
from the bankers’ budget constraint (77), the banker can still collect the assets left in 
the SMEs’ account after paying the monitoring cost. 
Equation (80) is used to determine the risk premium on SMEs loans. Following the 
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financial accelerator model (Bernanke et al., 1999), the total return form the SMEs’ 
loans must equal to the opportunity costs of loans at the risk-free rate in the equilibrium. 
SMEs need to borrow from banks based on how much capital they need to purchase 
and how much retained earnings or net worth, 𝑁𝑡, they have accumulated; thus, the 
loan amount is determined as, 
 𝐿𝑡
𝑆𝑀𝐸 = 𝑄𝑡
𝑆𝑀𝐸𝐾𝑡+1
𝑆𝑀𝐸 − 𝑁𝑡 (85) 
 
In addition, SMEs are allowed to keep the rest of the value from the capital investment 
once they repay the loans, which implies they only need to pay back the value up to 
the threshold of the idiosyncratic shock, ?̅?, hence,  
 
 𝑅𝑡
𝑆𝐵𝐿𝑡−1
𝑆𝑀𝐸 = ?̅?𝑅𝑡
𝐾𝑄𝑡−1
𝑆𝑀𝐸𝐾𝑡
𝑆𝑀𝐸 (86) 
 
Combining equations (80), (85) and (86), we can derive the following equation, 
 
 
𝑅𝑡
𝐾
𝑅𝑡
𝐿 =
1 − 𝑁𝑡−1/𝑄𝑡−1
𝑆𝑀𝐸𝐾𝑡
𝑆𝑀𝐸
𝛤(?̅?) − 𝜇𝐺(?̅?)
 (87) 
 
Where 𝛤(?̅?) − 𝜇𝐺(?̅?) implies the share of the net return goes to the bank, 1 −
𝑁𝑡−1/𝑄𝑡−1
𝑆𝑀𝐸𝐾𝑡
𝑆𝑀𝐸 is the leverage ratio in SMEs, 
Where 𝛤(?̅?) − 𝜇𝐺(?̅?) implies the share of the net return goes to the bank, 1 −
𝑁𝑡−1/𝑄𝑡−1
𝑆𝑀𝐸𝐾𝑡
𝑆𝑀𝐸 is the leverage ratio in SMEs, 
 
 
𝐺(?̅?) = [∫ 𝑤𝑑𝐹(𝑤)
?̅?
0
]    &   𝛤(?̅?) = [∫ ?̅?𝑑𝐹(𝑤)
∞
?̅?
] + [∫ 𝑤𝑑𝐹(𝑤)
?̅?
0
] 
 
(88) 
We then define the wedge between the expected capital return and risk-free lending 
rate in period 𝑡 + 1, as the risk premium, 𝑠𝑡, 
 𝑠𝑡 = 𝐸𝑡 (
𝑅𝑡+1
𝐾
𝑅𝑡+1
𝐿 ) (89) 
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Which is negatively related to the net worth, indicating that SMEs would have a lower 
leverage ratio and pay less risk premium if they have more retained earnings.  
4.3.3 Government Sector and Quantity-based Monetary Policy 
Different from the government sector from the first model, we specify that government 
spending is financed by the money supply in this framework.  
 
 𝐺𝑡 =  
𝑀𝑡−1 − 𝑀𝑡
𝑃𝑡
   (90) 
 
Since the PBoC explicit states that Chinese monetary policy uses M2 growth as the 
intermediate target, therefore, in this chapter, we incorporate a quantity-based 
monetary policy where the log-linearised form is, 
 
 𝑔𝑚,𝑡 = 𝜌𝑚𝑔𝑚,𝑡−1 + (1 − 𝜌𝑚)(𝑎𝜋𝜋𝑡 + 𝑎𝑦𝑦𝑡) + 𝑒𝑚,𝑡 (91) 
 
𝑔𝑚,𝑡 is the money supply growth rate, which implies,  
 𝑔𝑚,𝑡 = 𝑙𝑛
𝑀𝑡
𝑀𝑡−1
 (92) 
Therefore, Chinese monetary policy uses money growth to stabilise both inflation and 
output target.  
4.3.4 The Rest of the Model 
The rest of the model includes SMEs and SOEs production sectors, capital goods 
producers and final goods producers, which solve the same problem with the first 
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model in Chapter 3. Therefore, I briefly recall the relevant equations in this section. 
Capital demand is determined by solving the SMEs and SOEs profit maximisation 
problems, which result in two equations,  
 𝐸𝑡(𝑅𝑡+1
𝐾 ) =
𝑀𝑃𝐾𝑖,𝑡+1
𝑆𝑀𝐸 + 𝑄𝑡+1
𝑆𝑀𝐸(1 − 𝛿𝑆𝑀𝐸)
𝑄𝑡
𝑆𝑀𝐸  
(93) 
Where 𝑀𝑃𝐾𝑖,𝑡+1
𝑆𝑀𝐸represents the marginal product of capital in the SMEs’ sector, which 
is equal to 𝛼1
𝑃𝑡+1
𝑤,𝑆𝑀𝐸
𝑋𝑡+1𝑃𝑡+1
𝑤
𝑌𝑖,𝑡+1
𝑆𝑀𝐸
𝐾𝑖,𝑡+1
𝑆𝑀𝐸. 𝛿
𝑆𝑀𝐸  is the capital depreciation rate. Equation (93) states 
the expected gross return to holding a unit of capital from period 𝑡 to 𝑡 + 1. 𝑅𝑡+1
𝐾  is 
the return on capital investment. 
 𝑅𝑡+1
𝐿 =
𝑀𝑃𝐾𝑗,𝑡+1
𝑆𝑂𝐸 + 𝑄𝑡+1
𝑆𝑂𝐸(1 − 𝛿𝑆𝑂𝐸)
𝑄𝑡
𝑆𝑂𝐸  
(94) 
Equation (94) implies the gross return to holding a unit of capital in the SOEs, which 
equal to the risk-free lending rate from the commercial banks. 𝛿𝑆𝑂𝐸  is the 
depreciation rate and 𝑀𝑃𝐾𝑗,𝑡+1
𝑆𝑂𝐸  is the marginal product of capital in SOE’s sector, 
which takes the form as 𝛼2
𝑃𝑡+1
𝑤,𝑆𝑂𝐸
𝑋𝑡+1𝑃𝑡+1
𝑤
𝑌𝑗,𝑡+1
𝑆𝑂𝐸
𝐾𝑗,𝑡+1
𝑆𝑂𝐸 . 
 
There is a representative capital goods producer who purchases final output as 
materials inputs, 𝐼𝑡
𝑆𝑂𝐸 and 𝐼𝑡
𝑆𝑀𝐸 , and produce new capital goods for both SOEs and 
SMEs. the new capital goods are sold at the price 𝑄𝑡
𝑆𝑂𝐸  and 𝑄𝑡
𝑆𝑀𝐸 . Capital 
accumulation with adjustment costs in both sectors are,  
 𝐾𝑡
𝑆𝑀𝐸 = (1 − 𝛿𝑆𝑀𝐸)𝐾𝑡−1
𝑆𝑀𝐸 + 𝑒𝑡
𝐼𝑆𝑀𝐸 [𝐼𝑡
𝑆𝑀𝐸 −
𝜙𝐾
𝑆𝑀𝐸
2
(
𝐼𝑡
𝑆𝑀𝐸
𝐾𝑡−1
𝑆𝑀𝐸 − 𝛿
𝑆𝑀𝐸)
2
𝐾𝑡−1
𝑆𝑀𝐸] (95) 
And 
 𝐾𝑡
𝑆𝑂𝐸 = (1 − 𝛿𝑆𝑂𝐸)𝐾𝑡−1
𝑆𝑂𝐸 + 𝑒𝑡
𝐼𝑆𝑂𝐸 [𝐼𝑡
𝑆𝑂𝐸 −
𝜙𝐾
𝑆𝑂𝐸
2
(
𝐼𝑡
𝑆𝑂𝐸
𝐾𝑡−1
𝑆𝑂𝐸 − 𝛿
𝑆𝑂𝐸)
2
𝐾𝑡−1
𝑆𝑂𝐸] (96) 
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Tobin’s Q equations are,  
 
1
𝑄𝑡
𝑆𝑀𝐸 = [1 − 𝜙𝐾
𝑆𝑀𝐸 (
𝐼𝑡
𝑆𝑀𝐸
𝐾𝑡−1
𝑆𝑀𝐸 − 𝛿
𝑆𝑀𝐸)] 𝑒𝑡
𝐼𝑆𝑂𝐸 (97) 
And 
 
1
𝑄𝑡
𝑆𝑂𝐸 = [1 − 𝜙𝐾
𝑆𝑂𝐸 (
𝐼𝑡
𝑆𝑂𝐸
𝐾𝑡−1
𝑆𝑂𝐸 − 𝛿
𝑆𝑂𝐸)] 𝑒𝑡
𝐼𝑆𝑂𝐸 (98) 
A unit mass of monopolistic competitive retailers is included to incorporate sticky 
prices. They purchase intermediate wholesale goods from SMEs and SOEs at 
aggregate wholesale price 𝑃𝑡
𝑊, then bundle them into the homogeneous final products. 
This is identical to the final goods producer sector from Chapter 3, which yields the 
same New Keynesian Phillips curve,  
 ?̃?𝑡 = 𝛽𝐸𝑡?̃?𝑡+1 +
(1 − 𝜃)(1 − 𝜃𝛽)
𝜃
(−?̃?𝑡) (99) 
Where ?̃?𝑡 = 𝑝𝑡 − 𝑝𝑡
𝑤̃  implies the relative price between the aggregate wholesale price 
and retail price. 
4.4 Data  
Bayesian estimation from Chapter 3 requires eight macroeconomic time series data, 
which are: GDP, consumption, investment, labour, inflation, risk premium, capital 
investment return in SMEs’ sector, and SOEs output. In this chapter, we exclude labour 
input in the Cobb-Douglas function; therefore, we do not require data for labour. As 
we use M2 as the intermediate target in the monetary policy rule, we include M2 (𝑀𝑡) 
in our data sample. In addition, to conduct indirect inference estimation, we require 
capital inputs (𝐾𝑡
𝑆𝑂𝐸 and 𝐾𝑡
𝑆𝑀𝐸) and capital investments (𝐼𝑡
𝑆𝑂𝐸 and 𝐼𝑡
𝑆𝑀𝐸) in both SOEs 
and SMEs’ sectors, SMEs output (𝑌𝑡
𝑆𝑂𝐸). Sample periods are reduced to 84 periods due 
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to the data availability of capital investments in both sectors, which is between 1995Q1 
and 2015Q4. It is noted that all data are per capita in real term, and the source of the 
data is in the appendix.  
4.5 Calibrated Parameters 
There are two discount factors in this model, one is in the household sector, and the 
other is in the banker sector. Household’s discount factor 𝛽𝐻 is set to be 0.9867, which 
can be used to pin down the steady-state quarterly real deposit rate of 0.0135 or four 
per cent expressed at an annual frequency. The steady-state rate for shadow banking 
products 𝑅𝑆𝐵 can be pinned down as 1.0419 by the household discount factor and the 
steady-state default rate, 𝐹(?̅?), is 0.0273. The steady-state reserve ratio, 𝑣 is still set 
to be 0.15, and the steady-state loan-to-deposit ratio, ℎ is 0.75, which is the average 
value of the ratio between 1992 and 2015. The banker’s discount factor can be 
calculated by using equation (83) at the steady-state, which is 0.9999. Bankers are 
computed to be more patient than households since they offer both risk-free and risky 
products but do not bear any risks. The risk from the shadow banking loans is 
transferred to the households’ sector. The remaining calibrated parameters are identical 
to the first model in Chapter 3.  
4.6 Indirect Inference Estimation 
The DSGE framework in this chapter captures both the largest component in the 
Chinese shadow banking system, WMPs, and the commercial bank shadow banking 
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activities43. Therefore, this model can be treated as a more general case to represent 
the shadow banking sector. It is meaningful to discover whether this model that is 
closer to reality can find the optimal estimated parameters that can pass the indirect 
inference.  
The VAR auxiliary model is used in the evaluation estimate, and the choice of the 
auxiliary model includes output, inflation and money supply. The output is important 
in the auxiliary model because explaining output behaviour is essential in any macro 
model. Furthermore, quantity-based money supply uses money supply growth as the 
intermediate target to eventually stabilise both inflation and output. Therefore, 
including inflation, output and money supply in the auxiliary model are reasonable 
choices. As explained in the data section 4.4, the data employed in the estimated model 
is filtered by using one-sided HP filter.  
Figure 6 Filtered Data for the Auxiliary Model 
 
 
43 Noting that in the first model, the lending channel between SOEs and SMEs still use commercial bank as the intermediary in 
reality; hence, the commercial bank shadow banking activities in this model also capture the function of entrusted loans.  
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As can be seen in figure 6, money growth is more volatile than GDP and inflation rate. 
The mean value of the money supply is -0.13 with standard deviation 4.05; the mean 
value of output is -0.23 with standard deviation 1.92, and the mean value of inflation 
rate is -0.14 with standard deviation 0.92.   
The simulated annealing algorithm is used when conducting indirect inference 
estimation in order to find the best combination of estimated parameters that can 
possibly pass the test. I use the calibrated values as the starting point to estimate the 
model; this includes the capital share in both SMEs and SOEs sectors, 𝛼1 and 𝛼2, 
and the starting values are 0.4 and 0.5. Again, the higher value of the capital share in 
SOEs reflects a higher level of capital intensity. The parameter determines nominal 
price rigidity, 𝜃, is set to be 0.75, which is consistent with Bernanke et al. (1999). In 
addition, the starting values for the investment adjustment costs in both sectors are set 
to be 0.25, which is consistent with the model in Chapter 3. For the monetary policy 
rule, the parameters 𝜌𝑚 ,  𝑎𝜋 ,  𝑎𝑦  are set to be 0.9, 1.5 and 0.5. Finally, all the 
coefficients in the AR (1) shock processes are calibrated to be 0.9.  
To determine whether any set of estimated parameters can pass the indirect inference 
test at the 95% confidence level, I use Transformed Wald statistics44 where the critical 
value is 1.645. If the Transformed Wald statistics is less than the critical value, then 
the model can be treated as passing the test, or in other words, the model is not rejected 
 
44 Transformed Wald statistics (TW) is calculated by the following formula, 𝑇𝑊 = 1.648( √2𝑤
𝛼−√2𝑘−1
√2𝑤0.95−√2𝑘−1
), where is the Wald 
statistics for the actual data and is the Wald statistics for the 95th percentile of the simulated data.  
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by the actual data. Hence, in the first procedure, I specify the auxiliary model; second, 
I start with the calibrated parameters and iterate the indirect inference test 10000 times 
by using simulation annealing searching algorithm; finally, I need to search whether 
any set of parameters from the 10000 results can pass the test. If there is at least one 
combination of parameters that can provide a Transformed Wald statistic value less 
than 1.645, then I conclude the model is not rejected by the actual data. If there is no 
statistic smaller than 1.645, then the model is rejected by the data.  
The estimated results are shown in Table 6. On the firm side, the estimated value of 
𝛼1 is 0.47, which implies SMEs rely less on capital inputs in their production phase. 
Meanwhile, SOEs have more capital intensity with the estimated parameter, 𝛼2 
equals 0.54. The estimated value of price stickiness, 𝜃 , is 0.70, which is slightly 
smaller than the calibrated value. This indicates prices are adjusted around every three 
quarters in China. The investment-specific parameters in SOEs are estimated to be 
much higher than in the SMEs sector, 1.16 and 0.26 respectively. This strongly 
indicates a higher capital adjustment cost in SOEs capital investment. The last three 
estimated parameters are monetary policy-related, which are money growth smoothing 
parameter, inflation reaction parameter and output reaction parameter in the Quantity-
based monetary policy rule. The inflation reaction parameter, 𝑎𝜋 is estimated to be 
1.04, which is smaller than the calibrated value, 1.5. This indicates that Chinese 
monetary policy matters less on inflation stabilisation.  
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Table 6 Indirect Inference Estimation 
Estimated Parameters 
Definition Parameter Calibration Estimation 
Capital Elasticity in SMEs 𝛼1 0.40 0.47 
Capital Elasticity in SOEs 𝛼2 0.50 0.54 
Price Rigidity 𝜃 0.75 0.70 
Investment Specific in SMEs 𝜙𝐾
𝑆𝑀𝐸 0.25 0.26 
Investment Specific in SOEs 𝜙𝐾
𝑆𝑂𝐸 0.25 1.16 
Inflation Reaction in Taylor Rule 𝑎𝜋 1.5 1.04 
Output Reaction in Taylor Rule 𝑎𝑦 0.5 1.22 
Money Growth Smoothing  𝜌𝑚 0.9 0.70 
    Transformed Wald statistics                      23.91 
However, the authority focuses more on output stabilisation since the estimated value 
is 1.22 (𝑎𝑦), compared to the calibrated value, 0.5. The smoothing parameter, 𝜌𝑚, is 
smaller in the estimated result, which implies the monetary policy is less persistent 
than the initial guess. The estimated results are relatively consistent with the Bayesian 
estimation results in Chapter 3 apart from the price stickiness level, capital adjustment 
costs in SOEs, and output reaction in Taylor rule. The level of price stickiness is 
estimated to be higher in Bayesian approach (0.8256); capital adjustment cost is higher 
in Bayesian, but with a much lower level (0.2030) compared to the indirect inference 
results. Both estimation methods exhibit a higher level of output reaction in the 
Chinese economy, but the result is 0.5283 in Bayesian, while Indirect Inference reports 
1.22. Further to the estimated results, the main aim of this exercise is to test whether 
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the model can pass the indirect inference test. Unfortunately, the Transformed Wald 
statistic is 23.91, which is much higher than the critical value 1.645, and this concludes 
that my model fails to pass the test against the actual data.   
Compared to the calibrated parameters; the estimated parameters are mostly in line 
with the calibrated values. Estimated capital elasticity in the SMEs sector is 0.07 
higher than the calibrated value, while estimated capital elasticity in the state sector is 
0.04 higher. The estimated level of price stickiness is 0.05 lower than the calibrated 
parameter. Investment specific in SMEs is very close between calibration and 
estimation. However, it is much higher in SOEs sector with 1.16 estimated value 
compare to the 0.25 calibrated value. This implies a much higher adjustment costs for 
the state sector regarding the capital investment. In terms of the monetary policy 
reaction, the output indicates a more substantial effect (1.22 estimated parameter 
compare to 0.5 calibrated value), while inflation reaction has a smaller response (1.04 
estimated parameter compare to 1.5 calibrated value). If we compare the estimated 
results between the first model and the one in this chapter, capital elasticity in both 
sectors are similar, SMEs are less capital intensity (0.42 in the first model and 0.47 in 
the second), while in the state sector, it is more capital intensity (0.45 and 0.54). Price 
rigidity is higher in the first model (0.82) compare to this model (0.70), which indicates 
that if commercial banks directly involved in the shadow banking activities, the model 
illustrates a lower level of stickiness. The output reaction in the monetary policy is 
much more significant if the model incorporates a quantity-based policy rule (1.22), 
while in the conventional rule, the estimated output reaction is only 0.52 even though 
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it is already higher than the calibrated value. Therefore, this second model indicates 
that the priority of the central bank monetary policy is to stabilise output rather than 
inflation.    
4.7 Impulse Response Functions and the Properties of the Estimated Model 
Figure 7 shows the estimated IRFs for a contractionary monetary policy shock. Similar 
to the previous scenario, the tighter monetary policy further restricts the source of 
financing for the private sector; therefore, the private investment (inv) drops, which 
causes the decreasing in the private net worth (n). SMEs have less net worth, which 
implies they have less collateral to borrow money from the banks; as a result, they 
must pay a higher level of risk premium (rp). Under a quantitative-based monetary 
policy, the model behaves with a lagged reaction of output (y, ysoe and ypoe), the 
tighter policy reduces outputs in both sectors but after the first period rather than a 
prompt response.  
Figure 8 shows the estimated IRFs with a positive fiscal policy. Unlike the previous 
case that the positive fiscal policy shock increases the output, in the second model, 
output in both sectors decreases dramatically after the first period of the occurrence of 
the shock. Consistent with the previous model, expansionary fiscal policy crowds out 
the private investment (ipoe) and household’s consumption (ch). It increases the net 
worth temporarily because of the stimulation package; however, it quickly drops the 
net worth (n) and increases the risk premium (rp) in the private sector since the public 
investment worsens the financial situation of the private sector.   
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Figure 7 Contractionary Monetary Policy Shock 
     
Figure 8 Positive Fiscal Policy Shock 
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Table 7 shows the property of the estimated model, specifically, the forecast error 
variance decomposition of GDP, money supply and inflation rate. Productivity shocks 
in both sectors (35.58 per cent and 14.43 per cent) play dominant roles in determining 
the forecast error of the output, and the risk premium shock has the second-largest 
impact on forecasting error of GDP (20.51 per cent). Besides, investment-specific 
shock in the private sector accounts for 10 per cent of forecasting error on output. 
Monetary policy shock and SME investment-specific shock play a significant role in 
forecasting future money supply with the value of 30.44 per cent and 32.96 per cent, 
respectively. Reserve ratio shock ranks third place in influencing the forecast error 
(6.10 per cent). The model shows the risk premium shock has the most significant 
impact on forecasting inflation rate in the future period with 45.11 per cent and 
investment-specific shock in the private sector plays the second-highest impact (40.96 
per cent). Monetary policy shock ranks the third but only accounts for 5.44 per cent.  
Table 7 Variance Decomposition 
 
 𝒆𝒕
𝑴 𝒆𝒕
𝒂𝑺𝑶𝑬 𝒆𝒕
𝒂𝑺𝑴𝑬 𝒆𝒕
𝑰𝑺𝑶𝑬 𝒆𝒕
𝑰𝑺𝑴𝑬 𝒆𝒕
𝝉 𝒆𝒕
𝑺 𝒆𝒕
𝑮 
𝒀𝒕 0.11 35.58 14.43 0.99 10.80 0.22 20.51 0.01 
𝑴𝒕 30.44 1.31 0.54 0.10 32.96 6.10 34.38 0.26 
𝝅𝒕 5.44 1.26 0.53 0.14 40.96 7.34 45.11 0.32 
 
4.8 Conclusion 
In this chapter, I incorporate WMPs and commercial bank shadow banking activity in 
a DSGE framework. Compared with the model in Chapter 3, this model is closer to 
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reality as it considers both the largest shadow banking instrument and banks’ off-
balance-sheet lending behaviour. Specifically, commercial banks offer both deposit 
account and shadow banking products to households. Households are free to choose 
which products they want to invest, and the differences are that deposit is risk-free but 
with lower interest payment, while shadow banking products (WMPs) are risky but 
with a higher return. Commercial banks make a profit from lending out the funds they 
obtain from households. However, due to safe-loan regulation, on the commercial 
banks’ on-balance sheet, commercial banks are assumed to lend out the money 
obtained from deposits only to SOEs who are treated as risk-free borrowers. Banks 
have the incentive to circumvent the burdensome regulations; therefore, they create 
off-balance-sheet lending channels by cooperating with trust companies. Basically, 
trust companies issue WMPs, and banks sell it to households. The transactions then 
do not appear on the banks’ balance sheet. These funds are not subject to the banking 
regulation and can be lent to risky firms, such as SMEs. 
The aim of developing this model is that I want to test whether this model can be 
rejected or not rejected by the actual data. Bayesian estimation does not test the model 
against the actual data; hence, indirect inference estimation is applied to fulfil the 
purpose. Output, inflation and money supply are adopted in the VAR auxiliary model. 
The idea is using both actual data and simulated data of output, inflation and money 
supply in the same VAR model to work out the moments that represent the properties 
of the real data and the model; then, to compute the Transformed Wald statistics to 
search whether the estimated parameters can pass the indirect inference test. The 
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results in Section 4.6 show that, unfortunately, the estimated results fail to pass the 
test, and the model is rejected by the actual data; it cannot mimic the data. This may 
indicate the model possibly misses some important information from the data; hence, 
in the next chapter, an essential feature of the Chinese economy, the housing market, 
is incorporated into the model to see whether the performance can be improved.  
Appendix 4A Log-linearised Equations 
The main difference of this model is the money market and the banking sector; the rest 
of the model is the same as the first model in Chapter 3. 
Money Demand 
?̃?𝑡
𝐻 =
𝐶𝐻
𝑀
?̃?𝑡 + 𝛽
𝐻 ?̃?𝑡+1
𝐻   
Money Supply 
?̃?𝑚,𝑡 = 𝜌𝑚?̃?𝑚,𝑡−1 + (1 − 𝜌𝑚)(𝑎𝜋?̃?𝑡 + 𝑎𝑦?̃?𝑡) + ?̃?𝑚,𝑡 
?̃?𝑚,𝑡 = ?̃?𝑡 − ?̃?𝑡−1 
Banker 
?̃?𝑡+1
𝐿 =
𝑅𝐷
(1 − 𝑣)ℎ𝑅𝐿
?̃?𝑡+1
𝐷 − (
𝑅𝐷
(1 − 𝑣)ℎ𝑅𝐿
− 1)(?̃?𝑡+1
𝐵
− ?̃?𝑡
𝐵
) +
𝑣(𝑅𝐿 − 1/𝛽𝐵)
(1 − 𝑣)𝑅𝐿
?̃?𝜀𝑡
𝑣
 
 
Appendix 4B List of F.O.Cs 
Households 
1
𝑀𝑡
+ 𝛽𝐻
1
𝜋𝑡+1
=
𝐶𝑡+1
𝐻
𝐶𝑡
𝐻  
 
𝛽𝐻
𝑅𝑡
𝐷
𝜋𝑡+1
=
𝐶𝑡+1
𝐻
𝐶𝑡
𝐻  
 
𝛽𝐻[1 − 𝐹(?̅?𝑡)]
𝑅𝑡
𝑆𝐵
𝜋𝑡+1
  =
𝐶𝑡+1
𝐻
𝐶𝑡
𝐻  
Banker 
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𝐶𝑡+1
𝐵
𝛽
𝐵
𝐶𝑡
𝐵  =
[𝑅𝑡+1
𝐷 − 𝑅𝑡+1
𝐿 (1 − 𝑣𝑒𝜀𝑡
𝑣
)ℎ]
[1 − (1 − 𝑣𝑒𝜀𝑡
𝑣
)ℎ]
 
SMEs (Note that 𝑁 in Chapter 4 implies net worth) 
𝑠𝑡 = 𝐸𝑡 (
𝑅𝑡+1
𝐾
𝑅𝑡+1
𝐿 ) =
1 − 𝑁𝑖,𝑡/𝑄𝑡
𝑆𝑀𝐸𝐾𝑡+1
𝑆𝑀𝐸
𝛤(?̅?) − 𝜇𝐺(?̅?)
 
𝐸𝑡(𝑅𝑡+1
𝐾 ) =
𝛼1
𝑃𝑡+1
𝑤,𝑆𝑀𝐸
𝑋𝑡+1𝑃𝑡+1
𝑤
𝑌𝑖,𝑡+1
𝑆𝑀𝐸
𝐾𝑖,𝑡+1
𝑆𝑀𝐸 + 𝑄𝑡+1
𝑆𝑀𝐸(1 − 𝛿𝑆𝑀𝐸)
𝑄𝑡
𝑆𝑀𝐸  
SOEs 
𝑅𝑡+1
𝐿 =
𝛼2
𝑃𝑡+1
𝑤,𝑆𝑂𝐸
𝑋𝑡+1𝑃𝑡+1
𝑤
𝑌𝑗,𝑡+1
𝑆𝑂𝐸
𝐾𝑗,𝑡+1
𝑆𝑂𝐸 + 𝑄𝑡+1
𝑆𝑂𝐸(1 − 𝛿𝑆𝑂𝐸)
𝑄𝑡
𝑆𝑂𝐸  
Capital Goods Producers 
1
𝑄𝑡
𝑆𝑂𝐸 = [1 − 𝜙𝐾
𝑆𝑂𝐸 (
𝐼𝑡
𝑆𝑂𝐸
𝐾𝑡−1
𝑆𝑂𝐸 − 𝛿
𝑆𝑂𝐸)] 𝑒𝑡
𝐼𝑆𝑂𝐸  
 
1
𝑄𝑡
𝑆𝑀𝐸 = [1 − 𝜙𝐾
𝑆𝑀𝐸 (
𝐼𝑡
𝑆𝑀𝐸
𝐾𝑡−1
𝑆𝑀𝐸 − 𝛿
𝑆𝑀𝐸)] 𝑒𝑡
𝐼𝑆𝑂𝐸 
Final Goods Producers 
∑ 𝜃𝑘
∞
𝑘=0
𝐸𝑡 {[𝛬𝑡,𝑘 (
𝑃𝑡
∗
𝑃𝑡+𝑘
)
𝜖
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Appendix 4C Steady State Values From the Model 
 
Variables Steady State Values 
𝑪𝑯 2.2634 
𝑪𝑩 0.7520 
𝑪𝑬 0.1151 
𝑰 0.6778 
𝑮 0.6602 
𝑴 170.1806 
𝒀 4.7154 
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𝒀𝑺𝑴𝑬 1.8862 
𝒀𝑺𝑶𝑬 2.8293 
𝑰𝑺𝑴𝑬 0.1710 
𝑰𝑺𝑶𝑬 0.5067 
𝑲 19.3644 
𝑲𝑺𝑴𝑬 4.8860 
𝑲𝑺𝑶𝑬 14.4785 
𝑵 2.1987 
𝑹𝑫 1.0101 
𝑹𝑲 1.0713 
𝑹𝑳 1.0211 
𝑹𝑺𝑩 1.0419 
 
Appendix 4D Data 
The source of quarterly data of M2, capital investment in SOEs and SMEs is from 
Chen et al. (2016). The time series of M2 is derived and seasonally adjusted from the 
year-over-year growth rates published by the PBoC. Capital investment in SOEs is 
named as ‘NominalSOEGFCF (gross fixed capital formation: SOEs)’; and capital 
investment in SMEs is ‘NominalPrivGFCF (gross fixed capital formation: private 
sector—excluding government, households, SOEs, and other non-SOEs, for example, 
joint ventures)’. Capital inputs (𝐾𝑡
𝑆𝑂𝐸  and 𝐾𝑡
𝑆𝑀𝐸 ) are constructed according to the 
capital accumulation functions in each sector. Finally, SMEs output (𝑌𝑡
𝑆𝑂𝐸) is obtained 
from total output subtract the output in SOEs.  
 
Raw Data Description (RMB) 
Variable Minimum Maximum Mean 
M2 (Billion) 5241.57 139738.42 448423.00 
SOEs Capital Inputs (Billion) 1201.66 6229.26 2394.21 
SMEs Capital Inputs (Billion) 565.47 2092.24 967.39 
SOEs Capital Investment (Billion) 217.77 1453.82 661.85 
SMEs Capital Investment (Billion) 73.23 2248.20 666.08 
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Chapter 5 Chinese Shadow Banking with the Housing Market 
5.1 Introduction 
Due to restrictive capital controls in China, households and firms cannot freely invest 
their money abroad, therefore, they must seek investment opportunities domestically, 
for example, bank deposits, stock market and housing market. Figure 9 shows the 
national inflation rate with nominal bank deposit rate from 2003 to 2013. As can be 
seen that inflation rate fluctuates dramatically between 2% and 8%, while bank deposit 
rate stays in a narrow range between 2% and 4%. This is because the deposit rate is 
regulated by the central bank in China. Due to this reason, national inflation rate 
surpasses the deposit rate in 2004, 2008-2009, and 2011-2012, resulting in the negative  
Figure 9 Bank Deposit and Inflation Rate 
 
Source: Cited from Fang et al (2015) 
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real deposit rate. In addition, the average real deposit rate in 2003-2013 is 0.01%. 
Consequently, the low real return on bank deposit motivate households to seek for 
alternative investment vehicles in the recent decade.  
Households can also invest in the stock market inside China. However, compared to 
the US market, the stock market is still underdeveloped and small by size. China has 
two stock markets that established in the early 1990s, Shanghai and Shenzhen stock 
markets. Figure 10 depicts the Shanghai Stock Market Index for 2003-2013. There is 
substantial stock market boom at the beginning of 2006 from 1200 to the peak of 6092 
in October 2007. However, in conjunction with the global financial crisis in 2008, it  
Figure 10 Shanghai Stock Market Index 
 
Source: Cited from Fang et al (2015) 
experiences a bust in October 2008. Since then, the Shanghai Stock Market Index 
fluctuate between 2000 and 2003. During this period, the annual return is 7.3% but 
with 51.5% volatility. Hence, the large volatility in the underdeveloped stock market 
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prevent households and firms to invest too much in the stock market. 
During the same period, the annual returns of the housing among all cities are much 
higher than any other investment vehicles in China and with relatively small volatility. 
Table 8 summarises the annual returns in all first, second, and third-tier cities. The 
average return is 15.7% annually and the volatility is only 15.4% in tier 1 cities. 
Second tier cities offer an average 13.4% annual return with volatility of 9.9%. Tier 3 
cities provide lowest return of 11% but also with the smallest volatility of 7.5%.  
Table 8 Housing Return and Volatilities 
 
Source: Cited from Fang et al (2015) 
Considering the effect of the financial crisis in 2007-2009, the volatility of housing 
return has been remarkably low with much attractive return compare to the other types 
of investment opportunities. Therefore, housing investment becomes the most 
attractive investment vehicle than bank deposits and the stock market in China.   
The stable return in the housing market leads to further housing booms in China, and 
the booming always associated with credit expansion. Figure 11 shows the ratio of real 
estate mortgage loans to total bank loans in the period of 2010-2017. It clearly shows 
that the ratio remains very high level during the sample period, which increases from 
51.7% in 2010 to 75.9% in 2017.  
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Figure 11 Mortgage Loans Over Total Bank Loans 
 
Source: CEIC 
The financial system in China is highly regulated by the government. Credit policies 
have been used to either stimulate or prevent the housing market from potentially 
overheating. To guard against the global financial crisis in late 2008, the central 
government encouraged housing market by implementing administrative measures 
and guidelines, such as lowering minimum down payment ratio to 20% (Bian and Gete, 
2015), and even introducing the first pilot securitisation programs (Koss and Shi, 
2018). Moreover, commercial banks have been using financial innovations or shadow 
banking activities; for example, WMPs to circumvent heavy bank regulation, as 
mentioned in Chapter 4. 
Fontevecchia (2015) claims that the credit surge by the government has provided 
channels for weak borrowers, who are normally rejected by commercial banks, and 
encouraged them to increase expenditure in real estate market. This credit expansion 
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is similar to expansion in the US housing market before the 2007-2009 financial crisis, 
as explained by Favilukis et al. (2017). Allen et al. (2019) show that a large proportion 
of nonaffiliated loans (nonaffiliated entrusted loans) to SMEs have eventually flowed 
into the real estate industry, probably causing problematic performance. Table 9 
summarises the statistics from Allen et al (2019) for both the affiliated and 
nonaffiliated loans received by the real estate and construction sector within the 
sample period of 2004-2013. The sum of the entrusted loans accounts for 58.3% of 
total entrusted loans, which clearly shows most of the funds in entrusted lending 
market flows into the real estate and construction sectors during the sample period.   
Table 9 Entrusted Loans to Real Estate and Construction Sectors (Billion) 
 
 Loan  
Amount 
Proportion to the Total 
Entrusted Loans 
Affiliated Entrusted Loans 77.8 12.2% 
Nonaffiliated Entrusted Loans 294.3 46.1% 
Source: Cited from Allen et al. (2019) 
There has been growing concern about the Chinese housing market boom. The main 
concern is whether meltdown of the housing market may damage the Chinese 
economy, possibly resulting in similar following footsteps to Japan in the early 1990s 
and suffering economic downturn for many decades. The economic loss in China 
could further generate contagious effects on the rest of the world. Given the 
importance of housing market in the Chinese economy and credit expansion in the 
shadow banking sector, this exercise aims to add the housing market into the DSGE 
framework that developed from the two previous chapters and test whether this model 
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can present a higher chance of passing the indirect inference test. Section 5.2 briefly 
reviews the Chinese housing market. Section 5.3 describes the additional part of the 
model related to the housing market. Section 5.4 provides the estimated results, and 
section 5.5 concludes.  
5.2 Related Background 
The real estate market is a key component in the financial system of China. Housing 
sales in China reached 13.37 trillion RMB, which was approximately equivalent to 
16.4% of China’s GDP in 2017. The housing market is closely connected to the 
financial system through several channels. First, due to a lack of other quality 
investment opportunities for both households and firms and underdeveloped capital 
market, housing holdings have been the largest aspect of asset portfolios. More than 
70% of households’ wealth is in the housing market (Xie and Jin, 2015). Second, local 
governments rely heavily on land45 sale to generate fiscal income following the ‘tax 
reform’ in 1994 (Shu-ki and Yuk-shing, 1994). Local authorities can also use future 
land sale as collateral to borrow money through ‘Local Government Finance Vehicles’ 
(LGFVs). Third, since the global financial crisis in 2007, firms, especially well-
capitalised firms, rely on real estate assets as collateral to access bank credit. Finally, 
banks have accumulated real estate risks through lending to households, real estate 
developers, local governments, and firms backed by real estate assets. Property-related 
bank loans totalled 55 trillion RMB in the third quarter of 2016, which account for 25% 
 
45 In China, all buildable land is belonged and supplied by the government.  
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of banking assets in China, in which loans to housing developers and firms backed by 
real estate assets accounted for 37 trillion RMB (Liu and Xiong, 2018). 
According to Federal Housing Finance Agency data 46 , between 1996 and 2006, 
housing index maintained 5% annual growth rate but turned to averagely 6.4% 
negative growth rate during 2007 and 2012. Annual construction exceeded more than 
1.9 billion new housing units during 2005 and 2006 but decreased to only 0.7 million 
units per year averagely between 2009 and 2013. Although the change in the US 
housing market appears dramatic after the financial crisis, compared to the Chinese 
real estate boom, it still appears relatively stable. Fang et al. (2015) show that the 
growth rate of real housing prices in China from 2003 to 2013 was 13.1% annually, 
which is persistently faster than per capita disposable income growth. The greatest 
cost for housing developers is land; between 2004 and 2015, real land prices increased 
five times in 35 large cities (Wu et al., 2015). More than 100 billion square feet of 
floor space, or 74 square feet for each person, was added by Chinese housing 
developers from 2003 to 2014 (Chivakul et al., 2015).    
The mainstream explanations for rapidly increasing housing prices in China at national 
level include economic development, government intervention in land supply, and 
irrational investment (Wang and Zhang, 2014; Hui and Wang, 2014; Liu et al., 2016). 
However, housing prices increase largely unevenly across China’s cities. Cities in 
China are typically classified as four levels: tier 1, tier 2, tier 3 and tier 4. Basically, 
 
46 FEDERAL HOUSING FINANCE AGENCY https://www.fhfa.gov/AboutUs/Reports/ReportDocuments/HPI_2019Q2.pdf 
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GDP in tier 1 cities are over two trillion RMB; in tier 2 cities, GDP is over 70 billion 
RMB in mainly large, industrialised areas with relatively strong, well-established 
economies. Tier 3 cities are less wealthy but still relatively large by western standard 
with GDP over 20 billion, while tier 4 cities are the most underdeveloped areas with 
GDP less than 20 billion RMB.  
Tier 1 cities only include four most developed areas: Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou 
and Shenzhen. Housing prices have badly experienced high hikes over time in the 
first-tier cities. Figure 12 depicts the monthly housing price indices in all four tier 1 
cities with two measures of households’ purchasing power, per capita Gross Regional 
Product (GRP)47 and urban disposable income48. As can be seen, in Panel A, Beijing 
experienced a dramatic housing price rise since January 2003, which has increased 
660% within 10 years. Noticing that there are two price drops, one starts from May 
2008, and continued to around March 2009; another is between May 2011 and June 
2012. The first price drop represents a 13% drop in housing price which is coincided 
with the global financial crisis. The housing price index fluctuates between the vertical 
interval of 5.99 and 6.67 in the second episode of downward movement. In addition, 
both measurements of households’ purchasing power share similar growth from 2003 
to 2013, which substantially smaller than the housing price appreciation in Beijing.  
Panel B shows the overall housing price in Shanghai. It is more modest than that in 
 
47 The per capita value of output in the whole city. 
48 The per capita income received by urban residents of the city. 
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Beijing, which is increased from index 1 in 2003 to 4.43 in 2013. However, Shanghai 
started faster than Beijing, housing price is doubled by April 2005, while Beijing does 
not double until August 2006. There are two other price adjustments after 2005. 
Housing price pricks up from March 2007 and reaches an index level of 2.72 in August 
2008, and slightly drops down to 2.41 by the end of 2008. The second episode of rising 
starts from June 2011 with index 4.27 to 4.43 by March 2013. The growth of 
households’ disposable income is also smaller than the house price but is much closer 
than that in Beijing. GRP per capita is doubled in the sample period but still exhibits 
more modest growth in Shanghai.  
Guangzhou and Shenzhen experience similar path of the housing price movements. 
Between 2003 and 2013, the index increases from 1 to 5.1 in Guangzhou, while in 
Shenzhen, it increases from 1 to 3.65. The most severe price drop in both cities start 
from October 2007 and January 2009, index drops from 2.97 to 1.82 in Shenzhen, 
which represents for a 39% price correction. While index drop from 3.08 to 2.38 in 
Shenzhen, which indicates a 23% price correction. The reason of the dramatic drop in 
the housing market is because of the global crisis since both cities are the world’s 
largest manufacturing export center. Disposable income grows differently in both 
cities, it increases approximately three times in Guangzhou, while it only rises 68% in 
Shenzhen during the same period.   
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Figure 12 Housing Prices in Tier 1 Cities 
 
Source: Cited from Fang et al (2015) 
One of the reasons for this high price in the first-tier cities is the high proportion of 
non-local residents. Foreign migrants are too scarce to influence the domestic housing 
market in China, but the migration from lower-tier cities to first-tier cities is massive. 
The proportion of non-local residents was more than 40% in most tier cities and, in 
Shenzhen, the rate even exceeded 80% (Wang et al., 2017).  
There are 35 tier 2 cities, and these can be treated as the second choice for migration 
with higher income and more working opportunities compared to tier 3 and 4 cities. 
Figure 13 shows the housing price indices for second and third tier cities, which also 
depicts the monthly housing price indices with the two measures of households’ 
purchasing power. Although the magnitude of the housing price appreciation in 
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second-tier cities is smaller than the first-tier cities, the appreciation is 292%, which 
is still substantial by any standard. This is even larger than the housing price 
appreciations in both US and Japan housing crisis. However, Panel A shows a 
remarkable growth in measures of purchasing power, which may imply the 
fundamental reason of appreciation is income growth, or GRP growth. 
Figure 13 Housing Prices in Tier 2&3 Cities 
 
Source: Cited from Fang et al (2015) 
Apart from migration at city level, central policies also have considerable influence 
on housing prices. The four-trillion stimulation plan immediately after the 2007-2009 
global crisis prompted a rapid surge in development of the real estate industry. Bai et 
al. (2016) document that most stimulus planning was implemented by local 
government through LGFVs. Moreover, large amounts of fund flowed unnecessarily 
into real estate developers and other infrastructure projects (Ueda and Gomi, 2013).  
To tighten the potentially overheated real estate industry, the Chinese government 
introduced a series of policies to restrict the market. This has included new national 
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10 article49 in 2010 and new national 8 article50 in 2011. During the same period, 
monetary policy became tighter to restrict the overall bank credit for firm financing. 
The housing market began to cool down rapidly after the regulations, which even 
caused the central government to worry that the policies might be too tight (Koss and 
Shi, 2018). Hence, several relaxation measures were introduced to stabilise the cooling 
market and ensure the prices rose back to the steady value in 2012. Since then, housing 
prices in several tier 1 and tier 2 cities bounced back. Beginning in 2013, property 
prices started to deviate largely across a different notch of cities. Tier 1 and tier 2 cities 
experienced a large boom in real estate market, while tier 3 and tier 4 remained steady. 
Response from the central government has been to introduce different policies in 
different areas, and the related policy is known as national 5 article51.  
Although national 5 was designed to slow down the overheated market, the central 
policy of encouraging sale and reduction of housing inventories, has, to some extent, 
conflicted with the article. Therefore, the influence of the policies varies among 
different municipal levels, and largely depends on land supply. For the tier 1 and 
heated tier 2 cities with a higher level of urbanisation but restricted land supply, 
housing price has continued to increase at a steady acceleration since demand 
outweighed supply in the housing market. On the other hand, ghost town52 in lower-
 
49  Stop providing mortgage for purchasing the third house; restrict purchasing from non-local speculators  
http://house.people.com.cn/GB/11400758.html 
50 Down payment for purchasing second house increased to 60% http://finance.sina.com.cn/focus/gbt_2011/ 
51  In tier 1 and tier 2 cities, down payments increased to 30% for first home and 70% for second home. 
http://www.gov.cn/zwgk/2013-03/01/content_2342885.htm 
52 Newly constructed but mostly empty urban districts, usually in areas far away from traditional city centres.  
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tier areas has become more common. From 2014 to 2018, housing market has 
experienced very different regulation, including both stimulating and tightening 
processes. Starting from June 2014, a large number of non-tier 1 and heated tier 2 
cities have cancelled house purchase quota policy53 sequentially. However, market 
reaction was still very poor.  
In September 2014, the central government recommenced the loosening policy, mainly 
relaxing the loan limit on purchasing a second house54 . In March 2015, housing 
regulation continued relaxing, down payment for a second house decreased to 40%, 
and further decreased to 25% and without house purchase quota policy in September, 
since housing vacant rate remained very high. In the following period, down payment 
for the first house purchase decreased to 20% and 30% for a second house. Housing 
price began to recover in tier 3 and tier 4 cities due to the policy of rebuilding shanty 
areas in 2016 (Li et al., 2018). The new round of regulatory measures was introduced 
again by the central government in 2017 to curb rapid price rises. However, Koss and 
Shi (2018) argue that the policies were trying to freeze the market to avoid both 
dramatic increase and decrease in the market rather than changing the fundamentals 
of the housing market, particularly speculative activities.  
 
 
53 One of the policies in the National 10 article: each family can only purchase one new commercial house.   
54 Summary of housing regulations between 2012 and 2017 https://www.tuliu.com/read-66385.html  
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5.3 Model Framework 
The model in this chapter is constructed based on the second model in Chapter 4. The 
only difference is the housing market. However, the housing market is different from 
the Iacoviello (2005) type, in which impatient households borrow money from patient 
households and invest in housing. The Iacoviello-type financial friction incorporates 
two types of households and embeds only residential property in the conceptual 
framework. However, in China, households are not allowed to use property as 
collateral to borrow, on the contrary, firms, primarily private firms, can use housing as 
collateral to enhance their ability to get access to the credit. Thus, it is essential to 
include the housing sector in the production sector rather than just the household’s 
sector.  
Based on the above facts, one representative household remains in my model and can 
freely choose to save money in the deposit account or the shadow banking products. 
Bankers obtain money from households and lend out money to SOEs through on-
balance-sheet channel and to SMEs through off-balance-sheet channel. As mentioned 
in section 5.2, property-related loans to entrepreneurs reached 37 trillion RMB out of 
a total 55 trillion RMB. Thus, in my model, I assume SMEs invest in both capital and 
housing and use both as inputs to produce. The rest of the model is the same as the 
model in Chapter 4.  
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5.3.1 Off-balance-sheet Lending Contract 
The representative banker maximises the utility function,  
 𝑚𝑎𝑥 𝐸0 ∑ 𝛽𝐵
𝑡 𝑙𝑛𝐶𝑡
𝐵
∞
𝑡=0
 (90) 
Subject to the bankers’ flow of budget, 
 
 
𝐶𝑡
𝐵 +  𝑅𝑡−1
𝐷 𝐷𝑡−1 +  [1 − 𝐹(?̅?𝑡)]𝑅𝑡−1
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𝑆𝑂𝐸 +  𝐿𝑡
𝑆𝑀𝐸
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𝐾𝑄
𝑡−1
𝑆𝑀𝐸𝐾𝑡
𝑆𝑀𝐸 + 𝑅𝑡
𝐻𝑄
𝑡−1
𝐻 𝐻𝑡)
?̅?
0
     
(91) 
The only difference in the budget constraint from the previous model is the no arbitrary 
condition, in period 𝑡 + 1, the condition can be written as,  
 
[1 − 𝐹(?̅?)]𝑅𝑡+1
𝑆𝐵 𝐿𝑡+1
𝑆𝑀𝐸 + (1 − 𝜇) ∫ 𝑤𝑑𝐹(𝑤) (𝑅𝑡+1
𝐾 𝑄
𝑡
𝑆𝑀𝐸𝐾𝑡+1
𝑆𝑀𝐸 + 𝑅𝑡+1
𝐻 𝑄
𝑡
𝐻𝐻𝑡+1)
?̅?
0
= 𝑅𝑡+1
𝐿 𝐿𝑡+1
𝑆𝑀𝐸 
(92) 
Where  
 𝑅𝑡+1
𝑆𝐵 𝐿𝑡+1
𝑆𝑀𝐸 = ?̅?(𝑅𝑡+1
𝐾 𝑄
𝑡
𝑆𝑀𝐸𝐾𝑡+1
𝑆𝑀𝐸 + 𝑅𝑡+1
𝐻 𝑄
𝑡
𝐻𝐻𝑡+1) (93) 
The contractual return of the loans to SMEs, 𝑅𝑡+1
𝑆𝐵 𝐿𝑡+1
𝑆𝑀𝐸, equals the sum of capital and 
housing return times the threshold. The rate of the housing return is 𝑅𝑡+1
𝐻 , and house 
price is 𝑄
𝑡
𝐻. The amount of housing inputs is 𝐻𝑡+1.  
The amount of loans to SMEs is,  
 𝐿𝑡+1
𝑆𝑀𝐸 = 𝜑(𝑄
𝑡
𝑆𝑀𝐸𝐾𝑡+1
𝑆𝑀𝐸 + 𝑄
𝑡
𝐻𝐻𝑡+1) − 𝑁𝑡+1 (94) 
the amount of loans is determined by how much money SMEs need to purchase capital 
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and housing subject to the loan-to-value ratio55, 𝜑, and the net worth, 𝑁𝑡+1. Combining 
equations (3), (4) and (5), the risk premium can be derived as,  
 𝑅𝑡+1
𝐾 𝑅𝑡+1
𝐻
𝑅𝑡+1
𝐿 =
[𝜑(𝑄𝑡
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𝐻𝐻𝑡+1) − 𝑁𝑡+1] (
𝑄𝑡
𝑆𝑀𝐸𝐾𝑡+1
𝑆𝑀𝐸
𝑅𝑡+1
𝐻 +
𝑄𝑡
𝐻𝐻𝑡+1
𝑅𝑡+1
𝐾 )⁄  
[[1 − 𝐹(?̅?)]?̅? + (1 − 𝜇) ∫ 𝑤𝑑𝐹(𝑤)
?̅?
0
]
 (95) 
And the net worth evolution in the SMEs sector is modified as,  
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𝑆𝑀𝐸 + 𝑄𝑡−1
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(96) 
recalling that all equations are similar to the previous chapter with only one 
modification, the housing investment.  
5.3.2 Small-and-medium Sized Enterprises 
SMEs use both capital and housing as inputs to produce intermediate output, and the 
profit function can be constructed as,  
 
𝜋𝑡+1
𝑆𝑀𝐸 =
𝑃𝑡+1
𝑤,𝑆𝑀𝐸
𝑋𝑡+1𝑃𝑡+1
𝑤 𝑌𝑡+1
𝑆𝑀𝐸 − 𝑅𝑡+1
𝐾 𝑄𝑡
𝑆𝑀𝐸𝐾𝑡+1
𝑆𝑀𝐸 − 𝑅𝑡+1
𝐻 𝑄𝑡
𝐻𝐻𝑡+1
+ 𝑄𝑡+1
𝑆𝑀𝐸(1 − 𝛿𝐾
𝑆𝑀𝐸)𝐾𝑡+1
𝑆𝑀𝐸 + 𝑄𝑡+1
𝐻 (1 − 𝛿𝐻
𝑆𝑀𝐸)𝐻𝑡+1 
(97) 
In each period, SMEs first invest in capital and housing and use them to produce goods. 
By the end of the period, SMEs sell back undepreciated capital and housing back to 
capital goods producer and housing goods producer respectively, in which the housing 
depreciation rate is denoted as, 𝛿𝐻
𝑆𝑀𝐸. The production function is,  
 
 𝑌𝑡+1
𝑆𝑀𝐸 = 𝐴𝑡+1
𝑆𝑀𝐸(𝐾𝑡+1
𝑆𝑀𝐸)𝛼1(𝐻𝑡+1)
𝛽 (98) 
Solving the profit maximisation problem with respect to capital demand and housing 
 
55 The maximum loan-to-value ratio has been 80% in China.  
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demand yields, 
 
𝑅𝑡+1
𝐾 =
𝛼1
𝑃𝑡+1
𝑤,𝑆𝑀𝐸
𝑋𝑡+1𝑃𝑡+1
𝑤
𝑌𝑡+1
𝑆𝑀𝐸
𝐾𝑡+1
𝑆𝑀𝐸 + 𝑄𝑡+1
𝑆𝑀𝐸(1 − 𝛿𝐾
𝑆𝑀𝐸)
𝑄𝑡
𝑆𝑀𝐸  
(99) 
And  
 
𝑅𝑡+1
𝐻 =
𝛽
𝑃𝑡+1
𝑤,𝑆𝑀𝐸
𝑋𝑡+1𝑃𝑡+1
𝑤
𝑌𝑡+1
𝑆𝑀𝐸
𝐻𝑡+1
+ 𝑄𝑡+1
𝐻 (1 − 𝛿𝐻
𝑆𝑀𝐸)
𝑄𝑡
𝐻  
(100) 
Equation (10) determines the capital return, and equation (11) determines the housing 
return.  
5.3.3 Housing Goods Producers 
The representative housing goods producer maximises profit by following the 
following profit function,  
 𝜋𝑡
𝐻 = 𝑄𝑡
𝐻𝐻𝑡 − 𝐼𝑡
𝐻 (101) 
And the housing accumulation function is,  
 𝐻𝑡 = (1 − 𝛿𝐻
𝑆𝑀𝐸)𝐻𝑡−1 + 𝑒𝑡
𝐻 [𝐼𝑡
𝐻 −
𝜙
𝐻
2
(
𝐼𝑡
𝐻
𝐻𝑡−1
− 𝛿𝐻
𝑆𝑀𝐸)
2
𝐻𝑡−1] (102) 
which is similar to the capital accumulation technique with the housing investment-
specific shock, 𝑒𝑡
𝐻 . After solving the profit maximisation problem, we obtain the 
Tobin’s Q equation for housing, which is formed as,  
 
1
𝑄𝑡
𝐻 = [1 − 𝜙𝐻 (
𝐼𝑡
𝐻
𝐻𝑡−1
− 𝛿𝐻
𝑆𝑀𝐸)] 𝑒𝑡
𝐻 (103) 
5.4 Indirect Inference Estimation 
The choice of the VAR auxiliary model is slightly different from the previous one due 
to the existence of the housing market. The CPI inflation rate is replaced by the 
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housing price inflation as I want to test whether adding a housing market in the model 
can improve the model performance. The source of housing price is the National 
Bureau of Statistics of China. The sample period starts from 1995Q1 to 2015Q4 as in 
the previous chapters. Apart from the loan-to-value ratio (𝜑 = 0.80) in this model, the 
rest of the calibrated parameters are identical as before. The Indirect Inference 
estimation results after 5000 iterations are shown below,  
Table 10 Indirect Inference Estimation 
Estimated Parameters 
Definition Parameter Second Model This Model 
Capital Elasticity in SMEs 𝛼1 0.47 0.48 
Housing Elasticity in SMEs 𝛽 -- 0.28 
Capital Elasticity in SOEs 𝛼2 0.54 0.58 
Price Rigidity 𝜃 0.70 0.98 
Investment Specific in SMEs 𝜙𝐾
𝑆𝑀𝐸 0.26 1.06 
Housing Specific in SMEs 𝜙𝐻 -- 1.61 
Investment Specific in SOEs 𝜙𝐾
𝑆𝑂𝐸 1.16 1.86 
Inflation Reaction in Taylor Rule 𝑎𝜋 1.04 4.17 
Output Reaction in Taylor Rule 𝑎𝑦 1.22 3.43 
Money Growth Smoothing  𝜌𝑚 0.70 0.78 
    Transformed Wald statistics                      23.91 7.87 
The estimated results show similar results on capital elasticity both in SMEs and SOEs 
sectors (0.48 and 0.58). The housing elasticity in SMEs is estimated as 0.28. The level 
of price stickiness jumped to 0.98, which shows a much higher rigid in adjusting the 
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retail price in this model. Although the capital adjustment cost in SMEs is estimated 
to be much higher than the previous model (1.06 versus 0.26), it remains relatively 
smaller than the SOEs sector (1.86). The greatest change is in the monetary policy; 
both inflation reaction and output reaction exhibit much higher levels (4.17 and 3.43) 
compared to the model without housing market (1.04 and 1.22). However, the 
smoothing parameter, 𝜌𝑚, remains at a similar persistence level (0.78). As can be seen 
from Table 10, the performance of this model has a significant improvement with the 
Transformed Wald statistic 7.87, compared to the previous model, 23.91. This implies 
that adding housing market in the framework brings the model closer to reality. 
Unfortunately, the results are still not sufficiently good to pass the Indirect Inference 
test, as the critical value is 1.645. 
5.5 The Property of the Estimated Model and the Impulse Response Functions  
Table 11 Variance Decomposition 
 
 𝒆𝒕
𝑴 𝒆𝒕
𝒂𝑺𝑶𝑬 𝒆𝒕
𝒂𝑺𝑴𝑬 𝒆𝒕
𝑰𝑺𝑶𝑬 𝒆𝒕
𝑰𝑺𝑴𝑬 𝒆𝒕
𝝉 𝒆𝒕
𝑺 𝒆𝒕
𝑮 𝒆𝒕
𝑯 
𝒀𝒕 1.93 1.50 16.55 47.75 18.66 0.00 0.00 0.01 13.60 
𝑪𝒕
𝑯 0.32 1.40 18.48 58.24 18.48 0.00 0.00 0.00 3.08 
𝑰𝒕 1.12 2.38 3.3 55.89 23.05 0.04 0.76 0.03 13.43 
𝝅𝒕 2.19 2.04 26.15 25.54 25.04 0.00 0.01 0.01 19.02 
𝑰𝒕
𝑯 0.86 2.27 0.24 53.59 4.54 0.04 0.89 0.03 37.54 
 
Table 11 gives variance decomposition of output, consumption, total capital 
investment, inflation and housing investment based on the estimated results reported 
in Table 10. This indicates the percentage contribution of different shocks on the 
forecast error of selected variables. As can be seen from the table, all variables are 
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primarily driven by the exogenous shock of investment-specific shocks, especially 
from the SOE sector, 𝑒𝑡
𝐼𝑆𝑂𝐸 . The housing shock 𝑒𝑡
𝐻  contributes 19.02% on the 
inflation rate, 37.54% on housing investment and provides more than 10% on other 
variables except for households’ consumption (only 3.08%). Productivity shock in the 
SME sector, 𝑒𝑡
𝑎𝑆𝑀𝐸 , contributes 26.15% on inflation which ranks the first among all 
other shocks, but only contributes 3.3% of total capital investment. Both monetary 
policy, 𝑒𝑡
𝑀 and productivity shock in the SOE sector, 𝑒𝑡
𝑎𝑆𝑂𝐸 have a smaller impact 
on the forecast error of all variables. Finally, reserve ratio shock, risk premium shock 
and government spending shock (𝑒𝑡
𝜏 , 𝑒𝑡
𝑆 and 𝑒𝑡
𝐺  ) are all relatively trivial to the 
selected in the long run. To sum up, shocks in the SME sector, including productivity 
shock, investment-specific shock and housing investment shock jointly contribute 
approximately half of the impact of forecast error on all variables, and the other 
important part is the capital investment in SOE sector.  
Figure 14 shows a positive fiscal policy. Similar to the second model in my thesis. 
Outputs in both sectors (ypoe and ysoe) exhibit lagged reaction on the shocks. 
However, the differences are the private investment in capital and housing investment 
are crowded out by government spending. Net worth decreases due to the crowding-
out effect. The IRFs illustrate an apparent cyclical behaviour, which might signal some 
computational error in my model. This clearly needs some further investigation to 
understand better the current limitations in the framework.  
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 Figure 14 Positive Government Spending Shock   
                 
                 Figure 15 Contractionary Monetary Policy Shock 
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Figure 15 illustrates the IRFs of the contractionary monetary policy. The tighter policy 
again fails to cool down the economy since commercial banks are able to circumvent 
the heavy regulation and increase risk lending behaviour through off-balance-sheet 
shadow channel. This can be shown by the increasing level of private investment in 
both capital and housing (ipoe and ih respectively). However, the same issue of the 
cyclical behaviour will require further investigation of my model.  
5.6 Conclusion 
In this chapter, housing market is incorporated into the model developed from Chapter 
4. Housing market cannot be neglected since it is closely connected to the financial 
system through both conventional channels, for example, bank loans, and 
unconventional channel, i.e. shadow banking sector. The methodological purpose of 
adding the housing market into the framework is to investigate whether this 
modification can bring the model closer to the data or reality. The performance of the 
model in the previous chapter is not as good as I expect, which clearly indicates that 
the model is far from the reality. By adding the housing variable in the model, the 
performance dramatically improves; specifically, the Transformed Wald statistic 
decreases from 23.91 to 7.87, which is much closer to the critical value, 1.645. 
However, even though most of the estimated results are relatively robust compared to 
the model in Chapter 4, the results are still not good enough to pass the test. One 
possible reason might be that the model still lacks some important aspects of Chinese 
economy with shadow banking sector, or it could be because the model itself is too 
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complicated to pass the test. Although the model does not pass the test, the variance 
decomposition analysis shows the importance of shocks in SME sector and the 
influence of housing shocks on the forecast error of GDP, consumption, both capital 
housing investment and inflation rate.  
Appendix 5A Log-linearised Equations 
Risk Premium 
𝑅𝐾𝐾𝑆𝑀𝐸
𝑅𝐿
?̃?𝑡+1
𝐾 +
𝑅𝐻𝐻
𝑅𝐿
?̃?𝑡+1
𝐻 +
𝑅𝐾𝐾𝑆𝑀𝐸 + 𝑅𝐻𝐻
𝑅𝐿
?̃?𝑡+1
𝐿
= (
𝜑
𝛤(?̅?) − 𝜇𝐺(?̅?)
−
𝑅𝐾
𝑅𝐿
)𝐾𝑆𝑀𝐸(?̃?𝑡
𝑆𝑀𝐸 + ?̃?𝑡+1
𝑆𝑀𝐸) + (
𝜑
𝛤(?̅?) − 𝜇𝐺(?̅?)
−
𝑅𝐻
𝑅𝐿
)𝐻(?̃?𝑡
𝐻 + ?̃?𝑡+1) −
𝑁
𝛤(?̅?) − 𝜇𝐺(?̅?)
?̃?𝑡+1 +
𝜑(𝐾𝑆𝑀𝐸 + 𝐻)
𝛤(?̅?) − 𝜇𝐺(?̅?)
?̃?𝑡
𝑠 
 
Net Worth Accumulation 
?̃?𝑡+1 =
𝛾𝐾𝑆𝑀𝐸(𝑅𝐾 − 𝑅𝐿𝜑)
𝑁
(?̃?𝑡−1
𝑆𝑀𝐸 + ?̃?𝑡
𝑆𝑀𝐸) +
𝛾𝑅𝐻𝐻(𝑅𝐻 − 𝑅𝐿𝜑)
𝑁
(?̃?𝑡−1
𝐻 + ?̃?𝑡)
+
𝛾𝑅𝐾𝐾𝑆𝑀𝐸
𝑁
?̃?𝑡
𝐾 +
𝛾𝑅𝐻𝐻
𝑁
?̃?𝑡
𝐻 −
𝛾𝑅𝐿[𝜑(𝐾𝑆𝑀𝐸 + 𝐻) − 𝑁]
𝑁
?̃?𝑡
𝐿 + 𝛾𝑅𝐿?̃?𝑡 
 
SMEs Production Function 
?̃?𝑡+1
𝑆𝑀𝐸 = ?̃?𝑡+1
𝑆𝑀𝐸 + 𝛼1?̃?𝑡+1
𝑆𝑀𝐸 + 𝛽?̃?𝑡+1 
 
Housing Return 
?̃?𝑡+1
𝐻 = (1 −
1 − 𝛿𝐻
𝑅𝐻
)[𝜌?̃?𝑡+1
𝑆𝑀𝐸 + (1 − 𝜌)?̃?𝑡+1 − ?̃?𝑡+1 − ?̃?𝑡+1] +
1 − 𝛿𝐻
𝑅𝐻
?̃?𝑡+1
𝐻 − ?̃?𝑡
𝐻 
 
Housing Accumulation and Tobin’s Q Equation 
?̃?𝑡 = (1 − 𝛿𝐻)?̃?𝑡−1 + 𝛿𝐻𝐼𝑡
𝐻 + 𝛿𝐻?̃?𝑡
𝐻 
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?̃?𝑡
𝐻 = 𝜙𝐻
𝑆𝑀𝐸𝛿𝐻(𝐼𝑡
𝐻 − ?̃?𝑡−1) − ?̃?𝑡
𝐻 
Appendix 5B List of F.O.Cs 
Households 
1
𝑀𝑡
+ 𝛽𝐻
1
𝜋𝑡+1
=
𝐶𝑡+1
𝐻
𝐶𝑡
𝐻  
 
𝛽𝐻
𝑅𝑡
𝐷
𝜋𝑡+1
=
𝐶𝑡+1
𝐻
𝐶𝑡
𝐻  
 
𝛽𝐻[1 − 𝐹(?̅?𝑡)]
𝑅𝑡
𝑆𝐵
𝜋𝑡+1
  =
𝐶𝑡+1
𝐻
𝐶𝑡
𝐻  
 
Bankers 
𝐶𝑡+1
𝐵
𝛽
𝐵
𝐶𝑡
𝐵  =
[𝑅𝑡+1
𝐷 − 𝑅𝑡+1
𝐿 (1 − 𝑣𝑒𝜀𝑡
𝑣
)ℎ]
[1 − (1 − 𝑣𝑒𝜀𝑡
𝑣
)ℎ]
 
 
SMEs 
 
𝑅𝑡+1
𝐾 𝑅𝑡+1
𝐻
𝑅𝑡+1
𝐿 =
[𝜑(𝑄𝑡
𝑆𝑀𝐸𝐾𝑡+1
𝑆𝑀𝐸 + 𝑄𝑡
𝐻𝐻𝑡+1) − 𝑁𝑡+1] (
𝑄𝑡
𝑆𝑀𝐸𝐾𝑡+1
𝑆𝑀𝐸
𝑅𝑡+1
𝐻 +
𝑄𝑡
𝐻𝐻𝑡+1
𝑅𝑡+1
𝐾 )⁄  
[[1 − 𝐹(?̅?)]?̅? + (1 − 𝜇) ∫ 𝑤𝑑𝐹(𝑤)
?̅?
0
]
 
𝐸𝑡(𝑅𝑡+1
𝐾 ) =
𝛼1
𝑃𝑡+1
𝑤,𝑆𝑀𝐸
𝑋𝑡+1𝑃𝑡+1
𝑤
𝑌𝑖,𝑡+1
𝑆𝑀𝐸
𝐾𝑖,𝑡+1
𝑆𝑀𝐸 + 𝑄𝑡+1
𝑆𝑀𝐸(1 − 𝛿𝑆𝑀𝐸)
𝑄𝑡
𝑆𝑀𝐸  
𝑅𝑡+1
𝐻 =
𝛽
𝑃𝑡+1
𝑤,𝑆𝑀𝐸
𝑋𝑡+1𝑃𝑡+1
𝑤
𝑌𝑡+1
𝑆𝑀𝐸
𝐻𝑡+1
+ 𝑄𝑡+1
𝐻 (1 − 𝛿𝐻
𝑆𝑀𝐸)
𝑄𝑡
𝐻  
 
SOEs 
 
𝑅𝑡+1
𝐿 =
𝛼2
𝑃𝑡+1
𝑤,𝑆𝑂𝐸
𝑋𝑡+1𝑃𝑡+1
𝑤
𝑌𝑗,𝑡+1
𝑆𝑂𝐸
𝐾𝑗,𝑡+1
𝑆𝑂𝐸 + 𝑄𝑡+1
𝑆𝑂𝐸(1 − 𝛿𝑆𝑂𝐸)
𝑄𝑡
𝑆𝑂𝐸  
 
Capital Goods Producers 
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1
𝑄𝑡
𝑆𝑂𝐸 = [1 − 𝜙𝐾
𝑆𝑂𝐸 (
𝐼𝑡
𝑆𝑂𝐸
𝐾𝑡−1
𝑆𝑂𝐸 − 𝛿
𝑆𝑂𝐸)] 𝑒𝑡
𝐼𝑆𝑂𝐸  
1
𝑄𝑡
𝑆𝑀𝐸 = [1 − 𝜙𝐾
𝑆𝑀𝐸 (
𝐼𝑡
𝑆𝑀𝐸
𝐾𝑡−1
𝑆𝑀𝐸 − 𝛿
𝑆𝑀𝐸)] 𝑒𝑡
𝐼𝑆𝑂𝐸 
 
Housing Goods Producers 
 
1
𝑄𝑡
𝐻 = [1 − 𝜙𝐻 (
𝐼𝑡
𝐻
𝐻𝑡−1
− 𝛿𝐻
𝑆𝑀𝐸)] 𝑒𝑡
𝐻 
 
Final Goods Producers 
 
∑ 𝜃𝑘
∞
𝑘=0
𝐸𝑡 {[𝛬𝑡,𝑘 (
𝑃𝑡
∗
𝑃𝑡+𝑘
)
𝜖
𝑌𝑡+𝑘
𝑊 (𝑧) [
𝑃𝑡
∗
𝑃𝑡+𝑘
− (
𝜖
𝜖 − 1
)
𝑃𝑡+𝑘
𝑊
𝑃𝑡+𝑘
]]} = 0 
𝑃𝑡
∗ =
𝜖
𝜖 − 1
𝐸𝑡 ∑ 𝜃
𝑘∞
𝑘=0 𝛬𝑡,𝑘(𝑃𝑡+𝑘
𝑊 𝑃𝑡+𝑘
−(1−𝜖)
𝑌𝑡+𝑘)
𝐸𝑡 ∑ 𝜃𝑘
∞
𝑘=0 𝛬𝑡,𝑘(𝑃𝑡+𝑘
−(1−𝜖)
𝑌𝑡+𝑘)
 
 
Appendix 5C Steady State Values From the Model 
 
Variables Steady State Values 
𝑪𝑯 1.6564 
𝑪𝑩 0.4515 
𝑪𝑬 0.1600 
𝑰 0.4991 
𝑮 0.5656 
𝑴 138.0328 
𝒀 4.0400 
𝒀𝑺𝑴𝑬 1.6160 
𝒀𝑺𝑶𝑬 2.4240 
𝑰𝑺𝑴𝑬 0.1162 
𝑰𝑺𝑶𝑬 0.3829 
𝑲 14.2589 
𝑲𝑺𝑴𝑬 3.3197 
𝑲𝑺𝑶𝑬 10.9392 
𝑵 3.1405 
𝑹𝑫 1.0101 
𝑹𝑲 1.0620 
𝑹𝑳 1.0180 
𝑹𝑺𝑩 1.0419 
𝑹𝑯 1.0190 
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Appendix 5D Data 
 
Raw Data Description  
Variable Minimum Maximum Mean 
Housing Price (RMB Per Square Meter) 1007.25 6918.48 3770.57 
Housing Price Inflation (Per cent) -36.45 58.42 2.33 
 
 
Source: NBS
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Chapter 6 Conclusion 
In summary, this thesis aims to investigate: 1) why I study shadow banking, in 
particular, Chinese shadow banking system; 2) what are the similarities and 
differences between the Chinese and US shadow banking sectors; 3) why I use 
dynamic stochastic general equilibrium framework to undertake my research; 4) why 
both Bayesian and Indirect Inference estimations are applied in my research; 5) what 
are the research findings and implications from these exercises; particularly, how 
shadow banking system affects the policy implementations and effectiveness; what are 
the transmission mechanisms of different policies with the existence of two production 
sectors, i.e. small-and-medium-sized entrepreneurs and state-owned enterprises; and 
whether the dynamic stochastic general equilibrium models with Chinese shadow 
banking system and housing market can or cannot be rejected by the actual data.  
6.1 Why I study Chinese Shadow Banking System 
There are two reasons to investigate the Chinese shadow banking system. Firstly, the 
2007-2009 global financial crisis teaches the world a lesson about how badly an 
unregulated shadow banking can damage the economy. Chinese shadow banking 
sector has been growing dramatically since the four trillion stimulation package in 
2009, and it plays an essential role in the Chinese economy. The benefits are to satisfy 
the demand of SMEs financing and fuel economic growth; otherwise, it is difficult for 
SMEs to contribute more than 60% of the GDP if the private sector is excluded from 
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official credit. However, less restriction in the shadow banking sector also comes with 
substantial economic costs, which may cause financial instability. Secondly, I am a 
research member of the three-year project ‘Shadow Banking and the Chinese 
Economy – A Micro to Macro Modelling Framework’, which is funded by the 
Economic Social Research Council (UK) and the National Natural Science Foundation 
(China).  
6.2 The Similarities and Differences between Chinese and US Shadow Banking 
Shadow banking system is the largest in the US compared to other countries, while the 
system is the fastest growing in China in the recent decade. Development of the 
shadow banking sectors shares some common factors in both countries, but at the same 
time, there are considerable differences since both countries retain different economic 
structures. The main similarity in the development of the shadow banking sector in the 
two countries is regulatory arbitrage. The traditional banking sector has been heavily 
regulated in US; most importantly, the regulatory capital requirements restrict their 
leverage (first introduced in the Basel I officially and modified in Basel II and Basel 
III). Similarly, due to heavy bank regulations in the Chinese conventional banking 
sector, small-and-medium-sized enterprises (the real backbones of Chinese economy) 
find it difficult to gain access to bank credit. In the meantime, commercial banks also 
have incentive to circumvent the central bank regulations and extend credit to risky 
sectors via shadow banking channels.  
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However, since the economic structures remain substantially different in China and 
the US, the shadow banking system operates very differently. With the developed 
capital market, the structure and operation of shadow banking system in the US is 
more complicated, compared to China, and relies more on indirect shadow banking 
activities, i.e. securitisation. By comparison, the structure in China is simpler, and most 
of the shadow banking activities are direct borrowing and lending between shadow 
banking lenders and borrowers.  
6.3 Why I Use Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium Models 
The reason for using dynamic stochastic general equilibrium framework is that this 
type of model arguably remains the mainstream in the macroeconomic school of 
thought and has been widely used by researchers in both academic research and policy 
institutions, especially in central banks. Since one of the research objectives of my 
thesis is to discover policy impacts with the existence of shadow banking system in 
China, it is useful to adopt dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model to examine 
a variety of macroeconomic phenomena and conduct counterfactual policy 
experiments. In addition, it is not difficult to imagine that innumerable criticisms 
would immediately arise if central banks or any policy institution claim that they want 
to build a model that relies on static, rather than dynamic, deterministic, rather than 
stochastic, and partial, rather than general, equilibrium.  
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6.4 Why Both Bayesian and Indirect Inference Estimation Are Applied 
In terms of the methodological issue of adopting Bayesian and Indirect Inference 
estimations, I first use Bayesian technique to estimate the first model in my thesis. The 
reason is that Bayes can incorporate background knowledge into the estimation and 
allow for updating the previous understanding after analysing with the new data. 
Another advantage of Bayesian statistics is that it does not require testing the same 
null hypothesis repeatedly. One can locate the theory from prior literature and conduct 
further analysis. In addition to theoretical advantages, one practical advantage of using 
Bayesian methods is that it can deal with small sample size, which is not based on the 
central limit theorem as in the frequentist approach. However, Bayesian approach does 
not test the model framework with the actual data; instead, it normally concludes 
which model is more likely to be better than another, but the better model does not 
mean that it can mimic the real data. Indirect Inference provides a classical statistical 
inferential framework for judging whether the model is rejected or not rejected by the 
actual data. Thus, although it is convenient to apply Bayesian approach nowadays, it 
is still prudent to test the model before providing policy implications.    
6.5 Research Findings, Implications and Future Research 
The first model (Chapter 3) is a framework of one of the two largest shadow banking 
instruments, entrusted loans, and the risk-neutral state-owned enterprises lending 
behaviour. Commercial banks strongly favour state-owned enterprises for loans 
because of government endorsement. By taking advantage of the privileged access to 
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the formal banking system, state sectors obtain over 75% of bank loans (Tsai, 2015). 
By contrast, small-and-medium-sized enterprises face severe financial constraints in 
accessing bank credit, compelling them to rely on shadow banking for funds, mainly 
entrusted loans. In the meantime, SOEs have a long history of suffering from low 
productivity and inefficiency, which creates an incentive for them to engage in the 
entrusted lending market to seek additional profit.  
Using Bayesian estimation for the period 1992Q1-2015Q4, the research finding of this 
model is, first, that a tighter bank credit regulation, particularly a higher reserve ratio, 
pushes SOEs to raise the proportion of risky loans to SMEs. SOEs’ profit decreases 
due to the shortage of bank loans (higher reserve ratio). To compensate for the loss, 
SOEs are willing to increase lending to SMEs, which provides a higher return on loans. 
Second, the effectiveness of the monetary policy is dampened since SOEs’ entrusted 
lenders (SELs) are free to adjust the credit allocation to SMEs regardless of the 
underlying risks. The credit-constrained (private) sectors need to bear a higher cost of 
borrowing when monetary policy becomes tighter. However, with opportunities to 
borrow from the SOEs, SMEs can offer a higher return and offset their shortage of 
funds proportionally, which in turn renders the monetary policy less effective. Third, 
provisional positive government spending increases the output in both the private and 
state sectors. However, this crowds out private investment, which reduces the net 
worth and increases the risk premium of the private sector. Consequently, SMEs must 
reduce external finance and slow down their production. As mentioned earlier, SMEs 
are the engine of Chinese economic growth. Therefore, fiscal policy needs to be 
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implemented with caution as it may harm the real economy unless regulators can target 
the private sector for funds.  
The second model and third model are more sophisticated than the first model. The 
model framework in Chapter 4 includes both wealth management products, the other 
largest shadow banking instruments, and commercial banks’ shadow banking 
activities, which fit the feature of the overall status of Chinese shadow banking sector, 
i.e. the shadow of the banks. The final model in Chapter 5 is built upon the second 
model by adding a housing market in the framework since real estate industry is 
closely connected to the financial system through both conventional banking system 
and unconventional channel, i.e. shadow banking sector. Both models are estimated 
and tested by Indirect Inference technique to answer the methodological research 
question – whether such shadow banking models can or cannot be rejected by the 
actual data. I find that, although adding housing market brings the model closer to 
reality, both models are difficult to pass the test, which implies the models are rejected 
by Chinese time series macroeconomic data. Indirect Inference is a powerful test that 
might be even stronger than likelihood ratio tests. It is not surprising that such 
complicated dynamic stochastic general equilibrium models are rejected by the test. 
Nevertheless, one should be cautious when applying policy implications from a 
complex model that does not pass the appropriate empirical tests; for example, Indirect 
Inference approach.  
This study is a halfway house between the large structural models of Keynesian type 
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and simple models of the monetarist type. The aim of my research is not modelling 
everything in the Chinese economy that correlated to the shadow banking system, but 
the most relevant and important features. In the meantime, I do not want to neglect 
anything that might have a significant impact on my results. Therefore, although I have 
already developed three models, this research is still incomplete. None of my models 
passed the Indirect Inference test, which might be due to the models being still too 
complicated, or there being some important features hidden in the data that are not 
captured by my models.  
One direction of modifying my model is to allow the two sectors, both state and private 
sectors, to have a different degree of price rigidities. Compared with the state-owned 
sector, the private sector might react more flexible regarding the price. Hence, instead 
of incorporating the sticky price in the final good producers, a flexible price regime 
can be embedded into the private sector, while price stickiness can be included in the 
state sector. In the philosophy of scientific method, as Karl Popper (2005) states ‘the 
complex theories were the less probable ones’, which implies that the less complex 
the structure, the greater the likelihood of non-rejection. Therefore, in the future, I plan 
to begin with a partial equilibrium framework which would investigate the distortion 
impacts of a particular regulation and test with the Indirect Inference approach. Once 
the model passes the test, then I would gradually add components to the framework 
and develop a simple general framework (even simpler than my first model) that can 
still pass the test. Otherwise, the policy implications concluded by a rejected model 
are unconvincing. 
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